Opinion
2:19-CR-00144-DCLC-CRW
04-13-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES SLATER, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Clifton L. Corker United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Charles Slater's Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release [Doc. 143] pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The United States responded in opposition to Defendant's Motion [Doc. 146]. This matter is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion [Doc. 143] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2019, Slater pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute at least five grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) [Docs. 40, 45]. Slater admitted he trafficked at least 35 grams of methamphetamine [Doc. 62, ¶ 9]. On July 8, 2020, the Court sentenced Slater to a term of 70 months' imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release [Doc. 124]. Slater currently is serving his sentence at Coleman Low FCI, and his projected release date is April 27, 2024. https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. On February 1, 2022, Slater moved for compassionate release [Doc. 143]. He seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because he has been diagnosed with a terminal illness, has a serious medical condition, faces a serious deterioration in his health because of the aging process, and for other extraordinary and compelling reasons [Id., pg. 4]. Importantly, Slater has not exhausted his administrative remedies by requesting compassionate release from the warden of his Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) facility [Id., pgs. 2-3]. Moreover, the Government opposes Slater's motion for compassionate release, and argues that he does not meet the requirements for compassionate release [Doc. 146].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“A district court may modify a defendant's sentence only as provided by statute.” United States v. Johnson, 564 F.3d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 2009). The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115 391, 132 Stat. 5194, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to provide district courts with the authority to modify a defendant's sentence and grant compassionate release
upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonments after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds thatsextraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reductionsand that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commissions18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The statute includes a separate basis for compassionate release which requires, among other prerequisites, that “the defendant is at least 70 years of age” and “has served at least 30 years in prison, ” but this provision does not apply to Defendant, as he is 67 years old and has only served approximately 33 months in the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).
Pursuant to this amendment, district courts may consider motions for compassionate release filed either by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) or by a defendant after the defendant has “exhaust[ed] the BOP's administrative process” or “thirty days after the warden received the compassionate release request-whichever is earlier.” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1105 (6th Cir. 2020). Exhaustion of the administrative remedies is a “mandatory condition” to defendant-filed motions for compassionate release. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 2020). However, because the administrative exhaustion requirement operates as a “claimprocessing rule, ” it may be waived or forfeited by the Government. Id. at 833-34. In this case, however, the Government has neither waived nor forfeited that requirement.
In addition to the procedural requirements, § 3582(c)(1)(A) “has identified three substantive requirements for granting relief.” United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1004 (6th Cir. 2020). The Court must: (1) find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons merit a sentence reduction”; (2) find “that the reduction is consistent with ‘applicable' Sentencing Commission policy statements”; and (3) consider the factors in Section 3553(a), to the extent they apply. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1003-06). A motion for compassionate release may be denied when any of the three substantive requirements are not met. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has clarified that when the defendant, rather than the BOP, files a motion for compassionate release, the Court “may skip step two of the [Section] 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry” and has “full discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling' without consulting the policy statement in [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.13.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1111.
III. ANALYSIS
The Government asserts that Slater has not satisfied the mandatory exhaustion requirement [Doc. 146, pg. 4]. The Government requests that the Court dismiss Slater's motion without prejudice for Slater's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies [Id., pg. 4]. Alternatively, the Government argues that Slater has not shown that compassionate release would be consistent with the substantive requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government does not dispute that on February 9, 2022, Slater requested a request to the warden of his facility, albeit after petitioning the Court for relief.
In United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2020), the Sixth Circuit addressed whether an inmate's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived the Court of subject matter of jurisdiction, and if not, could the Court excuse “Alam's failure to satisfy that requirement over the government's timely objections?” Id. at 833. Alam requested compassionate release from the prison warden but only waited ten days before he filed his petition in federal court. The government objected to Alam's seeking court intervention prior to fully exhausting his administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit held that his failure “to satisfy this administrative exhaustion requirement does not deprive [the Court] of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. But the Court noted that “it remains a mandatory condition.” Id. “When properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced.” Id. at 834 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Alam requires this Court to dismiss Slater's petition without prejudice. At the time he filed this petition, Slater had not even requested compassionate relief from the prison warden, much less wait the 30-day waiting period required by the statute. Moreover, the government has properly invoked this mandatory claims-processing rule, requesting the Court dismiss Slater's petition so that he can exhaust the administrative remedies. Because this rule “must be enforced” when properly invoked, the Court has no option but to dismiss without prejudice Slater's petition.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Slater's Motion for Compassionate Release [Doc. 143] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED: