Opinion
Case No. 2:12-cr-0071-MCE
07-10-2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. VICTOR GABRIEL VALDEZ-INZUNZA, aka Victor Valdez Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney CHRISTOPHER S. HALES Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
CHRISTOPHER S. HALES
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America
STIPULATION FOR CONTINUANCE
UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
THEREON
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 12, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 9, 2012 and to exclude time between July 12, 2012 and August 9, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 200 pages of documents from defendant's immigration A file. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with his client.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 12, 2012 to August 9, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by
the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
____________________________
CHRISTOHPER S. HALES
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
____________________________
BENJAMIN D. GALLOWAY
Counsel for Defendant
ORDER
Pursuant to the foregoing stipulation, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. The status conference in this matter is accordingly continued until August 9, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. under Local Code T4.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE