Opinion
No. 2:17-cr-20002-5
2020-04-30
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Cortney WILLIAMS, Defendant.
Samuel Robert Stringfellow, US Attorney's Office, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.
Samuel Robert Stringfellow, US Attorney's Office, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.
ORDER
SAMUEL H. MAYS, Jr., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Cortney Williams' pro se Motion for Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence (the "Motion"). (ECF Nos. 758, 759.) The government responded on April 20, 2020. (ECF No. 760.) For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
I. Background
In March 2017, Williams was indicted for various crimes based on his involvement in a drug trafficking organization. (See generally ECF No. 28.) In October 2018, Williams pled guilty to two counts of a Superseding Indictment. (ECF Nos. 474-76.) In January 2019, the Court sentenced Williams to 46 months in prison on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. (ECF Nos. 562-564.) Williams' anticipated release date is August 31, 2020. See BOP Inmate Locator at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/In.
On April 10, 2020, Williams sent the Court a pro se motion for "Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 758.) Williams argues that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes an "extraordinary and compelling circumstance[ ]" warranting his early release from prison. (Id. at 1-2.) He argues that the institution where he is located "can not assure the safety of [his] health and life," that the facility "places a substantial risk due to the tight space in crowded conditions," and that "social distancing can not be accomplished." (Id. at 1.) He says that he, "like most individuals would not like to test [his] body, life or health against the virus ...." (Id. ) On April 15, 2020, Williams supplemented his Motion, informing the Court that his facility has had "42 confirmed [COVID-19] cases and increasing," and asked the Court to allow him "to proceed without exhaustion." (ECF No. 759 at 1.) On April 20, 2020, the government filed a response to Williams' Motion, arguing that the Court does not have the authority to consider it because Williams has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 760.)
II. Standard of Review
A sentencing court does not have inherent authority to modify an otherwise valid sentence. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). The authority to resentence a defendant is limited by statute. United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2001) ). Eighteen U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a court to modify a term of imprisonment where "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [modification]." Motions under that section have been called "motions for compassionate release." United States v. McCann, No. 13-cr-52, 2020 WL 1901089, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2020). "The compassionate release provisions were ... intended to be a ‘safety valve’ to reduce a sentence in the ‘unusual case in which the defendant's circumstances are so changed, such as by terminal illness, that it would be inequitable to continue the confinement of the prisoner.’ " United States v. Ebbers, 432 F.Supp.3d 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing S. Rep. 98-225, at 121 (1983)).
In the First Step Act of 2018 (the "First Step Act"), Pub L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a prisoner to file a motion for compassionate release on his own behalf. Before the First Step Act, a motion for compassionate release could be brought only by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (the "BOP"). United States v. York, Nos. 3:11-cr-76, 3:12-cr-145, 2019 WL 3241166, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2017) ). The First Step Act modified § 3582(c)(1)(A) with the intent of "increasing the use and transparency of compassionate release." Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (capitalization omitted); see also Ebbers, 432 F.Supp.3d at 427.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) now provides that:
[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment ... after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that --
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ...
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....
Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission, "in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, [to] describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples." 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). In the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (the "U.S.S.G."), the Sentencing Commission has published a policy statement addressing the standards for compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (the "Policy Statement"). That Policy Statement reiterates that a court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction" and "after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable." Id. The Policy Statement also directs courts to determine that "the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community," before reducing a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id.
The Application Notes to the Policy Statement describe four categories of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that may justify compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) : (A) the medical condition of the defendant; (B) the age of the defendant; (C) family circumstances; and (D) other reasons. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)-(D). Relevant here, the "other reasons" category allows compassionate release if, "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists ... an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C)." Id. The Application Notes to the Policy Statement do not give examples or provide more guidance for what may qualify in this "other" category.
Some courts have interpreted the "[a]s determined by the Director of the [BOP]" language to mean the criteria detailed in the BOP's Program Statement 5050.50, which states slightly different criteria than 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(a) and the Application Notes. See United States v. Hansen, 2020 WL 1703672, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020). However, that language is "at least partly anachronistic because it has not yet been updated to reflect the new procedural innovations of the First Step Act." Ebbers, 432 F.Supp.3d at 427 & n.6. The "Director's prior ‘interpretation of ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons is informative,’ but not dispositive." United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 451 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (citation omitted).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires a defendant to "first exhaust [his] administrative remedies [with the BOP] before seeking judicial relief." United States v. Koch, No. 01-cr-083, 2019 WL 3837727, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2019). A defendant may exhaust his administrative remedies in one of two ways: (1) by exhausting his "administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf," or (2) upon "the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; see York, 2019 WL 3241166, at *5 ("Other district courts have recognized that the language of § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, requires the defendant to file an administrative request with the BOP ‘and then either exhaust administrative appeals or wait thirty days after submitting his request to the BOP.’ ") (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Heromin, No. 11-cr-550, 2019 WL 2411311, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2019) ). The defendant bears the burden of showing he has exhausted his administrative remedies and is entitled to compassionate release. See Ebbers, 432 F.Supp.3d at 426 (citing United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992) ). III. Analysis
Williams moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 79.) He asks the Court for "immediate release or home confinement" at his sister's house. (Id. at 2.) The Court does not have authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to place a prisoner in home confinement. See Miller v. United States, No. 16-cr-20222, 453 F.Supp.3d 1062, 1064-65 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2020) (collecting cases). Therefore, the Court construes Williams' Motion as a request for immediate release.
Before moving for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a defendant must ask the BOP to file a motion for compassionate release on his behalf, and then "fully exhaust[ ] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf" or wait until "30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility" have elapsed. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Williams asks the Court to allow him "to proceed without exhaustion." (ECF No. 759 at 1.) The government argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s administrative exhaustion requirement is "jurisdictional" and that the Court "lacks authority to act on [Williams' Motion] at this time." (ECF No. 760 at 2-4.) Alternatively, the government argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s administrative exhaustion requirement is a "mandatory claim-processing rule" that must be enforced if the government raises it. (Id. at 3-6.)
Exhaustion is at issue in two different contexts: when it is jurisdictionally prescribed or when it is mandated by a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. See United States v. Ogarro, No. 18-cr-373-9, 2020 WL 1876300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020). Jurisdictional prescriptions govern a court's adjudicatory authority (e.g., subject matter jurisdiction). See Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848, 204 L.Ed.2d 116 (2019). If jurisdictional prescriptions are not satisfied, a court does not have authority to entertain any of the substantive matters of the relevant claim (e.g., if a party's claim does not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal-court diversity jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss (or remand) the case). See id.; see also Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017) ("Failure to comply with a jurisdictional time prescription, we have maintained, deprives a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal -- a ‘drastic’ result.") (citations omitted). Jurisdictional prescriptions are "not subject to waiver or forfeiture." Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17 ; Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012). A prescription may be jurisdictional in two ways: (1) when Congress expressly makes the prescription jurisdictional by incorporating it into a jurisdictional provision, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 ... and is between (1) citizens of different States ...."); or (2) "when a long line of Supreme Court decisions left undisturbed by Congress attached a jurisdictional label to the prescription." Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1849. (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); see also Thaler, 565 U.S. at 141–42 & 142 n.3, 132 S.Ct. 641.
If a prescription is not jurisdictional, it is a "nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule." Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1849. Nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules "seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Id. (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) ). "A claim-processing rule may be mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party properly raises it. But an objection based on a mandatory claim-processing rule may be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam)); see also Manrique v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1272, 197 L.Ed.2d 599 (2017). Although it is clear that mandatory claim-processing rules maybe be forfeited, the Supreme Court has continually "reserved [the question of] whether mandatory claim-processing rules may ever be subject to equitable exceptions." Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1849 n.5 (alteration omitted) (quoting Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18, n.3 ). If a prescription is jurisdictional, it may not be waived or forfeited. Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17. If a prescription is nonjurisdictional, a "mandatory" claim-processing rule, it may be forfeited if not timely raised. Otherwise it is "unalterable." See Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1272.
The Supreme Court has never fashioned a definition or test for the difference between a mandatory and a nonmandatory claim-processing rule.
Considering administrative exhaustion, the Supreme Court has held that, when a statute creates a "mandatory exhaustion regime," judicial discretion is foreclosed and "a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust ...." Ross v. Blake, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856-58, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016). A statute creates a "mandatory exhaustion regime" when its "text suggests no limits on a[ ] [plaintiff's] obligation to exhaust ...." See id. at 1856. In Ross, the Supreme Court distinguished statutorily-mandated exhaustion regimes from judge-made exhaustion doctrines. See id. at 1857. The former are "mandatory" and are not subject to any "excuse[s]." The latter are "amenable to judge-made exceptions." See id. at 1857-58 ("No doubt, judge-made exhaustion doctrines, even if flatly stated at first, remain amenable to judge-made exceptions."); see also United States v. Woodson, No. 18-cr-845, 452 F.Supp.3d 31, 34-35 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) ("[S]tatutory exhaustion requirements are mandatory, while the judicial (common-law) exhaustion doctrine is discretionary and includes a number of exceptions.").
There are two possible ways to reconcile Ross with the Supreme Court's distinction between jurisdictional prescriptions and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules. One is to read Ross as deciding that statutorily-mandated exhaustion regimes are mandatory claim-processing rules that must be strictly enforced and are not subject to exceptions. See id. at 1856 ; see also Ogarro, 2020 WL 1876300, at *2. That reading requires the caveat that, if they are not timely raised, they do not have to be strictly enforced and may be forfeited. See Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 16 ("[A] mandatory claim-processing rule [is] subject to forfeiture if not properly raised by the appellee."). Under this reading, judge-made exhaustion regimes are nonmandatory claim-processing rules that are subject to waiver and other judicially-created exceptions. See Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856.
The second way to reconcile Ross is to read it as implicitly holding that statutorily-mandated exhaustion regimes are jurisdictional prescriptions. Ross's holding that judicial discretion is foreclosed under statutorily-mandated exhaustion regimes, 136 S. Ct. at 1856-58, would thus conform with the rule that jurisdictional prescriptions cannot be waived or forfeited, Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17. But see Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1862-63 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (reiterating his argument that statutory-mandated administrative exhaustion regimes are subject to "well-established exceptions to exhaustion") (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)). Under this reading, judge-made exhaustion regimes are nonmandatory claim-processing rules and are subject to judicially-created exceptions.
There is arguably a third way to read Ross. Under that reading, administrative exhaustion regimes, and the rules governing statutory-mandated and judge-made exhaustion regimes, are distinct from the jurisdictional prescription and mandatory claim-processing rule dichotomy. See United States v. Johnson, No. 14-cr-0441,451 F.Supp.3d 436, 440-44 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2020).
Eighteen U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s administrative exhaustion regime is clearly a "mandatory exhaustion regime" because the "text suggests no limits on a[ ] [plaintiff's] obligation to exhaust ...." See Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856 ; see also Ogarro, 2020 WL 1876300, at *3 (collecting cases); United States v. Holden, No. 13-cr-00444, 452 F.Supp.3d 964, 973-74 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2020). It mandates that, where the BOP has not submitted an application for a sentence reduction, a court cannot, under any circumstances, grant compassionate release unless the defendant has "fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal" or waited at least 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The record is clear that Williams has not requested compassionate release from the BOP, i.e., he has failed to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirement of § 3582(c)(1)(A). (See ECF No. 760-1.)
Williams asks the Court to excuse his failure. (ECF No. 759 at 1.) The government argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s statutorily-mandated exhaustion regime is jurisdictional and that William's failure to comply with it deprives the court of jurisdiction over his motion. (See ECF No. 760 at 2-4.) The government argues that Williams' failure to exhaust cannot be excused because jurisdictional prescriptions are not subject to waiver or forfeiture. (See id. ) Alternatively, the government argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s statutorily-mandated exhaustion regime is a mandatory claim-processing rule that it has timely raised and that the Court cannot excuse Williams' failure to meet it. (Id. at 4-5.)
It is unnecessary to decide whether § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s statutorily-mandated exhaustion regime is a jurisdictional prescription or a mandatory claim-processing rule. See Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1271 (declining to address the jurisdictional question because the requirement at issue was "at least a mandatory claim-processing rule"); Ogarro, 2020 WL 1876300, at *3 ("[R]egardless of whether the statute is jurisdictional or a claim-processing rule, its exhaustion requirements are clearly mandatory."); United States v. Monzon, No. 99-cr-157, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 550220, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2020) ("It is unnecessary to resolve here whether § 3582(c) creates a jurisdictional bar to the modification of [defendant's] sentence or simply sets forth a statutory exhaustion requirement.").
Some courts have found that § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a jurisdictional prescription. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 14-cr-0441, 451 F.Supp.3d 436, 439-42 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2020). The Sixth Circuit has previously held that § 3582(c)(2) is jurisdictional. See United States v. Williams, 607 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (6th Cir. 2010). However, because the Supreme Court has cautioned courts against finding that a statute contains jurisdictional prescriptions unless the statute clearly does so, see Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1850, and because the Court can decide the present issue without reaching jurisdiction, it will.
The government has timely raised § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s administrative mandate. (See ECF No. 760.) The Court does not have judicial discretion to excuse Williams' failure to exhaust. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856-58 ; United States v. Alam, No. 15-cr-20351, 453 F.Supp.3d 1041, 1043-44 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2020) ("[A] failure to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s filing requirements bars defendants from filing motions for compassionate release, and that the judiciary has no power to craft an exception to these requirements for defendants seeking release during the COVID-19 pandemic.") (collecting cases); see also, e.g., United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement foreclosed the court's consideration of defendant's motion for compassionate release and that "strict compliance with [the] exhaustion requirement takes on added -- and critical -- importance" during the current crisis); United States v. Hofmeister, No. 5:16-cv-13, 2020 WL 1811365, at *2-3 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 9, 2020) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) "expressly prohibits [a court] from modifying the defendant's sentence unless the defendant gives the warden 30 days to act on his request" and holding that "[a court] has no authority to act on a motion filed by the defendant before that time"); United States v. Allen, No. 1:19-cr-98, 2020 WL 1878774, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2020) (same); United States v. Woodson, No. 18-cr-845, 452 F.Supp.3d 31, 33-36 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) (same).
A minority of courts have held that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s administrative exhaustion requirement is subject to "exceptions" to exhaustion, such as futility or undue prejudice. See, e.g., Samy v. United States, No. 16-cr-20610, 2020 WL 1888842, at *2-3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2020) ; United States v. Zukerman, No. 16-cr-194,451 F.Supp.3d 329, 331-34 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2020) ; United States v. Colvin, No. 3:19-cr-179, 451 F.Supp.3d 237, 239-40 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2020). Those interpretations are not persuasive. They rely on the proposition that statutory exhaustion regimes are subject to equitable exceptions, citing a case in which the Second Circuit stated equitable exceptions to a judge-made exhaustion regime. See Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2019). Unlike "judge-made exhaustion doctrines," however, "mandatory exhaustion statutes," like § 3582(c)(1)(A), "establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion." Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1857 ; see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) ("Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required."); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 751 (6th Cir. 2019) ("For exhaustion rules that originate with a clear statutory command, courts have ‘refus[ed] to add unwritten’ exceptions on top of those in the text itself.") (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1857 ) (emphasis in original). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a mandatory exhaustion regime. It expressly requires a defendant to exhaust his administrative remedies with the BOP before filing a motion for compassionate release with a court. The Court may not disregard that requirement.
Williams asks, if the Court is inclined to deny his Motion, that it alternatively "stay his motion pending exhaustion or the [ ] warden[']s response." (ECF No. 759 at 1.) The Court will deny Williams' Motion with leave to renew if the BOP denies his request for compassionate release or if the BOP does not decide within thirty days of the date it receives his request. IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Williams' Motion is DENIED.
So ordered this 30th day of April, 2020.