Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney PAUL A. HEMESATH Assistant United States Attorney Sacramento, CA Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
MICHAEL LONG Counsel for Defendant MARIANO MONTENEGRO VALLEJO
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 9, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 7, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between June 9, 2015, and July 7, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes various reports and records of telephone calls. In addition, the discovery contains records of the material found during a physical search warrant. Furthermore, defendant's previous counsel raised the issue of possible re-testing of the substances seized during the search. Additionally, defense counsel has represented that he intends to bring video evidence to the jail to allow defendant to review that evidence. All discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Current counsel was recently appointed for previous counsel. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to meet with his client, review the discovery, and consider the issues raised, as well as to consider new issues that may be raised during his review. In particular, questions regarding the forfeiture of certain properties have been raised, and the parties wish to consider those questions.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 9, 2015 to July 7, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.