Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER DATE
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 12, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 16, 2014, and to exclude time between December 12, 2013, and January 16, 2014, under Local Code T4.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHAEL D. ANDERSON, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America,
TASHA PARIS CHALFANT, Counsel for Defendant, VYACHESLAVA STASYUK.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 381 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client and to continue to conduct investigation, including locating and interviewing potential witnesses. Many of the interviews being conducted by the defense require the use of a Russian interpreter, which increases the time required to schedule and conduct the interviews. Counsel for the defendant believes it is likely that this case will proceed to trial and defense counsel also requires additional time for trial preparation and further examination and discussion of potential trial issues with her client. Finally, counsel for the defendant intended to be present at the currently scheduled status conference, but has been delayed out-of-state due to severe weather.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 12, 2013 to January 16, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.