Opinion
Criminal No. 17-608 (FAB)
2021-11-04
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ricardo Alberto VILLA–GUILLÉN, Defendant.
Jose A. Contreras, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Jose A. Contreras, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Ricardo Alberto Villa—Guillén ("Villa—Guillén")’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of his pro se motion to dismiss, filed while represented by counsel. (Docket No. 167) For the reasons set forth below, Villa—Guillén's motion for reconsideration is DENIED .
I. BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2021, Villa—Guillén, who was represented by counsel at the time, filed a pro se motion to dismiss, based on his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Docket No. 139) On May 27, 2021, the Court held a status conference and learned that Villa—Guillén's attorney would not adopt the motion. (Docket No. 149) The Court thus denied the motion on the record, id., and issued a subsequent line order citing Local Rule 11, which requires motions submitted by an attorney or an unrepresented person to be signed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and citing Local Rule 112, which applies Local Rule 11 to criminal matters. (Docket No. 150) Villa—Guillén's attorney moved to withdraw on July 1, 2021 due to a breakdown in the attorney—client relationship. (Docket No. 154) The Court granted the motion, (Docket No. 156,) and appointed a new attorney to represent Villa-Guillén on July 7, 2021. (Docket No. 157)
At a status conference on September 7, 2021, Villa—Guillén's new attorney requested time to file pretrial motions and was granted an additional 20 days to do so. (Docket No. 166) On September 26, 2021, Villa—Guillén's new attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of Villa—Guillén's pro se motion to dismiss, but stated in the motion for reconsideration that he would not adopt the motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 167) New counsel for Villa—Guillén argued that the Court should nevertheless rule on the motion to dismiss, citing McCoy v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1500, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018), in which the Supreme Court clarified the right of criminal defendants to determine the objective of their defense, and more specifically, to maintain their innocence even if counsel views this approach as detrimental to avoiding the death penalty. Id. at p. 1. The government responded in opposition, (Docket No. 169,) and Villa—Guillén filed a reply pro se , without permission, inadvertently disavowing his attorney's reliance on McCoy by pasting the government's response arguments into his reply. (Docket No. 170) Villa—Guillén proceeded to make a merits argument on his speedy trial right, and attached as an exhibit a different pro se motion to dismiss for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right and a request for a Franks hearing. Id. at p. 2—8.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly provide for motions for reconsideration. See United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288, 292 n.2 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) ("[M]otions for reconsideration in criminal cases are not specifically authorized either by statute or by rule."). The First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, applies the civil standard for a motion for reconsideration to criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009). On a motion for reconsideration, a district court will alter its original order only if "the moving party presents newly discovered evidence, if there has been an intervening change in the law, or if the movant can demonstrate that the original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was clearly unjust." Id.
In deciding a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing court possesses considerable discretion. Venegas-Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2004). "As a general rule, motions for reconsideration should only be exceptionally granted." Villanueva-Méndez v. Nieves Vázquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 (D.P.R. 2005) (Domínguez, J.).
B. Denial of Villa—Guillén's Pro Se Motion Made While Represented by Counsel
In his motion for reconsideration, Villa—Guillén asks the Court to reconsider its previous refusal to rule on the merits of his pro se motion to dismiss, made while Villa—Guillén was represented. (Docket No. 167) Villa—Guillén argues that based on McCoy’s clarification that a defendant has the right to choose the objectives of his defense, a defendant has the additional right to insist that counsel "refrain from objecting to his defense," and therefore a defendant has a right to have a pro se motion heard and decided by the Court. Id. at p. 1—2. New counsel for Villa—Guillén states clearly that he does not adopt Villa—Guillén's pro se motion to dismiss. Id. at p. 1.
The government argues that McCoy is inapplicable, both because Villa—Guillén's attorney is not making a contrary argument to his client, unlike in McCoy, and because McCoy itself outlines that the choice of "what arguments to pursue" is within the province of the attorney, not the defendant. (Docket No. 169 at p. 2) The Court agrees with the government.
While "a party has a right to represent himself or to be represented by an attorney, ... he cannot have it both ways." McCulloch v. Vélez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004). There is no explicit right for a represented party in a federal criminal matter to be both his own attorney and have an attorney, though "hybrid representation occasionally may be permitted in the trial court's discretion." Id. at 5 (citing United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) ). "A district court enjoys wide latitude in managing its docket and can require represented parties to present motions through counsel." United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279, 1285 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that "[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider [defendant]'s unsigned, pro se motions."); see also United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In this case, the district court was not required to accept Washington's pro se motion at all. The court acted within its discretion in striking the motion.").
The Court denied Villa—Guillén's pro se motion to dismiss because his counsel refused to adopt it and it did not conform to Local Rule 11. (Docket Nos. 149 and 150) The Court has discretion to control its docket and refuse to allow hybrid representation. See Tracy, 989 F.2d at 1285. Villa—Guillén's new counsel, rather than adopting the motion to dismiss, argues instead that pursuant to McCoy, Villa—Guillén has the evident right to file whatever pro se motions he chooses, and have the Court rule on them. (Docket No. 167) McCoy only held, however, that defendants have a right within the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to require their counsel to assert their innocence. McCoy, 138 S.Ct. at 1508. This right is part of a defendant's right to determine the objective of their representation, even if that means other objectives, such as avoiding the death penalty, would be harder to achieve or completely foreclosed. Id. Counsel cannot substitute their judgment for the objectives of the defendant if the defendant voices the desire not to admit guilt. Id. at 1509.
The question of whether the Court must decide a pro se motion filed by a defendant who is represented by counsel does not implicate a defendant's right to designate the objectives of his defense. As the government points out, McCoy itself emphasized that the decision on "what arguments to pursue" is the province of the attorney. McCoy, 138 S.Ct. at 1508 (quoting González v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248, 128 S.Ct. 1765, 170 L.Ed.2d 616 (2008) ). Villa—Guillén is certainly protected in deciding the goal of his representation, but he is not the one who may dictate the legal strategy of achieving the goal. Cf. id. To hold otherwise would invite chaos to the dockets of district courts, who would be forced to field motions whenever a represented defendant did not agree with his or her counsel. Cf. Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1122 ("When a litigant elects to exercise his right of self-representation, the burden on the trial judge increases exponentially. He must not only safeguard the orderly processes of trial against the incursions of a neophyte, but must take on an added responsibility for protecting the defendant from the consequences of his own folly.") Instead, the Court has the inherent ability to control its docket and decide within its discretion if it will consider motions filed pro se by defendants who are represented. See Tracy, 989 F.2d at 1285. Here, neither Villa—Guillén's counsel at the time the motion to dismiss was filed, nor his current counsel, have adopted the motion. (Docket Nos. 149 and 167) As both have a duty to zealously advocate for their client and assert his rights, the evident disinclination of either attorney to adopt the motion suggests that it has no merit and would be an inefficient use of the Court's resources to decide it nevertheless.
The Court is sensitive to Villa—Guillén's frustration at not being able to have his legal theory heard, but that is the nature of designating counsel as his agent. Villa—Guillén is encouraged to speak with his attorney to understand better why his counsel is deciding to proceed as he is, and to ultimately trust that his counsel is upholding his professional ethical duty to competently advocate for him.
The Court thus finds that it did not make a manifest error of law or make a decision that was clearly unjust, and so reconsideration is not warranted. See Allen, 573 F.3d at 53.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Villa—Guillén's motion for reconsideration. (Docket No. 167)