University of Tn. v. Memphis Hosp. Col. Bldg., Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Wellesley Builders v. Village

    No. M2002-03102-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2004)

    Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (1993). The Association has cited one case for the proposition that the absence of corporate minutes does not necessarily mean that the corporation acted without authority, University of Tennessee v. Memphis Hospital College Building Co., 6 Tenn. App. 131 (1927). While this may be correct, the cited case also says, "[t]he absence of authority on the minutes does not disprove authority, it is merely negative and proves nothing."

  2. McBride v. Allison

    No. E2024-00037-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2024)

    However, a "[c]hange in value is not [a] sufficient ground for denying specific performance." Brister v. Brubaker's Est., 336 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960) (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Memphis Hosp. Coll. Bldg. Co., 6 Tenn.App. 131 (1927); Smith's Heirs v. Christmas, 15 Tenn. 565 (1835); Rogers v. Roop, 92 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935); 49 Am.Jur.-Specific Performance,-Sec. 64, p. 78). Moreover, the parties freely entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement, which expressly entitles Buyer to an award of specific performance in the event of Seller's breach. "This Court must enforce the plain terms of the contract as written, even if doing so leads to a result that seems harsh or unjust."

  3. Brister v. Brubaker Estate

    47 Tenn. App. 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960)   Cited 28 times
    Reversing trial court's refusal of award of specific performance in case involving contract for sale of land

    Change in value is not sufficient ground for denying specific performance. University of Tennessee v. Memphis Hospital College Building Company, 6 Tenn. App. 131; Smith's Heirs v. Christmas, 15 Tenn. 565; Rogers v. Roop, 19 Tenn. App. 579, 92 S.W.2d 423; 49 Am. Jur. — Specific Performance, — Sec. 64, p. 78. With reference to the Chancellor's holding that laches on the part of complainant entitles defendants in the instant case to have complainant's bill dismissed, we think the delay in the instant case was not unreasonably long. Only a little more than a year's time had elapsed between the date of the contract and C.B. Brubaker's death, on November 1, 1956, and only a little more than two years thereafter, the present suit was filed. It appears, also, that a previous suit, which for some reason had been dismissed without prejudice, so as to permit the filing of the present suit, was filed August 1, 1957, which was less than a year after C.B. Brubaker's death. Besides, the determinative test as to laches, which may be available as a successful defense, is not the length of time that has elapsed, but whether, because of such lapse of time, the

  4. Bean v. Commercial Securities Co.

    156 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941)   Cited 11 times

    " It seems that this section applies only to sales of all the corporation's property and not to sales of part of it. University of Tennessee v. Memphis Hospital College Bldg. Co., 6 Tenn. App. 131. It will thus be seen that the sale of all the corporation's assets may not be had unless it is authorized by an affirmative vote of a majority of the stockholders of record. It will also be observed that this section does not prohibit the sale, lease, or exchange of some of the corporate property and assets, if such disposition of the assets does not substantially limit the corporate business.