Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Defendant Alfred Tribbey, by and through Linda M. Parisi, his counsel of record, Defendant Ruben Barksdale by and through his counsel of record, Douglas Beevers, and plaintiff, by and through its counsel, Jason Hitt hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 5, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now moves to continue the status conference until February 13, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between December 5, 2013 and February 14, 2014 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and related documents.
b. Counsel for Mr. Tribbey and Mr. Barksdale need additional time to consult, to review discovery, conduct investigation and to discuss potential resolutions.
LINDA M. PARISI, LAW OFFICES OF WING & PARISI, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Alfred Tribbey.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JASON HITT, Assistant U.S. Attorney, For the United States.
LAW OFFICES OF DOUGLAS BEEVERS DOUGLAS BEEVERS, For the Defendant RUBEN CHANDLER BARKSDALE.
c. Counsel for defendants Mr. Tribbey and Mr. Barksdale believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The United States Attorney agrees to the continuance. e. All counsel agrees to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 5, 2013, to February 13, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
ORDER
Based on the reasons set forth in the stipulation of the parties filed on December 3, 2013, and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the status conference currently set for December 5, 2013, be vacated and that a status conference be set for Thursday, February 13, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated in the parties' December 3, 2013 stipulation, the time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act is excluded during the time period of December 5, 2013, through and including February 13, 2014, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code 25.