Opinion
CRIMINAL NO. 22-351 (RAM)
2022-12-28
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Y.Y.O.U., a Male Juvenile, Defendant.
Attorney(s) for Plaintiffs (AUSA): Jeanette M. Collazo-Ortiz, Jonathan L. Gottfried. Attorney(s) for Defendants (FPD): Eric Vos, Jessica Earl. Attorney(s) for Interested Party, Department of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Rafael B. Fernandez Castaner.
Attorney(s) for Plaintiffs (AUSA): Jeanette M. Collazo-Ortiz, Jonathan L. Gottfried. Attorney(s) for Defendants (FPD): Eric Vos, Jessica Earl. Attorney(s) for Interested Party, Department of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Rafael B. Fernandez Castaner. OPINION AND ORDER RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is the Department of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's (the "PRDOJ") Motion for Reconsideration of Orders (the "Motion"). (Docket No. 32). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2022, the United States of America (the "USDOJ") filed a juvenile information charging the defendant Y.Y.O.U. ("Defendant") with three violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Carjacking) and three violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Using, Carrying, and Brandishing a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence). (Docket No. 3). The USDOJ then moved to transfer Defendant to adult criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032. (Docket No. 6).
18 U.S.C. § 5032 requires the Court to consider and make findings regarding six factors when assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. To prepare for a transfer hearing in which it would carry the burden of proof, the USDOJ moved to compel disclosure of Defendant's records from several local agencies, including the Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Assistant Secretariat for Juveniles and Family. (Docket No. 12). The USDOJ also moved to compel the disclosure of certain records concerning L.J.Z.C., another juvenile connected with Defendant's case. (Docket No. 21). This Court reviewed the USDOJ's motions and ordered the PRDOJ to provide all juvenile records, including Defendant's and L.J.Z.C.'s complete case files and any of Defendant's social or mental reports, or the negative certification of the existence of any record of [Defendant and L.J.Z.C.], to the USDOJ. (Docket Nos. 15 and 23).
Following receipt of these orders, the PRDOJ filed the pending Motion, seeking to quash the subpoenas issued by the Court. (Docket No. 32). The PRDOJ contends that "[t]he Commonwealth is precluded by law from complying with the sealed orders, because the Puerto Rico Minors Act forbids it." (Docket No. 32 at 4). The USDOJ filed an opposition to the Motion in which it argued that "the Supremacy Clause disposes of the argument that the Puerto Rico Minors' Act supports the quashing of the Court's order." (Docket No. 36 at 7). The PRDOJ subsequently filed a reply, and the USDOJ answered with a sur-reply. (Docket Nos. 52 and 54).
All of the other agencies that were subpoenaed, except the PRDOJ, complied with this Court's orders. (Docket No. 36 at 3).
The Motion also seemed to raise several other issues with the subpoenas, but the PRDOJ later clarified that the Motion is predicated on its perceived inability to simultaneously comply with the subpoenas and the Puerto Rico Minors' Act. (Docket No. 52 at 8-10).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A federal district court has jurisdiction over a juvenile if "the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that . . . the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony . . . and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Once a district court has jurisdiction, "[a] juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a felony that is a crime of violence, may be proceeded against as an adult by means of a transfer to adult court if the district court determines that it would be 'in the interest of justice' to do so." United States v. Male Juv. E.L.C., 396 F.3d 458, 461 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5032). In determining whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice, a district court must consider and make findings with respect to each of the following six factors:
[1] the age and social background of the juvenile, [2] the nature of the alleged offense; [3] the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; [4] the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; [5] the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; [6] the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.18 U.S.C. § 5032. "There is a presumption in favor of juvenile adjudication and, therefore, the burden is on the government to establish that transfer to adult status is warranted." Male Juv. E.L.C., 396 F.3d at 461.
B. The Puerto Rico Minors' Act
The Puerto Rico Minors' Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34, § 2237, governs, among other things, the confidentiality of the records in cases brought against minors. The Act provides, in relevant part:
The records in the cases of minors shall be kept in files separated from the records of adults and shall not be subject to inspection by the public, except that they will be accessible for inspection by the minor's legal counsel after being duly identified and in the place designated for it. Those records in the custody of the police as well as those in the custody of the Prosecutor shall be subject to the same confidentiality. No copies of legal or social documents shall be furnished to be removed from the court.Id. § 2237(d) (emphasis added).
No information shall be furnished as to the contents of the records, except that, after showing the need for it and with the court's express permission, said information shall be provided to the officers of the General Court of Justice in their official duties and to those persons of renowned professional or scientific reputation who have demonstrated in writing their interest in obtaining information in order to carry out their official duties, research or work and always subject to the conditions stipulated by the judge.
The term "court" is defined in the statute as the "Court of First Instance, Part that executes its authority pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 2203(u). A "judge" as used in the statute is "[t]he person designated to take cognizance in the matters within the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 2203(n).
C. Conflict Preemption
The federal preemption doctrine is "rooted in the Supremacy Clause," which states that " 'the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' " SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). A federal statute may preempt a state regulatory scheme in three ways. Id. at 530-31. Relevant here is what is known as conflict preemption. Conflict preemption "may occur when compliance with both state and federal statutes and regulations is a physical impossibility, or when compliance with the state statute would frustrate the purposes of the federal scheme." Id. at 531 (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Puerto Rico Minors' Act Frustrates the Purpose of, And Is Thus Preempted By, 18 U.S.C. § 5032
1. The Puerto Rico Minors' Act Prevents Federal District Courts from Adequately Considering the Six Relevant Factors in 18 U.S.C. § 5032
When analyzed in light of the laws and principles laid out above, it is clear that the confidentiality provisions of the Puerto Rico Minors' Act frustrate the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 5032, a federal statute. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 requires a court, in determining whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice, to consider and make findings with respect to six factors. The statute also creates a "presumption in favor of juvenile adjudication" and thus, places the burden on the USDOJ "to establish that transfer to adult status is warranted." Male Juv. E.L.C., 396 F.3d at 461. Therefore, when this Court oversees the transfer hearing currently scheduled for January 25, 2023, it will expect the USDOJ to present evidence regarding each of the six factors listed in the statute. (Docket No. 56). The USDOJ premised its motions to compel on the need to present such evidence, and the Court issued the subpoenas to allow the USDOJ to do so. This includes evidence showing "the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record" and records that will allow the USDOJ's expert to determine "the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity." 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The Puerto Rico Minors' Act substantially increases the difficulty of obtaining these records, and thus undoubtedly frustrates the purpose of the federal statute.
The Court is persuaded by analogous cases in which federal courts have held that the federal Sentencing Guidelines preempt state confidentiality statutes that make it difficult to obtain and consider pertinent sentencing information. For example, in United States v. Daniels, a defendant contended his federal sentence was improper because the district court considered two state juvenile adjudications when computing his criminal history category that were confidential under New York law. 929 F.2d 128, 129 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, stating that, "[e]ven if the juvenile proceedings had been sealed pursuant to state law, that law could not bar consideration of them by a federal court in determining a sentence" because "Section 4A1.2(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines expressly permits sentencing courts to consider juvenile adjudications . . . and thus the Sentencing Guidelines must be given force over any conflicting state law." Id. at 130. Similarly, in United States v. Carney, the district court considered the defendant's prior juvenile convictions at sentencing despite the fact that "Oklahoma law generally provides that records of juvenile delinquency are confidential and not to be disclosed." 106 F.3d 315, 317 (10th Cir. 1997). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that even if Oklahoma law barred federal courts from using juvenile court records for adult sentencing purposes, "it is clear that Oklahoma law could not bar consideration of [the] state juvenile court records by a federal court in determining a sentence, when federal law provides otherwise." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
The First Circuit has also relied on the reasoning in Daniels when discussing the interplay between state sealing statutes and the federal Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Dobovsky, 279 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 2002).
In the case at bar, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 not only permits this Court to consider evidence of the extent and nature of Defendant's prior delinquency record and Defendant's present intellectual development and psychological maturity, it requires consideration of such evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the Puerto Rico Minors' Act cannot bar consideration of Defendant's juvenile records currently being held by the PRDOJ when federal law commands otherwise. As the party with the burden of proof at this stage, the USDOJ must be given access to these records so that it may present them to the Court at the transfer hearing.
2. Referring This Matter to a State Judge Would Similarly Frustrate the Purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 5032
Additionally, the Court must discuss the provisions in the Puerto Rico Minors' Act that suggest only a state court may order the release of the records at issue here. The Act states that any information "as to the contents of the records" shall only be furnished "with the court's express permission" and that the provision of such records is "always subject to the conditions stipulated by the judge." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34 § 2237(d). As noted above, "court" is expressly defined as the "Court of First Instance, Part that executes its authority pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 2203(u). The Act therefore suggests that the proper course of action would be for this Court to refer this issue to a state judge.
To that end, the PRDOJ identified two cases in which "other district courts have declined to issue orders requiring the disclosure of juvenile files that are classified as confidential under state laws." (Docket No. 52 at 7) (citing United States v. Pretlow, 770 F. Supp. 239 (D.N.J. 1991); Knight v. McDaniel, 2001 WL 87436 (N.D. Okla. 2001)). In both of those cases, the district court determined it lacked authority to order the release of the records at issue pursuant to a state confidentiality statute, and thus urged the parties to seek the requested relief before the relevant state court. See Pretlow, 770 F. Supp. at 244 ("I believe the principles of federalism and comity demand that this court refrain from ordering the release of Pretlow's records and, instead, allow the Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Part the opportunity to do so."); Knight, 2001 WL 87436, at *1 (denying the Motion for Disclosure of Confidential Records and urging the defendants "to pursue their argument before the appropriate state court").
However, despite the Act's language and the cases cited by the PRDOJ, the Court finds that simply referring this matter to a state judge similarly frustrates the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 5032, and thus does not avoid the preemption issue. As laid out above, the USDOJ and this Court undoubtedly need to access the relevant PRDOJ records to consider and make findings as to each of the six factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Therefore, this Court cannot let a state court determine whether it can access such documents. If the parties litigated this dispute in state court, and the state judge denied the USDOJ's motion to compel, this Court would be left without the crucial information it needs to conduct a proper transfer analysis. Any intervention by this Court at that time to aid the USDOJ in securing the records would risk violating, at the very least, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Thus, merely referring the parties to state court leaves open the possibility that this Court would be left without sufficient records to determine if a transfer to adult court is warranted, and with no recourse to obtain them. That prospect would undoubtedly frustrate the express directive from Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 5032 for district courts to consider and make findings regarding all six factors.
"[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over 'cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Palange v. Forte, 2022 WL 2359627, at *1 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)).
B. The Court Will Not Quash Either Subpoena
Having determined that the confidentiality provision of the Puerto Rico Minors' Act is void where it conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 5032, the Court must determine whether to nevertheless quash its previously issued subpoenas. As district courts around the country have recognized, "[w]hile a federal court . . . may enforce a subpoena even in contravention of state law, it should not do so in all circumstances," including when "the government fail[s] to demonstrate that the records [are] sufficiently relevant and necessary to trump the state's interest in protecting the[ir] confidentiality[.]" United States v. Harrill, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1376 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (citation omitted).
Upon reconsideration, the Court will not quash either subpoena. The USDOJ articulated why the documents in Defendant's and L.J.Z.C.'s files are relevant to the transfer analysis. (Docket No. 54 at 5-6). Additionally, the First Circuit has made clear that "section 5032's requirement that mentation be given to all six named transfer factors[ ] does not preclude the district court from considering other unnamed factors that are relevant to the determination of whether the juvenile's transfer would be in 'the interest of justice.' " Male Juv. E.L.C., 396 F.3d at 462. Therefore, as the party with the burden of proof, the USDOJ needs access to both juveniles' files to determine precisely which records to present at the transfer hearing. The requests are not overly broad and do not constitute an impermissible fishing expedition. The Court finds that the requested files are "sufficiently relevant and necessary to trump the state's interest in protecting the[ir] confidentiality[.]" Harrill, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 1376.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion at Docket No. 32 is DENIED. The PRDOJ shall comply with this Court's orders at Docket Nos. 15 and 23.
IT IS SO ORDERED.