Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-723 (RMC).
January 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, and/or for a more definite statement filed variously by the Defendants herein. After examining the pleadings, the undisputed facts, and the applicable law, the Court will dismiss the complaint allegations against the Medical Society of New York and First Unum Life Insurance Company. The Court will grant summary judgment to Charles J. Sellers and Company, Inc. The Court will grant the motions of Continental Casualty Company and Hartford Life Group Insurance Company for a more definite statement.
I. Background
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has filed a lengthy complaint with numerous claims arising from a disability insurance policy obtained in the State of New York. Plaintiff is presently a resident of the District of Columbia. During the time frame of the conduct alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was a licensed physician using the name Michael John Mazzeo with offices in New York, New York. Complaint (Compl."), ¶ 17; Mtn. of Charles J. Sellers Company ("Sellers"), Affidavit of Thomas G. Sellers ("Sellers Aff."), ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that in 1995 he applied for long-term disability income insurance under a program sponsored by the Medical Society of the States of New York. Id., ¶ 6. He contends that a member of the Society assisted him in completing the insurance application, but did not provide him with detailed information because the representative was motivated to obtain a sale. Compl., ¶¶ 10, 13.
Defendant Sellers was an authorized agent for the insurance program, which until November 1, 1996 was underwritten by defendant First Unum Life Insurance Company ("First Unum"). Compl., ¶ 15; Sellers Aff, ¶ 6. On that date, Plaintiff's policies were cancelled by First Unum and transferred to Defendant Continental Casualty Company. Compl., ¶ 15; Sellers Aff, ¶ 8. Continental Casualty issued two long-term disability insurance policies for Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 10. The policies provided that in order to receive disability benefits, the insured must be continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his occupation and be under the regular care of a licensed physician. Id., ¶ 11. Mr. Sellers was the sales agent for the policies. Id., ¶ 12; Compl., ¶ 15.
On August 15, 1999, after being treated by Dr. Glenn Becker, Plaintiff filed a claim for long-term disability insurance benefits based on an injury he sustained to his right foot. Sellers Aff., ¶¶ 13-14. According to insurance company records, Dr. Becker stated that Plaintiff's activities were to be restricted for three months due to the injury. Id., ¶ 17. Plaintiff contends that his treatment by Dr. Becker and other physicians revealed that he had persistent and continual damage to the lower right extremity, and chronic pain, all of which required orthopedic surgery and constituted a continuing disability. Compl., ¶ 28.
Following receipt of Plaintiff's claim application, Continental Casualty requested that he provide statements of income from his medical practice and expense information. Sellers Aff., ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges the insurance company refused his request for additional time to provide the information. Compl., ¶ 25. On April 10, 2000, Continental Casualty denied Plaintiff's claim on the grounds that he did not provide the requested information and that the medical reports he did submit did not demonstrate an inability to return to full-time work. Sellers Aff., ¶ 18.
In May 2000, Plaintiff consulted with two specialists in orthopedic surgery, Drs. Koval and Paksima. Compl., ¶¶ 42-43. The doctors found a tenderness on a nerve in Plaintiff's right leg, including numbness, tingling, and pain in his right foot. Sellers Aff., Exhibits ("Exs.") 12 13. Plaintiff was able to walk on his tip toes and his heels. Id. The doctors recommended a number of approaches to the injury, including possible surgery in the future. Id.
The medical reports were submitted by Plaintiff in support of his review before Continental Casualty's Appeals Committee. Id., Ex. 13. On August 24, 2000, the Appeals Committee affirmed the initial denial of Plaintiff's claim. Id., Ex. 14. The Committee stated that the medical records did not indicate a continuing inability to perform the substantial and material duties of Plaintiff's practice as a neurologist. Id.
II. Standard of Review
Defendants have filed motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of a plaintiff. Taylor v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.3d 753, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). "Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
In considering whether there is a triable issue of fact, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Moreover, "any factual assertions in the movant's affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion." Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The mere existence of a factual dispute by itself, however, is not enough to bar summary judgment. The party opposing the motion must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. To be material, the fact must be capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation; to be genuine, the issue must be supported by admissible evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier-of-fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. See id.; Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
III. Analysis A. Defendant Medical Society of the State of New York
The Medical Society of the State of New York ("Medical Society") moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 34, 42 (D.D.C. 2003). In order to meet his burden, Plaintiff must allege specific facts on which personal jurisdiction can be based; he cannot rely on conclusory allegations. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot aggregate allegations concerning multiple defendants in order to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over any individual defendant. Id. In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the Court need not treat Plaintiff's allegations as true. Id. Rather, the Court may consider and weigh affidavits and other relevant matter in making the jurisdictional determination. Id.
The District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423, is the only basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be exercised over defendants who do not reside within or maintain a place of business in the District of Columbia. Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Robertson v. Merola, 895 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995). The District of Columbia long-arm statute provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over those who have (1) transacted business in the District of Columbia; (2) contracted to supply services in the District of Columbia; (3) caused a tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District; or (4) caused a tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District while regularly doing or soliciting business or engaging in any other persistent course of conduct in the District. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)-(4).
For there to be personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, Plaintiff must allege some specific facts evidencing purposeful activity by the Medical Society in the District of Columbia by which it invoked the benefits and protections of its laws and specific acts connecting it with the forum. See, e.g., Cellutech v. Centennial Cellular Corp., 871 F.Supp. 46, 48 (D.D.C. 1994). At the very least, Plaintiff must allege a tortious injury in the District of Columbia even if the act causing the injury took place elsewhere. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4). See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 53-54 (D.D.C. 1998).
The Medical Society is a non-profit organization of New York physicians whose principal place of business is in the State of New York. Medical Society's Mtn. to Dismiss, Affidavit of Matthew Talty ("Talty Aff."), ¶ 3. The Medical Society does not have any offices in the District of Columbia. Id., ¶ 5. None of the Medical Society's actions asserted by Plaintiff are alleged to have occurred in the District of Columbia. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that a tortious injury occurred in this jurisdiction. All of the factual averments by Plaintiff concern actions that took place solely in the State of New York. For these reasons, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Medical Society and the claims against it will be dismissed without prejudice.
B. Defendant Charles J. Sellers Company
Defendant Charles J. Sellers Company has filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Company contends that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
In cases based on diversity jurisdiction, federal courts are required to apply the choiceof-laws rules of the forum court. Ideal Electronic Sec. Co. v. Int'l Fidelity. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bradley v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution, 245 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2003). Therefore, in cases such as the present action, the District of Columbia statute of limitation applies. See Material Supply Intern., Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., Ltd., 146 F.3d 983, 991-92 (D.C. Cir. 1998); A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The District of Columbia has a three-year statute of limitations on insurance claims. See D.C. Code § 12-301(7)(2001); see also Partnership Placements, Inc. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 722 A.2d 837, 841 (D.C. 1998). An insurance action accrues when the insurer denies coverage. Saylab v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 271 F.Supp.2d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2003). It is undisputed in this case that Plaintiff applied for an insurance policy with Charles J. Sellers Company in 1996. Plaintiff made his disability claim in 1999. The claim was denied by Continental Casualty after appeal on August 24, 2000. This cause of action was filed by Plaintiff on May 3, 2004.
Assuming the most generous interpretation of the facts, Plaintiff's claim against Charles J. Sellers Company accrued on August 24, 2000. Plaintiff's complaint was filed over three years later. The claims against Charles J. Sellers Company, therefore, are time-barred and the Court will grant summary judgment in its favor.
Defendant First Unum Life Insurance Company
First Unum has filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, or for a more definite statement. The allegations in the complaint and First Unum's submitted affidavits establish that effective November 1, 1996, the long-term disability policy issued to Plaintiff by First Unum was cancelled and transferred to Continental Casualty, which thereafter issued a new policy. First Unum has no active policy with Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a claim to Continental Casualty and that his claim was denied. Plaintiff has made no allegation that First Unum was a party to this transaction. In the absence of facts establishing a basis for liability against First Unum, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Defendants Continental Casualty Company and Hartford Life Group Insurance Company
The remaining Defendants, Continental Casualty and Hartford Life Group Insurance Company ("Hartford"), have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. These Defendants have not provided a basis for dismissal of the complaint against them. However, their points regarding the complaint are well-taken. Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading." As these Defendants correctly assert, the complaint is lengthy, sometimes unintelligible, and contains extraneous and irrelevant allegations.
The Court has reviewed plaintiff's complaint under the more flexible standards applied to complaints filed by pro se litigants. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, as Plaintiff asserts and Defendants point out, Plaintiff is a well-educated person and a physician who has testified as an expert. While it is clear that the gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint is the Defendants' denial of long-term disability insurance, his complaint does not allow the Defendants to respond appropriately to each numbered paragraph. Therefore, according to the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will order Plaintiff to provide a "short and plain statement" of the facts that he believes support his claims against Continental and Hartford and the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The Court will grant the motions for a more definite statement and require Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
According to ¶ 17 of the Complaint and Grievance,
Since the plaintiff myself, Bruno Unum (also known as Michael Mazzeo) is a physician and has done postgraduate work at George Washington University Hospital, National Rehabilitation Center, New York Medical College, Westerchester [sic] County Medical Center, Metropolitan Hospital, Lincoln Hospital, Mount Vernon Hospital, Jersey City Medical Center, Methodist Hospital, Saint John's Episcopal Hospital, Peninsula General Hospital and three Health Authorities in the United Kingdom (Plymouth, Plymouth, England; Ashford in Surrey[;] Bedford in Bedfordshire.[)] Owned and operated five medical and surgical clinics and worked in about twenty-five clinic's [sic] in multiple S[t]ates throughout the United States and in different countries; The [sic] plaintiff myself Bruno Unum has also testified as an impartial expert witness in Supreme Court, Appellate Court, and Court of Appeals for civil and criminal cases. As well as Saint George's University School of Medicine, University of Buffalo, Roswell Park Memorial Cancer Research Center, University of Scranton, Marist College, Mount Saint Mary's College.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the claims against Defendant Medical Society of the State of New York will be dismissed without prejudice and summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants Charles J. Sellers Company and First Unum Life Insurance Company. The remaining defendants are Continental Casualty Company and Hartford Life Group Insurance Company. Plaintiff will be required to file an amended complaint solely against these two Defendants. The amended complaint must conform with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must be filed within 30 days of the date of this decision. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e).
A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.