Opinion
Criminal 20-1524-WJ
12-20-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. KALANI S. UEHARA, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
WILLIAM P. JOHNSON CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Kalani Uehara's “Motion to Reconsider Denial of Defendant's Motion to Continue Sentencing, and Motion to Withdraw Her Plea Entered July 11, 2024.” Doc. 235. The United States filed a Response in opposition (Doc. 236). After reviewing the filings and applicable law, the Court:
• DENIES as MOOT the motion to reconsider (as drafted). Practically speaking, the Court cannot continue the sentencing-because it already took place. To the extent Ms. Uehara explicitly seeks to withdraw her guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d), that request must also be DENIED as MOOT given the imposition of sentence and entry of judgment.
• DISMISSES without prejudice Ms. Uehara's request to withdraw her guilty plea after acceptance by the Court and after imposition of sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e). The Court lacks jurisdiction to effectuate her request. Instead, her plea may be set aside only “on direct appeal or collateral attack.” Id. But here, Ms. Uehara knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her appellate and post-conviction rights. See Doc. 211 at ¶¶ 2831; see also Doc. 223 (“Plea Hrg. Tr.”). Consequently, the Court shall enforce her waiver.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Uehara pleaded guilty on July 10, 2024. See Docs. 209-212. The Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement contained a specific sentence of “time-served” and “one day.” Doc. 211 at ¶ 13.a. It also contained a “waiver of appeal rights and post-conviction rights.” See id. at ¶¶ 28-31. Of particular consequence (see infra), in her plea agreement, Ms. Uehara “agree[d] to waive any collateral attack on [her] conviction(s) and any sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255, or any other extraordinary writ, except on the issue of defense counsel's ineffective assistance.” Doc. 211 at ¶ 31; see also Plea Hrg. Tr. at 18:1-8.
After the Court accepted the plea agreement (Doc. 211) and guilty plea (Plea Hrg. Tr.), sentencing was docketed for September 11, 2024. See Doc. 222. Then, on September 9, 2024- two days before sentencing-Ms. Uehara filed a motion to continue so that she could consider withdrawing from her plea. See Doc. 227 at ¶¶ 2-3 (noting “Ms. Uehara has made inquiries as to a motion to withdraw her plea” and “need[s] additional time to continue these discussions”).
United States District Judge Kea W. Riggs presided over the change of plea hearing because the undersigned was unavailable.
For a more thorough analysis of the Rule 11 plea colloquy, see Doc. 228; see also United States v. Uehara, No. 20-cr-1524, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162909 (D.N.M. Sept. 10, 2024) (same). In that Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court goes through Rule 11 subsection-by-subsection-cross-referencing Judge Riggs' rights advisal and Ms. Uehara's answers thereto. See id. at 2-3 & nn. 2-15.
The Court denied her requested continuance, see Doc. 228, and sentencing occurred as scheduled-primarily because Ms. Uehara was in custody and her plea agreement provided for a sentence of time served plus one day; so, in order for Ms. Uehara to receive the benefit of the bargain she negotiated for in her plea agreement, the Court needed to move expeditiously with sentencing. Consistent with the plea agreement (Doc. 211 at ¶ 13), the Court sentenced Ms. Uehara to a specific sentence of “time served plus 1 day.” Doc. 233 at 3. After the imposition of sentence, the Court reminded Ms. Uehara that, pursuant to her plea agreement, she waived her right to appeal. See Doc. 211 at ¶¶ 28-31; see also Doc. 230 at 2.
* * *
Now, more than four months after having pleaded guilty (and almost three months postsentencing), Ms. Uehara filed a motion to reconsider the Court's Order (Doc. 228). In her motion, Ms. Uehara first asks the Court to reconsider its denial of her request to continue the sentencing. See Doc. 235 (“mov[ing] for the Court's reconsideration of” Doc. 228 which denied “her motion to continue sentencing” in Doc. 227). Then, Ms. Uehara asks the Court to allow her to “withdraw her plea entered on July 10, 2024.” Doc. 235 at 1.
DISCUSSION
I. Timeliness of Motion to Reconsider Continuing Sentencing
The requested relief here is, ostensibly, to grant the continuance previously sought in September. See Doc. 227 at 2 (asking the Court to “continue the September 11, 2024, sentencing in this matter”). But sentencing happened. See Docs. 230 & 233. This means the Court cannot reconsider its previous denial of the requested continuance (at least not in any meaningful way). This is especially true in light of Tenth Circuit precedent indicating “a motion for reconsideration in a criminal case must be filed within the 14-day period for filing a notice of appeal.” United States v. Koerber, 813 F.3d 1262, 1281 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Numerous panels of the Tenth Circuit have reiterated this 14-day timing aspect for motions to reconsider in criminal cases. In fact, panel opinions authored by nearly every Judge have stated reconsideration motions in criminal cases must be filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Maxton, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10059, at *5-7 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) (unpublished) (Holmes, J.); United States v. Baker, 716 Fed.Appx. 775, 777 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (Hartz, J.); United States v. Heath, 846 Fed.Appx. 725, 728 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (Matheson, J.); United States v. Norwood, 755 Fed.Appx. 813, 815-16 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (Phillips, J.); United States v. James, 728 Fed.Appx. 818, 821 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (McHugh, J.); United States v. Setiyaningsih, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 9625, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 2024) (unpublished) (Moritz, J.); United States v. Banks, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 173, at *24-25 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 2023) (unpublished) (Briscoe, J.); United States v. Green, 625 Fed.Appx. 901, 906 n.2 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (Baldock, J.).
The United States argues Ms. Uehara's motion is untimely (Doc. 236 at 14). See United States v. Garduno, 506 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (10th Cir. 2007). Consistent with Tenth Circuit guidance, this Court concludes Ms. Uehara's motion to reconsider filed three months post-entry of Judgment is “inordinately late.” United States v. Majalca-Aguilar, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 37992, at *2 (10th Cir. July 18, 2022) (unpublished). And although the United States must typically invoke “the time bar in Rule 4(b),” United States v. Muldrow, 612 Fed.Appx. 508, 511 (10th Cir. 2015), this Court may do the same, sua sponte. See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750 (10th Cir. 2008).
The Court's conclusion that Ms. Uehara's motion to reconsider is untimely provides just one justification for denying (or, alternatively, dismissing) her request.
II. Jurisdiction (Or Lack Thereof)
What about this Court's jurisdiction? Jurisdiction in criminal cases ends upon a district court's entry of judgment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 & 3582(b); see also United States v. Garcia-Herrera, 894 F.3d 1219, 1220 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he entry of final judgment in the case ended the court's § 3231 jurisdiction.”); see generally United States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2015). Judgment was entered on September 12, 2024 (Doc. 233). As it stands, this Court is unaware of any statutory authority to consider Ms. Uehara's motion.
Rule 33 does not help Ms. Uehara-because there was no trial in the first instance. Plus, she isn't asking for a new trial, but instead a withdrawal of her guilty plea. Much the same, Rule 35 is also unhelpful for Ms. Uehara. The motion to reconsider was filed more than “14 days after sentencing,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), and she seeks to withdraw from her plea-not correct an “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Id. The United States points out this jurisdictional flaw, too. See Doc. 236 at 9 (citing Rule 11(e), Rule 35, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582).
The question before this Court is whether Ms. Uehara may move to have her guilty plea withdrawn after she was sentenced. The answer is no, because a district court may not set aside a guilty plea after sentencing except as a consequence of a direct appeal or through a collateral proceeding. See United States v. Stang, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 30360, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 2023) (unpublished) (Holmes, C.J.); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e). “Having accepted the defendant's plea, conducted a full sentencing hearing, and imposed a sentence, the court lost any jurisdiction” to permit Ms. Uehara to withdraw her plea. United States v. Mercado-Flores, 872 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Shehadeh, 962 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Once the district court has imposed its sentence, the defendant may no longer withdraw the plea.”).
Given the above, dismissal of Ms. Uehara's motion to reconsider is necessary. See United States v. Moreno, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 956 (10th Cir. Jan. 16, 2024) (unpublished).
III. Merits of the Motion to Reconsider Continuing Sentencing
But even if Ms. Uehara had filed a timely motion and this Court had jurisdiction, her request for reconsideration contains no argument(s) proper for a motion to reconsider-meaning her motion also fails on the merits.
A party may seek reconsideration on the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2021); see also Doc. 236 at 8. Here, there is no change in controlling law that undermines this Court's previous denial of the motion to continue sentencing. Ms. Uehara presents no new evidence. And there is no need to correct any error (let alone a clear error). Instead, Ms. Uehara is hoping for a second chance to relitigate an issue-an issue, mind you, wherein this Court cannot even grant the requested relief. Motions to reconsider are not a vehicle through which litigants may take a proverbial second bite of the apple. See United States v. Garcia, 936 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2019) (“These motions are not the place to relitigate already-resolved issues ....”); cf. Doc. 236 at 8-9 (noting Ms. Uehara's “change of heart” does not justify “revisiting” this Court's earlier ruling).
Technically this is the third request to continue sentencing to allow Ms. Uehara more time to withdraw from her plea agreement and guilty plea. The first is the Motion itself (Doc. 227). Then, at sentencing, defense counsel orally moved to continue the sentencing to allow Ms. Uehara to withdraw from her guilty plea. See Doc. 230 at 3. In this regard, the motion to reconsider (Doc. 235) is really a third bite at the apple.
Although Ms. Uehara incorrectly relies on Rule 11(d) instead of Rule 11(e), the Court agrees with the United States' analysis under this notably incorrect subsection.
The United States makes clear that Rule 11(d) does not apply “because Defendant has already been sentenced.” Doc. 236 at 10 n.4. This much is black letter law. Nevertheless, the Court finds the United States' analysis of the Yazzie factors as-applied to Rule 11(d) compelling. See id. at 10-16; see also United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005). This Court's analysis back in September balanced the factors in a similar manner and ultimately came to the conclusion. See Doc. 228 at 5-7 (denying Ms. Uehara's motion to continue after applying the Yazzie factors to her “attempt[] to continue [the] case of the eve of sentencing” in hopes of “withdraw[ing] from [her] guilty plea”).
IV. Waiver of Appellate and Post-Conviction Rights
Finally, even if this Court ignored the title and substance of the motion-instead addressing only the relief requested-the outcome would be the same.
Ms. Uehara's requested relief under Rule 11(e) is a collateral attack on her conviction and sentence. Therefore, the issues to be decided are: (1) whether this attack falls within the scope of the waiver in Ms. Uehara's plea agreement, and, if so, (2) whether the waiver should be enforced. The Court answers yes to both.
The Tenth Circuit has established a three-part test to determine if a post-conviction waiver is enforceable: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice ....” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).
Here, Ms. Uehara's plea agreement contained a waiver of her appellate and post-conviction rights. See Doc. 211 at ¶¶ 28-31. The Court's plea colloquy went over this waiver, as required. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N); see also Doc. 228 at 2 (citing Plea Hrg. Tr. at 18:1-8); United States v. Uehara, No. 20-cr-1524, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162909, at *1-4 (D.N.M. Sept. 10, 2024) (same).
In the plea agreement, Ms. Uehara agreed to waive her right to appeal the “conviction(s) and any sentence imposed . . . as well as any order of restitution.” Doc. 211 at ¶ 28. She also waived “the right to appeal the denial of any motion filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” id. at ¶ 30. Finally, Ms. Uehara waived “any collateral attack” as to her “conviction(s) and any sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255, or any other extraordinary writ,” excepting, of course, ineffective assistance of counsel. id. at ¶ 31. During the plea hearing, the Court questioned Ms. Uehara about the waiver of her appellate and post-conviction rights. See Plea Hrg. Tr. at 18:1-8. Ms. Uehara stated she had gone over those rights with her attorney and understood those rights. Ibid. Relevant here are paragraphs 28 and 31-dealing with the waiver of her direct appeal and the waiver of any collateral attack.
As for prong one: Ms. Uehara's motion to withdraw clearly falls within the scope of her waiver. Even narrowly construing her waiver of appellate and post-conviction rights, as this Court must, Ms. Uehara must be held “to the terms of a lawful plea agreement.” United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Like most waivers, a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence is to be construed narrowly.”). Withdrawal of a guilty plea postsentencing can only be effectuated by “direct appeal or collateral attack.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e). But again, Ms. Uehara waived the direct appeal of her conviction and sentence. See Doc. 211 at ¶ 28 (waiving direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742). The first avenue of attack is foreclosed by her waiver of appellate rights. Again, though, Ms. Uehara also “agree[d] to waive any collateral attack” as to her convictions and sentence. id. at ¶ 31. This means both possible avenues for a post-sentencing withdrawal of her guilty plea under Rule 11(e) were waived.
Next, the Court looks to see if Ms. Uehara knowingly and voluntarily waived her appellate rights. Defense counsel argues Ms. Uehara was “coerced into entering her plea,” Doc. 235 at 6, and was suffering from a “mental disorder.” id. at 7. But these assertions belie the record. During her plea colloquy, Ms. Uehara stated she was not suffering from any mental illness. See Plea Hrg. Tr. at 5:23-25. And although Ms. Uehara stated she was taking medication; she explained the medication did not affect her ability to understand the proceeding. id. at 5:10-16; see also Doc. 236 at 5. Finally, Ms. Uehara explained she was “freely and voluntarily” entering a plea of guilty- absent any coercion or threats. Plea Hrg. Tr. at 22:11-20. The Court found Ms. Uehara was “competent and capable of entering an informed plea . . . and that this plea [was] made knowingly and voluntarily.” id. at 23:5-9. From the time Ms. Uehara waived her right to a jury trial (Doc. 173) to when she entered the plea agreement (Doc. 211) all the way through her sentencing (Docs. 230 & 233), there are no indicia of incompetence or coercion. In fact, the record is clear that Ms. Uehara: (1) was competent and, (2) her actions were knowing and voluntary. The Court reasons, then, that Ms. Uehara entered into this agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Stated another way, Ms. Uehara did not carry her burden in establishing she did not understand her waiver. See United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 872-73 (10th Cir. 2003).
As an aside, back in June-when Ms. Uehara waived her right to a jury trial (Doc. 173)-the Court held a hearing and conducted a similar colloquy. The Court asked Ms. Uehara, defense counsel, and the United States questions regarding competency. No issues were raised as to any lack of competency. See Doc. 188; see also Doc. 81.
Finally, the Court must decide whether the enforcement of the waiver will constitute a “miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (listing the four exceptions to waiver). Like above, Ms. Uehara bears the burden of persuasion to show that a miscarriage of justice will occur if the waiver is enforced. United States v. Maldonado, 410 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, the Court did not rely upon an impermissible factor such as race in sentencing. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1329 (citing Elliott, 264 F.3d at 1173). Her sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. Id. And the waiver is not otherwise unlawful. Id. The only factor remotely touched on is whether Ms. Uehara received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Doc. 235 at 1 (“Ms. Uehara asserts . . . she was . . . not provided effective assistance of counsel). But even that assertion is rebuffed by the record. See Plea Hrg. Tr. at 19:10-12. At the plea hearing, Ms. Uehara stated she was satisfied with her attorney's representation. Ibid.; see also Doc. 236 at 6-7. Even though an ineffective assistance claim can be raised later (because it was not-nor cannot-be waived), Ms. Uehara waived a generalized collateral attack: such as the one contained in this motion “made pursuant to Rule 11.” Doc. 235 at 1.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enforce the plea agreement-including the waiver of appellate and post-conviction rights. As such, the motion for reconsideration based on Rule 11(e) must be dismissed.
To the extent Ms. Uehara wants to file a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance-albeit in a separate civil case-that is certainly allowed. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Doc. 211 at ¶ 31. But her motion to reconsider rooted in Rule 11(d) is without merit.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Ms. Uehara's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 227) is DENIED as MOOT with respect to continuing the sentencing. Sentencing occurred (and no motion or Order of the Court can change that reality). Additionally, her request to withdraw her guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d) is DENIED as MOOT given the imposition of sentence. See Docs. 230 & 233.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ms. Uehara's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 227) is DISMISSED without prejudice to the extent she seeks to withdraw her guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e). First, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider her request to withdraw the plea. Further, after the imposition of sentence, Rule 11(e) permits withdrawal only “on direct appeal or collateral attack.” Ms. Uehara knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived these appellate and post-conviction rights, see Doc. 211 at ¶¶ 28-31, and the Court will enforce this waiver.