Opinion
Case No. 2:00-CR-00050
03-03-2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JAY TANIGUCHI, Defendant.
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Jay Taniguchi's Motion for Clarification and Modification of Judgment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). (Doc. 248). Defendant argues that this Court failed to set a detailed payment schedule and improperly delegated its statutory authority to the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). (Id. at 6). Defendant seeks an Order from this Court setting his payment schedule at $25.00 per quarter for the duration of his incarceration. (Doc. 250 at 4). The United States opposes, on the grounds that Defendant has failed to provide any evidence of a material change in his economic circumstances that affects his ability to pay pursuant to the restitution schedule, and that Defendant's disagreement with this Court's payment schedule should have been raised on appeal. (Doc. 249 at 2).
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 24, 2000, a jury convicted Defendant of multiple counts of robbery and the use of a firearm in the commission of a violent crime. (Doc. 69). On November 15, 2000, this Court sentenced Defendant to 504 months in prison, followed by 5 years supervised release. (Doc. 91; Doc. 94). The Court also ordered Defendant to pay a $600 special assessment, and restitution in the amount $166,907.75, to be paid immediately, or else to be paid through participation in the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP"). (Doc. 94 at 5).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 ("MVRA"), this Court has jurisdiction to adjust Defendant's payment schedule. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). To merit an adjustment, the Defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a "material change in [his] economic circumstances that might affect [his] ability to pay restitution." United States v. Baird, No. 3:03-CR-91, 2009 WL 5170198, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2009); United States v. Hill, No. 98-3709, 205 F.3d 1342, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999) (Defendant did not meet his evidentiary burden when he "did not attach any proof regarding his financial status or current income to the motion."). "A material change" is identified by "an objective comparison of a defendant's financial condition before and after a sentence is imposed." United States v. Dabny, No. 3:02-CR-68-003-R, 2009 WL 2422292, at *2 (W.D. Ky. July 29, 2009) (quoting United States v. Dye, 48 F. App'x. 218, 220 (8th Cir. 2002)).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendant asks that this Court set a detailed payment schedule to begin when Defendant is released and has a full time job with a secured income. (Doc. 248 at 11). Defendant argues that the Court failed to set forth a detailed payment schedule, and thus impermissibly delegated its statutory duty to the BOP, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B)(2). (Id. at 5-6). According to Defendant, the Court did not even consider the Defendant's financial position and simply ordered immediate payment, with the details to be set by the BOP. (Id. at 8). As such, Defendant asserts that the Court has jurisdiction to take corrective action. (Id. at 6).
The United States responds that Defendant's Motion must be denied because Defendant has provided no evidence of a material change in his economic circumstances that might affect his ability to pay under the current payment schedule. (Doc. 249 at 2). Moreover, it argues that Defendant's Motion is a collateral attack on his sentence that should have been raised on appeal, which Defendant failed to do both on direct appeal as well as on his collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Id. at 5-7); see United States v. Taniguchi, 49 F. App'x. 506 (6th Cir. 2002).
The MVRA provides that restitution is mandatory when the Defendant commits "a crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(l)(A)(i); United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). Under the MVRA, "the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). The Court must also "specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid." 18 U.S.C. § 3364(f)(2). The Court has discretion to adjust the payment schedule, if the defendant notifies "the court and the Attorney General of any material change in the [D]efendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution." 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). Upon a demonstration of material change in economic circumstances, the Court may then "adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice requires." Id.; see also Baird, 2009 WL 5170198, at *2. The Court will not modify its restitution order, however, when a defendant fails to produce any evidence of a material changes in his economic circumstances. United States v. Best, No. 04-CR-80879, 2008 WL 553241, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2008); United States v. Blankenship, No. 1:05-CR-29-03, 2008 WL 2325612, at *1 (W.D. Mich. June 2, 2008).
In this case, Defendant has failed to provide any evidence that there has been a material change to his economic circumstances which would warrant this Court to modify his payment schedule pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). Rather, Defendant employs § 3664(k) to attack the validity of this Court's initial restitution order. As the court made clear in Blankenship, this Court will not modify a restitution payment schedule when the Defendant presents no evidence that his financial situation has worsened. 2008 WL 2325612 at *1. Without providing such evidence, the Court cannot make an objective evaluation of Defendant's financial condition before and after his sentence was imposed. Dabny, 2009 WL 2422292 at *2. Moreover, there is no indication that Defendant has provided the required notice to the Attorney General of a material change in his economic circumstances.
Defendant instead asserts that modification is required since the Court entered an improper restitution order by delegating the setting of the payment schedule to the BOP. (Doc. 248 at 9). This argument should have been raised on appeal. See Best, 2008 WL 553241 at *2 ("Had Defendant wanted to attack the validity of the restitution order, he could have done so during his appeal."). The Court will not allow Defendant to use 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) as a vehicle to attack his judgment. Id. Moreover, even were the Court to consider Defendant's argument, reliance on the BOP to set a restitution payment schedule is not an improper abdication of this Court's responsibility. Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 359-60 (6th Cir. 2001).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Clarification and Modification of Judgment (Doc. 248) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE