Nor did it explain how the requirement could have been necessarily implied in Jimenez-Ortega when our court had upheld a Section 3C1.1 enhancement just months earlier in a case where the sentencing court had not made express findings on all three perjury elements. United States v. Armstrong, 749 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2014).
See United States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2014). And moving the handgun, in violation of the district court's pretrial release condition that Umoren "refrain from possessing a firearm," constituted concealing "evidence that is material to a[] . . . judicial proceeding." See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 Application Note 4(D); United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that we have affirmed the application of obstruction enhancements when defendants impede pretrial release proceedings); United States v. Manning, 704 F.3d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 2012) (lying to pretrial services about possession of firearms warranted obstruction of justice enhancement).
"[A] defendant who willfully provides materially false testimony to a judge during a bond revocation hearing may be subject to a sentence enhancement under section 3C1.1." United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2014).
A defendant commits perjury under § 3C1.1 if he "gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). The district court's finding that Laney believed he was telling the truth is inconsistent with a finding that Laney willfully offered false testimony. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621; Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94; United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2014). We accordingly vacate Laney's sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.
False testimony is material if it has the potential to obstruct the prosecution of the offense. See United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 642 (9th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2014); U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6 (defining materiality as "tend[ing] to influence or affect the issue under determination"). If believed, testimony that agents dragged Rodriguez-Penuelas into the United States still had the potential to influence the jury's decision, especially because Rodriguez-Penuelas' specific intent to enter the United States free from official restraint was a key element in dispute at trial.
The district court therefore made all findings necessary to trigger the enhancement. See United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that the district court did not err in failing to make a specific finding of perjury where it made sufficient findings that the defendant acted willfully). AFFIRMED.
These findings are sufficient to uphold a sentencing enhancement for perjury under section 3C1.1 on clear error review. See United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding sentencing enhancement under section 3C.1.1 when the district court reviewed a recording of a bond revocation hearing and determined that the defendant "clearly and unambiguously and under oath, told a story that was simply not true, based on the totality of the evidence[,] in an effort to persuade the magistrate judge that [he] should not be taken back into custody") (internal quotation marks omitted, second alteration in original)). AFFIRMED.
We review a district court's factual determination under Section 3C1.1 for clear error. United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2014). Appellant contends that the district court committed clear error in finding that he willfully obstructed justice.
We review a district court's construction and interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion. United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir.2014) ; United States v. Popov, 742 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.2014). Flores argues that the district court procedurally erred by applying a 2–level obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 without making the requisite willfulness and materiality findings.See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 4(D).
, the undersigned finds the district court's adoption of the PSR, the written objections and memoranda considered, and the district judge's statements on the record at the time of sentencing, accord with the required findings of United States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d at 822. United States v. Thomsen, 830 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016) (district court addressed elements of perjury, including falsity, intent, and materiality, in applying obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement to defendant's sentence for various crimes related to tax fraud scheme, and thus court did not erroneously apply enhancement, where court recognized falsity of defendant's testimony, court's findings encompassed intent to provide false testimony when it recognized that defendant gave false testimony in an attempt to exonerate himself, and court's findings encompassed materiality element when it found that the false testimony was intended to suggest that defendant was not person who committed the offenses); United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 846-848 (9th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Cuenca, 692 Fed.Appx.[] 857, 858-859 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Though the district court did not discuss each element of the obstruction of justice enhancement on the record, its adoption of the findings in the PSR regarding falsity, materiality, and willfulness were sufficient for the purposes of Castro-Ponce"). Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Local Rule 36-3, unpublished dispositions issued on or after January 1, 2007, may be cited to the courts of the Ninth Circuit in accordance with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 but are not precedent.