Opinion
Criminal Action No. 19-0390 (RC)
2023-07-03
UNITED STATES of America v. Michael Jabaar WILKINS, Defendant.
Amy Elizabeth Larson, Janani Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Criminal Division, Washington, DC, Jessica Arco, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States of America. Christopher MacChiaroli, Silverman, Thompson, Slutkin & White, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Amy Elizabeth Larson, Janani Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Criminal Division, Washington, DC, Jessica Arco, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States of America. Christopher MacChiaroli, Silverman, Thompson, Slutkin & White, Washington, DC, for Defendant. RESTITUTION ORDER RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
Defendant Michael Jabaar Wilkins pleaded guilty to one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). See Min. Order, July 21, 2021; Judgment at 1, ECF No. 144. The Court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment and 120 months of supervised release, but left restitution to be determined pending a hearing on June 27, 2023. Having heard argument at that hearing, and after reviewing the parties' sentencing submissions and supplemental submissions regarding restitution, together with the attached exhibits, the Court orders restitution in the amount of $1,250 to victim O.R. and $661,180 to victim J.J.
18 U.S.C. § 1593 requires an order of restitution for violations of section 1591. See § 1593(a). Specifically, the Court must "direct the defendant to pay the victim . . . the full amount of the victim's losses." § 1593(b)(1). As relevant here, those losses include "medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care," "lost income," and "any other relevant losses incurred by the victim." 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2); see § 1593(b)(3) (incorporating § 2259(c)(2)). In addition, the restitution amount "shall . . . include the greater of the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's services or labor[.]" § 1593(b)(3); see In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("Section 1593 requires that the defendant pay the victim 'the full amount of the victim's losses,' defined as the sum of two components: (1) ill-gotten gains plus (2) the 'full amount of the victim's losses[.]' " (internal citation omitted)).
The order of restitution "shall be issued and enforced in accordance with [18 U.S.C. §] 3664 in the same manner as an order under [18 U.S.C. §] 3663A." § 1593(b)(2). Under section 3664, the court is to determine the victim's losses "without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant." § 3664(f)(1)(A). "Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence" and "[t]he burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government." § 3664(e). "No victim shall be required to participate in any phase of a restitution order." § 3664(g)(1). However, the amount of restitution need not be "proven with exactitude;" rather "the district court's charge is to estimate, based upon the facts in the record, the amount of the victim's loss with some reasonable certainty." In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d at 66 (cleaned up). While "[t]he Court may not order restitution for losses that are unsubstantiated or speculative," United States v. Williams, 946 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2006)), the relevant question is whether "the basis for reasonable approximation is at hand." United States v. Boutros, No. 20-cr-82, 2020 WL 6683064, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2020) (quoting United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 617 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Fair, 699 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (requiring an "evidentiary basis" on which to calculate restitution).
The signed plea agreement provides that Defendant will "pay restitution to all victims associated with [his] conduct charged in all counts of the Indictment, which includes dismissed counts." Plea Agreement at 10, ECF No. 102. The superseding indictment charged 10 counts and refers to victims J.J., O.R. and L.H., see Superseding Indictment at 1-2, ECF No. 61, but the Government does not seek restitution for L.H. because she "actively avoided contact with the prosecution team," so the Government "has been unable to come up with an estimated restitution figure for her with reasonable certainty, as required." Gov't's Rest. Req. at 9 n.7, ECF No. 140. The Government seeks restitution in the amount of $1,250 for O.R. and $931,380 for J.J. The Court considers each request in turn.
Because the Government's submission is not paginated, pin citations to this document are herein referred to using the automatically generated page numbers stamped at the top of each page.
A. Restitution as to O.R.
As to O.R., the Government requests $1,250 in lost income for five days she spent helping the Government prepare for this case. Id. at 8; see Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. B, ECF No. 140-2 (table of case preparation meetings with O.R. showing five days of law enforcement interviews, grand jury testimony, trial preparation, and related travel). The $1,250 figure was calculated using an hourly derivative of the $65,000 annual salary she earned at the time. See Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. D, ECF No. 140-4 (text message from O.R. confirming $65,000 annual salary). Defendant appears to agree that this amount is appropriate as to O.R. See Def.'s Suppl. Mem. Rest. at 3, ECF No. 147 (quoting passage from defense counsel's email to the Government offering to agree that O.R. is entitled to $1,250.70 in restitution). The Court thus finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that O.R. is entitled to $1,250.
B. Restitution as to J.J.
The parties disagree sharply as to the restitution amount to which J.J. is entitled. According to the signed statement of offense accompanying the plea agreement, Defendant trafficked J.J. between January 2011 and November 2017. Statement of Offense at 1, ECF No. 101. The Government seeks $15,000 in medical expenses, $680 in lost wages, $700 in other relevant losses, and $915,000 in gross income generated. Gov't's Rest. Req. at 3, 7. Defendant "requests that he not be ordered to pay a million dollars in restitution based on the insufficient record submitted by the Government." Def.'s Suppl. Mem. Rest. at 5; see also id. at 3 (quoting email from defense counsel to the Government offering to agree on restitution of $4,000 as to J.J.).
1. Medical Expenses
The Government submits that J.J. "has had countless medical appointments and operations as a result of the defendant assaulting her inside a hotel room in February 2012, resulting in a fractured finger and vision loss in her right eye." Gov't's Rest. Req. at 3. The signed statement of offense explains that, during this assault, Defendant "struck J.J. multiple times in the face and head, causing her to lose consciousness." Statement of Offense ("SOO") at 1-2, ECF No. 101. She regained consciousness at a hospital in Atlanta, Georgie with a "fractured finger." Id. at 2. "She also has endured ongoing problems with one of her eyes, including some loss of vision." Id. A summary of a telephonic interview that the Government conducted with J.J. on February 7, 2023 in anticipation of sentencing in this case provides evidence of the out-of-pocket expenses J.J. incurred to treat these injuries. Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. A, ECF No. 140-1. Specifically, J.J. stated that she "had to pay out of her pocket approximately $15,000 for surgery on her eye and the cost of a prosthetic eye," and referred to numerous related "doctors visits." Id. at 1. These out-of-court statements are admissible for purposes of restitution proceedings, see In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d at 62 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming restitution order based in part on grand jury testimony). In conjunction with Defendant's admissions that he committed the February 2012 assault and that it caused J.J. to go to the hospital and resulted in "ongoing problems with one of her eyes," SOO at 1-2, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that J.J. is entitled to $15,000 in restitution for medical expenses.
2. Lost Wages
The Government seeks $680 in lost wages that J.J. incurred in order to help the Government prepare for this case. Gov't's Rest. Req. at 3. According to a case preparation table submitted by the Government, J.J. participated in law enforcement interviews on five days. See Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. B, ECF No. 140-2. According to the interview summary from her February 2023 interview with the Government, J.J. missed work in order to participate in these law enforcement interviews, causing her to sacrifice the $17 hourly wage she otherwise would have made during her eight-hour workdays. See id., Attch. A at 2. Defendant's submission does not address this evidence of lost wages, so the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that J.J. is entitled to $680 in restitution for lost wages.
3. Other Relevant Losses
The Government requests $700 in restitution for "other relevant losses." Gov't's Rest. Req. at 5; 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2)(F). Specifically, the Government states that Defendant destroyed two of J.J.'s cell phones: an iPhone valued at $500 in January 2013, and an Android valued at $200 in "approximately 2014 or 2015." Gov't's Rest. Req. at 4-5. As to the iPhone, the February 2023 interview summary reflects J.J.'s description that Defendant "damaged this phone so that it was no longer working . . . during the documented Charlottesville, VA incident." Id., Attch. A at 1. The "Charlottesville, VA incident" is an apparent reference to a violent altercation between Defendant and J.J., detailed in the statement of offense, in which Defendant "punched her in the face with a closed fist," "pushed [her] into a countertop next to the sink, causing [her] to sustain a large bruise to her leg," and then "stomped on her leg with his foot, leaving a footprint on her leg." SOO at 2. This altercation occurred in a hotel room after Defendant "demanded money from J.J." and became enraged when he "found out that J.J. had lied about not having money." SOO at 2. According to the presentence investigation report, Defendant was charged with assault and battery in Virginia based on this incident, and the criminal complaint stated that Defendant "took [J.J.'s] . . . phone [and] smashed the phone with his foot[.]" Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") ¶ 82, ECF No. 135. The $500 valuation for this iPhone represents a low-end approximation by J.J., which the Government notes is substantially below the average iPhone price in 2012. See Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. A at 1; id. at 4 n.1. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the destruction of J.J.'s iPhone was "a proximate result of the offenses involving" J.J., 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2), and therefore that she is entitled to $500 in restitution for this relevant loss.
However, the Court cannot find the same as to the Android. The Government asserts only that Defendant destroyed the phone "while [J.J.] was working for him in approximately 2014 or 2015 by placing it in water." Gov't's Rest. Req. at 4-5. The February 2023 interview summary offers little additional clarity, stating only that "[t]he first phone he destroyed was an Android that cost a couple of hundred dollars" and that Defendant "destroyed this one by placing it in water." Id., Attch. A at 1. Unlike with respect to the iPhone, where Defendant destroyed the phone in a hotel room after demanding money that J.J. earned, the Government does not offer any basis beyond mere suspicion on which the Court can conclude that the loss of the Android was "a proximate result of the offenses involving" J.J. § 2259(c)(2). Accordingly, the Court will not order additional restitution for the loss of the Android.
4. Gross Income
As noted above, the Court's restitution calculation "shall . . . include the greater of the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's services or labor[.]" § 1593(b)(3). In recognition of the fact that restitution calculations "will inevitably involve some degree of approximation," In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d at 66 (quoting United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2011)), courts have calculated restitution owed to sex trafficking victims based on the average amount they earned over the time period they were trafficked, as established by record evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 791 F. Supp. 2d 81, 92-94 & n. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2011) (calculating restitution in sex trafficking case based on "daily average amounts" earned by victims or "daily quotas" they were forced to meet, as substantiated by grand jury testimony of the victims and admissions by the defendant in the statement of facts attached to the plea agreement); United States v. Hamilton, No. 17-cr-89, 2018 WL 2770638, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 8, 2018); ("[T]he minor victims' calculation of their average daily earnings, provided in statements to [a special agent], are sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for a restitu[tion] order because the statements were corroborated by evidence introduced over the course of the trial."); United States v. Jackson, No. 2:16-cr-54, 2018 WL 3127241, at *3 (D.S.C. June 26, 2018) ("The minor victims' calculations of their average daily earnings were provided in victim impact statements, in statements to [a police officer], in their trial testimony, in jail calls, and in the testimony of codefendants. They are sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for this restitution order."); United States v. Rojas, 853 Fed. App'x 733, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming restitution order where the government calculated its proposed amount based on "information provided by the victims and multiplied the average number of sex acts the victims were forced to perform each week (70) by the average price per transaction ($15) to reach a monthly estimate of $4,200" and where the district court held an evidentiary hearing and considered "the sworn statements" of victims).
Here, the Government submits that J.J. is entitled to $915,000. See Gov't's Rest. Req. at 7. It calculates this figure using a low-end estimate of the daily average income of $500 that J.J. earned for Defendant, multiplying that figure by the number of days Defendant trafficked her—67 months between January 2011 and July 2016—and then subtracting two days each month and another full month "to account for the instances in which [J.J.] ran away from [Defendant]." Id. at 7 & n.5. Defendant contends that the Government has not met its burden to prove that J.J. is entitled to this amount by a preponderance of the evidence. See Def.'s Suppl. Mem. Rest. at 4 ("[T]he Government refuses to seek out evidence since the sentencing that was missing from its investigation, such as, dates, times, amounts, and rather chooses to revert back to a general comment made by Mr. Wilkins . . . regarding what Mr. Wilkins could make on certain occasions in managing prostitutes, not every day, and not specifically or exclusively as to J.J.").
Those 67 months included 2,036 days, taking into account the Government's assertion that the trafficking ceased on July 29, 2016 when Wilkins was sentenced to prison for a cocaine conviction in Virginia. See Gov't's Rest. Req. at 6. At a rate of $500 per day, that would equal gross earnings of $1,018,000. By the Court's calculation, subtracting earnings from 2 days per month and one full 31-day month (165 days total) would bring that figure down to $935,500. It is unclear why the Government's calculation produced a gross income of $915,000 based on this methodology, but because the Court herein finds that J.J. is entitled to less than the Government's request, the difference is immaterial.
As an initial matter, while the signed statement of offense indicates that Defendant trafficked J.J. "[b]etween January of 2011 and November of 2017," SOO at 1, the Government only seeks restitution through July 29, 2016, as that is the date on which Defendant "was sentenced to serve a prison term for Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine in Virginia," Gov't's Rest. Req. at 6. Consistent with the statement of offense and the presentence investigation report, Defendant does not appear to contest that this is the relevant period. See SOO at 1; PSR ¶¶ 7, 13, 18, 85; see also id. ¶ 33 ("[T]he defendant generally agreed with the conduct described in the Statement of Offense as presented to the Court prior to his guilty plea."). The Court therefore adopts this as the relevant period for purposes of restitution.
Next, the Court agrees with the Government that $500 is the appropriate daily average earnings rate. Defendant cited this figure in his presentence interview with the Probation Office. See PSR ¶ 153 ("[Defendant] said each girl would earn him approximately $500/day, and most times he earned closer to $1,000/day."). And this admission is corroborated by statements that J.J. and O.R. independently made to investigators. See Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. A at 2 (summary of Government's interview with J.J. stating that she "worked seven days a week, and she had at least 10 commercial sex dates per day" at a rate of "$150 per commercial sex date on the track" and "$300 per commercial sex date in hotels or clients homes"); Gov't's Sentencing Mem., Ex. 6 at 3-4, ECF No. 138-4 (FBI investigation summary documenting 2015 incident in which an undercover officer was informed by J.J. that the price for a date would be a "$300 donation" or "$600 for two" after calling the number in a Backpage.com advertisement); Gov't's Suppl. Mem. Rest., Ex. 1, ECF No. 146-1 (summary of Government's interview with O.R. in which she stated that "she would make between $500 and $1000 a day while in D.C." and that Defendant "expected $500 at the very least a day"). The Court thus finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that $500 is an appropriate, and indeed conservative, daily average to apply for purposes of calculating restitution.
The "track" refers to "an area near the Logan Circle neighborhood [of D.C.] that is known for street-level commercial sexual exploitation." SOO at 1.
Whether the Government has met its burden to prove that J.J. worked for Defendant every day during the relevant period is a closer question. Powerful evidence for this proposition comes from J.J.'s statement, reflected in the February 2023 interview summary, that she "worked seven days a week, and she had at least 10 commercial sex dates per day." Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. A at 2. She further stated that "[t]he only times that [she] did not earn money for [Defendant] was when she would run away from him," which occurred "approximately once a month for a day or two, and one time [she] ran away for about one month." Id. Defendant dismisses these statements as "not admissible evidence in any capacity," Def.'s Suppl. Mem. Rest. at 5, but Courts routinely rely on out-of-court statements at sentencing in general, see United States v. Jones, 744 F.3d 1362, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("Clear precedent permits hearsay to be used in sentencing decisions . . . ." (citations omitted)), and when ordering restitution in particular, see In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d at 62 (affirming restitution order based in part on grand jury testimony); see also United States v. Loreng, 956 F. Supp. 2d 213, 222 n.4 (D.D.C. 2013) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause's protections do not extend to restitution proceedings."). This includes unsworn statements. See Hamilton, 2018 WL 2770638, at *3 (relying on sex trafficking victims' statements to an FBI investigator).
As noted above, the days on which J.J. ran away were subtracted from the Government's restitution request.
To corroborate J.J.'s assertion, the Government points to commercial sex advertisements placed for J.J., although the Government notes that its ability to locate the ads "was significantly constrained" due to the passage of time. Gov't's Suppl. Mem. Rest. at 8, ECF No. 146. In total, it was able to locate ads on Backpage.com for J.J. "on at least 24 different days during the time she was working for [Defendant]." Id. at 9. More recent advertisements for another of Defendant's victims suggests that the 24 advertisements that the Government was able to identify for J.J. represent only a small sample of the total quantity of advertisements likely placed for her. See, e.g., Gov't's Suppl. Mem. Rest., Ex. 14, ECF No. 146-14 (spreadsheet showing a high volume of advertisements placed for L.H. during the period Defendant trafficked her in 2019, including ads that were reposted dozens of times over periods of just a few weeks or less). And even the 24 identified ads for J.J. show patterns of advertisement on consecutive days. See, e.g., id., Ex. 6, ECF No. 146-6 (showing advertisements for J.J. on Backpage.com each day from November 2, 2014 through November 10, 2014); Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. C at 8, ECF No. 140-3 (showing advertisements for J.J. on Backpage.com on December 29-30, 2014 and January 2-4, 2015).
As explained by the Government's counsel at the hearing on June 27, 2023, this spreadsheet is produced from the Spotlight program, which aggregates advertisements with certain identifiers—here, identifiers associated with L.H. The column labeled "Post Count" indicates how many times over the stated period a post was reposted on the website.
While advertisements do not necessarily represent converted transactions, other record evidence suggests that Defendant routinely possessed quantities of cash consistent with earnings from daily commercial sex work. See, e.g., Gov't's Sentencing Mem., Ex. 6 at 3-4 (FBI investigation summary documenting Defendant's 2012 arrest in which he "had about $2,100 in his jacket pocket"); PSR ¶ 85 (documenting Defendant's 2015 arrest in which he was found with $1,066 in cash on his person); see id. ¶ 153 (summarizing Defendant's statement that "each girl would earn him approximately $500/day and most times he earned closer to $1,000/day"). One particularly compelling example comes from an image posted to Defendant's Instagram account at 4:02 p.m. on November 3, 2015 showing a large stack of $100 bills and three gold rings next to two sets of car keys and various drug paraphernalia. See Gov't's Suppl. Mem. Rest., Ex. 2 at 21, ECF No. 146-2. Notably, one of the commercial sex advertisements for J.J. was posted less than 48 hours earlier, on November 1, 2015 at 8:41 p.m. Id., Ex. 9 at 1, ECF No. 146-9 (fourth line from the bottom of the spreadsheet). The Government explained during the June 27 hearing that commercial sex workers, including J.J., tend to work from midnight until around 8:00 a.m. on a given night. Therefore, this picture of many hundreds of dollars in cash was posted on Defendant's Instagram just over a day after a commercial sex transaction booked via the November 1 advertisement would have been completed. This supports a finding that the frequency of commercial sex advertisements represents a reasonable proxy for completed transactions. See Hamilton, 2018 WL 2770638, at *3 (accepting the government's restitution calculation which "multipl[ied] the daily average prostitution earnings of each minor victim by the number of prostitution advertisements featuring each woman"). Moreover, to whatever extent reference to the frequency of advertisements risks overstating the rate of completed commercial sex transactions, that risk is eliminated by the countervailing certainty that these advertisements do not capture street-level commercial sex transactions that J.J. initiated on the track in D.C. See Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. A (summarizing J.J.'s statement that she worked "on the commercial sex track 30% of the time").
In light of this substantial evidence, the Court finds that the Government has met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that J.J. was trafficked between January 2011 and July 2016, that she earned an average of at least $500 each day she worked for Defendant, and that she regularly worked for Defendant seven days per week. However, there remains doubt that she worked seven days per week every week, as Defendant regularly transported J.J. between Virginia, D.C., and Maryland for commercial sex dates. See SOO at 1; Gov't's Rest. Req., Attch. C (showing Backpage.com ads for J.J. in all three locations). On the one hand, the Government has provided evidence that Defendant's victims at least sometimes performed commercial sex work on the same day that they traveled. See Gov't's Sentencing Mem., Ex. 4 at 5, ECF No. 138-2 (showing texts between Defendant and victim L.H. in which Defendant arranges to pick up L.H. at the train station at approximately 1:30 a.m. and further texts later that same morning indicating that L.H. was engaging in commercial sex work). On the other, however, transportation and housing logistics alone render it highly improbable that J.J. worked every day while traversing these three locations, especially given that the pattern of commercial sex advertisements for J.J. suggests that she traveled between these locations multiple times per week. See Gov't's Suppl. Mem. Rest., Ex. 5, ECF No. 146-5 (summary chart listing commercial sex advertisements for J.J. showing ads in Virginia Beach, V.A., Washington, D.C., and Annapolis, M.D. between November 5, 2014 and November 10, 2014).
Along similar lines, an episode detailed in the statement of offense in which Defendant physically assaulted and knocked J.J. unconscious occurred in North Carolina, and J.J. regained consciousness in a hospital in Atlanta, Georgia, so she almost certainly was not working in Virginia, D.C., or Maryland on those days. See SOO at 2.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that J.J. worked for Defendant's benefit an average of five days per week, but not more, given the likelihood that J.J. did not work during at least some days each week while she traveled. Though possibly lower than the amount that J.J. actually earned for Defendant, this reasonable approximation reflects the limit of the Government's "demonstrate[ion] [of] the amount of the loss sustained" without "nickel[ ] and diming" the victim. United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 480, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)); see United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 196 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[A] 'reasonable approximation' will suffice, especially in cases in which an exact dollar amount is inherently incalculable."); United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 617 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that "the preponderance standard must be applied in a practical common-sense way" and that "as long as the basis for reasonable approximation is at hand, difficulties in achieving exact measurements will not preclude a trial court from ordering restitution"); see also United States v. Huff, 609 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the mandatory restitution statute requires "resolving uncertainties with a view toward achieving fairness to the victim" (citation omitted)).
According to the Court's calculation, there were 290 weeks and 6 days between January 1, 2011 and July 29, 2016. 291 multiplied by 5 days per week equals 1,455 days. Subtracting the 165 days on which J.J. ran away from Defendant, see supra note 2, and that makes a total of 1,290 days for which J.J. is entitled to lost earnings. At $500 per day, that equals $645,000 in gross income lost.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is hereby ORDERED to pay restitution to O.R. in the amount of $1,250 and to J.J. in the amount of $661,180.
SO ORDERED.