Opinion
KEVIN V. RYAN United States Attorney MARK KROTOSKI Chief, Criminal Division DEREK R. OWENS Special Assistant United States Attorney
CATHERINE BLOOM Law Clerk San Francisco, California Attorneys for Plaintiff
STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED]
EDWARD M. CHEN, Magistrate Judge
On December 6, 2006, the parties in this case appeared before the Court and stipulated that time should be excluded from the Speedy Trial Act calculations from December 6, 2006 to February 7, 2007 for effective preparation of counsel, in that defense counsel required adequate time to supply the United States with information that may impact the outcome of the case and that the United States required adequate time to evaluate the information. The parties represented that granting the continuance was the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of both Stipulation and [Proposed] Order defense counsel and the United States, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv). The parties also agreed that the ends of justice served by granting such a continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).
SO STIPULATED:
As the Court found on December 6, 2006, and for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and that time should be excluded from the Speedy Trial Act calculations from December 6, 2006 to February 7, 2007 for effective preparation of defense counsel and the United States. See 18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(8)(A). The failure to grant the requested continuance would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and continuity of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would result in a miscarriage of justice. See 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8)(B)(iv).
SO ORDERED.