Opinion
Criminal No. 16-526 (FAB)
2019-10-23
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ricardo Alberto VILLA-GUILLÉN [8], Defendant.
Francisco J. Adams-Quesada, San Juan, PR, for Defendant. Jonathan Edward Jacobson, Jose A. Contreras, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Francisco J. Adams-Quesada, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Jonathan Edward Jacobson, Jose A. Contreras, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
The Court denied defendant Ricardo Villa-Guillén ("Villa")'s motion to suppress on July 24, 2019. United States v. Villa-Guillén, 394 F.Supp.3d 196 (D.P.R. 2019) (Besosa, J.). Villa moves for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Docket No. 576.) For the reasons set forth below, Villa's motion for reconsideration is DENIED . I. Motion for Reconsideration Standard
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly provide for motions for reconsideration. See United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288, 292 n.2 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The First Circuit Court of Appeals applies, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (" Rule 59(e)") to motions for reconsideration arising in the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying Rule 59(e) to a motion for reconsideration in a criminal case).
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), a district court will alter its original order only if it "evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations." Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration does "not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures [or] allow a party [to] advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment." Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). " Rule 59(e) does not exist to allow parties a second chance to prevail on the merits ... [and] is not an avenue for litigants to reassert arguments and theories that were previously rejected by the Court." Johnson & Johnson Int'l v. P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc., 322 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.P.R. 2017) (Besosa, J.) (citations omitted). In deciding a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing court has considerable discretion. Venegas-Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2004). "As a general rule, motions for reconsideration should only be exceptionally granted." Villanueva-Méndez v. Nieves Vázquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 (D.P.R. 2005) (Domínguez, J.).
II. Discussion
Villa moves to exclude evidence obtained from a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted by Miami-Dade Police Department officers. (Docket No. 526.) Villa did not own, rent or drive the vehicle subject to police intervention. He was a passenger. The Court held that Villa "nonetheless has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the traffic stop." Villa-Guillén, 394 F.Supp.3d at 200 n.2 (citing Brendlin v. Cal., 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) ).
Villa asserts that he also has standing to challenge the "warrantless search of the vehicle in which [he] was a passenger." (Docket No. 576 at p. 1.) He misconstrues Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The search and seizure of a vehicle are discrete acts with separate standing requirements. See United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1991) ("When resolving issues of Fourth Amendment standing, it is important to distinguish between different government intrusions that implicate different constitutionally protected interests" (i.e. searches and seizures)); United States v. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015) ("Searches and seizures implicate two distinct interests; a privacy interest affected by a search, and a possessory interest affected by a seizure."). Indeed, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the passenger of a vehicle may challenge a traffic stop, but not a vehicle search. Compare United States v. Starks, 769 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that a "passenger traveling in a car is seized along with the driver, and therefore has standing" to challenge the stop pursuant to the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added) with United States v. Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a "vehicle search does not infringe upon the passenger's Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the passenger lacks standing to challenge the search ") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Villa lacks standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. For the reasons set forth above, Villa's motion for reconsideration is DENIED . (Docket No. 576.)