Opinion
CR20-0168-JCC
04-02-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY TIFT, Defendant.
ORDER
JOHN C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 351) of this Court's order extending Defendant's self-surrender date (Dkt. No. 348). In that order, the Court referenced Defendant's “history of employing dilatory tactics” while describing its reasoning for denying a previous order. (Id. at 1.) Defendant asks that the Court strike this language, arguing it “can later be used to discredit future important motions.” (Dkt. No. 351 at 1.) For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion.
Motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored. See CrR 12(b)(13). Reconsideration is only appropriate where there is “manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to [the Court's] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Id. “A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask the court to rethink what the court had already thought through-rightly or wrongly.” Wilcox v. Hamilton Construction, LLC, 426 F.Supp.3d 788, 792 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citations omitted).
Here, Defendant fails to point to any manifest error in the Court's order. On the contrary, his motion for reconsideration is entirely inapt considering that, in its order, the Court granted Defendant his requested relief. (See Dkt. No. 348) (extending Defendant's self-surrender date). Defendant cannot utilize the reconsideration process merely to nitpick phrases in the Court's order, especially where he received the outcome he sought. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 351).
To the extent Defendant's motion can be read as a motion to strike, the Court further denies this request.