Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
The United States of America, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, and defendants Dustin Wilson and Michelle Troung, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, hereby agree and stipulate to the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 19, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 27, 2014, and to exclude time between December 19, 2013, and March 27, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 1400 pages of discovery consisting of investigative reports and bank and financial records. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) On October 11, 2013, the undersigned counsel for Michelle Troung substituted in as counsel of record. Counsel for defendant Troung desires additional time to review discovery, to consult with his client and conduct research, and discuss potential resolution with his client. Counsel for defendant Wilson needs additional time to review discovery and discuss potential resolution with his client.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
PATRICK SWILLINGER, ESQ., Counsel for Defendant, Dustin Wilson.
PAUL DENNISON, ESQ., Counsel for Defendant, Michelle Troung.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance although it reserves the right to request a trial date be set at the next proposed hearing date.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 19, 2013 to March 27, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.