Opinion
2:20-cr-311
09-14-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. XIAODONG ZHANG, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
J. NICHOLAS RANJAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Defendant Xiaodong Zhang moves to suppress statements he made when USPS agents executed a search warrant at his home on November 17, 2016. He argues that he was subject to custodial interrogation, despite asking for a lawyer and notifying the agents of his difficulties with English. After carefully considering the parties' arguments and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion.
No party asked for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. From the Court's review of the parties' briefs, the material facts at issue are not disputed, and so a hearing is unnecessary. United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2010).
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
At the outset, Miranda rights apply only when a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). A person is in custody when “there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (cleaned up). The key question, then, is whether under the circumstances “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 100 (1995). Relevant factors that this Court must consider include: (1) whether the officers told the suspect he was under arrest or free to leave; (2) the location or physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the length of the interrogation; (4) whether the officers used coercive tactics such as hostile tones of voice, display of weapons, or physical restraint of the suspect's movement; and (5) whether the suspect voluntarily submitted to questioning. United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2006).
Here, based on an analysis of the relevant factors, Mr. Zhang was not in custody during the search. He was in his own home, which the Supreme Court has found is typically not a coercive setting. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 44950 (1966). Though he was not free to move around the search area, he does not contend that he was placed under arrest or restrained, or that the postal agents used any other coercive methods. Moreover, the government reports that agents informed him he was free to leave, and Mr. Zhang does not dispute that account. Compare ECF 64, p. 5 n.2 with ECF 65. There is also nothing suggesting that the length of the interrogation was unduly long. Because Mr. Zhang was not in custody, nothing he said before asking for a lawyer is subject to suppression. See ECF 64, p. 2.
Nevertheless, Mr. Zhang asked for counsel because of his limited English proficiency. ECF 61, p. 1 n.1; ECF 64, pp. 2-3. When he did so, law enforcement stopped questioning him. ECF 61, p. 3. But after about an hour, as the agents were leaving his home, it was Mr. Zhang who began the interaction leading to his incriminating statements. Id. at p. 1. Accordingly, the agents were permitted to resume speaking with him. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that “an accused shaving expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police”); United States v. Rought, 11 F.4th 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2021) (“If the suspect, without prompting from law enforcement, then voluntarily reinitiates discussion.it is quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment for [his] statements about a covered topic to be admissible at trial.” (cleaned up)).
Further, Mr. Zhang's initial comment dealt with the investigation and its effects, thereby waiving his right to have counsel at that time. See Rought, 11 F.4th at 187 (“Initiation and waiver are distinct analytical steps; initiation by itself is not adequate to find a waiver.”). Specifically, Mr. Zhang asked “whether he can still mail out his parcels” and “no fake one?” ECF 61, p. 2. These statements tied directly to Mr. Zhang's alleged crime of mail fraud. United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085 (3d Cir. 1989) (“an initiation occurs when a suspect initiates a conversation ‘evincing a willingness and a desire for generalized discussion about the investigation.'” (adopting the plurality test from Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983) (finding waiver where suspect asked, “what is going to happen to me now?”))). And he did so of his own accord. Rought, 11 F.4th at 189 (“[I]t is important for the suspect to bring the covered topic back up without undue prompting from law enforcement.”).
Finally, Mr. Zhang contends that a language barrier prevented him from fully understanding what was happening and the rights available to him, effectively rendering his statements involuntary. ECF 61, p. 3. But because he initiated the conversation at issue, and because there is no evidence of law enforcement coercion, his argument fails. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause[.]”). There is simply no evidence that his “will was overborne” when he spoke to the agents. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 304 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604 (3d Cir. 1986)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Zhang's motion to suppress his statements is DENIED. However, this is without prejudice to Mr. Zhang raising any concerns with the statements on evidentiary grounds as part of a motion in limine, or otherwise arguing over the weight of this evidence at trial.