Opinion
21-2284
04-29-2022
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: April 4, 2022
Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
Before KELLY, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The district court refused to grant Naricco Scott any relief under the First Step Act. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). The reason it gave was that it could not reduce a sentence that was already at the statutory minimum. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010).
The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2019) (discussing the standard of review and outlining the two-step analysis for motions under the First Step Act). "The First Step Act applies to offenses, not conduct, and it is [the defendant's] statute of conviction that determines his eligibility for relief." Id. at 772 (citation omitted). Scott pleaded guilty to a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which carries a mandatory-minimum sentence of twenty years in prison under the Fair Sentencing Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010). The statutory minimum is the lowest sentence available, see United States v. Taylor, 982 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2020), and to the extent Scott now tries to collaterally attack his original sentence, he cannot do so through a motion like this one, see United States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining how motions under the First Step Act are different from "original, plenary sentencing" proceedings); see also United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (refusing to entertain this type of challenge).
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.