Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHELE BECKWITH, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
DANNY D. BRACE, JR., Counsel for Defendant, Sergey Shchirskiy.
CHRISTOPHER R. COSCA, Counsel for Defendant, Vladimir Atamanyuk.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through defendants' counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 14, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 25, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between May 14, 2015, and June 25, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes several hundreds of pages of documents, including investigative reports, tax documents, and documents obtained via subpoena. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant Shchirskiy is currently in trial on another matter. Counsel for both defendants need additional time to review discovery, consult with their clients, to conduct investigation, and to otherwise prepare for trial, if necessary.
c) The parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) There are no objections to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 14, 2015 to June 25, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.