We reverse. An operator of a motor vehicle traveling with the right-of-way has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles (seeRichardson v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 173 A.D.3d 1083, 1085, 104 N.Y.S.3d 655 ; Shvydkaya v. Park Ave. BMW Acura Motor Corp., 172 A.D.3d 1130, 1131, 100 N.Y.S.3d 320 ; Fried v. Misser, 115 A.D.3d 910, 982 N.Y.S.2d 574 ). Since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant moving for summary judgment is required to make a prima facie showing that he or she is free from fault (seeBoulos v. Lerner–Harrington, 124 A.D.3d 709, 2 N.Y.S.3d 526 ; Fried v. Misser, 115 A.D.3d at 911, 982 N.Y.S.2d 574 ).

Further, "an operator of a motor vehicle traveling with the right-of-way has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles" (Fried v Misser, 115 AD3d 910, 910 [2d Dept 2014], citing Allen v Echols, 88 AD3d 926 , 926 [2d Dept 2011]; Pollack v Margolin, 84 AD3d 1341, 1342 [2d Dept 2011]; Bonilla v Calabria, 80 AD3d 720, 720 [2d Dept 2011]; Todd v Godek, 71 AD3d 872, 872 [2d Dept 2010]). "A driver who has the right-of-way may still be found partially.

In this case, the evidence submitted in support of the defendant's motion, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Boulos v Lerner-Harrington, 124 A.D.3d 709), failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendant was free from fault in the happening of the accident. The defendant's submissions did not eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether she was negligent in failing to see that which through the proper use of her senses she should have seen and whether she used reasonable care to avoid colliding with the plaintiff (see Fried v Misser, 115 A.D.3d 910, 911; Espiritu v Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789).

In opposition, the plaintiff submitted, among other things, his own affidavit, in which he gave a completely different version of the events preceding the accident. The plaintiff's evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver, who was obligated to keep a proper lookout, see what was there to be seen through the reasonable use of his senses, and avoid colliding with other vehicles (see Nesbitt v Gallant, 149 A.D.3d 763, 763-764; Fried v Misser, 115 A.D.3d 910, 911), was indeed at fault in the happening of the accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative negligence as a matter of law (seeInesta v. Florio, 159 A.D.3d 682, 71 N.Y.S.3d 161 ; Colpan v. Allied Cent. Ambulette, Inc., 97 A.D.3d 776, 777, 949 N.Y.S.2d 124 ; Pollack v. Margolin, 84 A.D.3d 1341, 924 N.Y.S.2d 282 ). "In order for a defendant driver to establish entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability in a motor vehicle collision case, the driver must demonstrate, prima facie, inter alia, that he or she kept the proper lookout, or that his or her alleged negligence, if any, did not contribute to the accident" ( Ellis v. Vazquez, 155 A.D.3d 694, 695, 63 N.Y.S.3d 530 ; seeFried v. Misser, 115 A.D.3d 910, 911, 982 N.Y.S.2d 574 ; Brandt v. Zahner, 110 A.D.3d at 753, 974 N.Y.S.2d 482 ; Topalis v. Zwolski, 76 A.D.3d 524, 525, 906 N.Y.S.2d 317 ). The issue of comparative fault is generally a question for the trier of fact (see CPLR 1411 ; Inesta v. Florio, 159 A.D.3d 682, 71 N.Y.S.3d 161 ; Gezelter v. Pecora, 129 A.D.3d 1021, 1022, 13 N.Y.S.3d 141 ; Colpan v. Allied Cent. Ambulette, Inc., 97 A.D.3d at 777, 949 N.Y.S.2d 124 ; Allen v. Echols, 88 A.D.3d 926, 927, 931 N.Y.S.2d 402 ).

"A violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence as a matter of law" (Adobea v Junel, 114 AD3d at 819). However, "[s]ince there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a movant seeking summary judgment is required to make a prima facie showing that he or she is free from comparative fault" (Fried v Misser, 115 AD3d 910, 911; see Regans v Baratta, 106 AD3d 893, 894).

The issue of comparative fault is generally a question for the jury to decide (see Berish v Vasquez, 121 AD3d 634; Bullock v Calabretta, 119 AD3d 884; Bonilla v Calabria, 80 AD3d 720). Thus, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the proponent of a motion for summary judgment has the burden of establishing, prima facie, his or her freedom from comparative fault (see Calderon-Scotti v Rosenstein, 119 AD3d 722; Fried v Misser, 115 AD3d 910; Pollack v Margolin, 84 AD3d 1341, 1342). Here, the plaintiff did not demonstrate, prima facie, that he was free from comparative fault with respect to the happening of the accident (see Regans v Baratta, 106 AD3d 893, 894; Ayala v Jasons Towing, Inc., 105 AD3d 689, 689; Cox v Nunez, 23 AD3d at 427).

In opposition, the plaintiff submitted, among other things, his own affidavit, in which he gave a completely different version of the events preceding the accident. The plaintiffs evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver, who was obligated to keep a proper lookout, see what was there to be seen through the reasonable use of his senses, and avoid colliding with other vehicles (see Nesbitt v Gallant, 149 A.D.3d 763, 763-764 [2017]; Fried v Misser, 115 A.D.3d 910, 911 [2014]), was indeed at fault in the happening of the accident. Hassanv. Brauns Express, Inc., 209 A.D.3d 631,632-33,174 N.Y.S.3d860 [2dDept2022].

if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident. Although a driver with the right-of-way...has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid a collision... a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision." (See Jeong Sook Lee-Son v Doe, 170 A.D.3d 973 [2d Dept 2019]; see also Adobea v Junel, 114 A.D.3d 818 [2d Dept 2014]; see also Fried v Misser, 115 A.D.3d 910 [2d Dept 2014].) Here, Kantor established that Alyeshmerni violated sections 1128(a), 1143 and 1173 and that he had the right of way and that Alyeshmerni failed to yield the right of way and that Alyeshmerni was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Moreover, Alyeshmerni admitted at the deposition that she could not see Kantor's vehicle prior to the collision, and the defendant driver admitted that she hit Kantor's vehicle while attempting to come out of her driveway

Adobea v. Junel, 114 A.D.3d 818 [2nd Dept. 2014], An operator of a motor vehicle traveling with the right-of-way has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles. Fried v. Misser, 115 A.D3d 910 [2nd Dept. 2014]. Thus, a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident.