Opinion
17-CR-548 (JMF)
03-23-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSHUA SHULTE, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
The Court has received two pro se motions from Defendant Joshua Schulte, copies of which are attached as Exhibits A and B. In the first, Defendant moves to recuse the undersigned on the ground of “bias and prejudice.” In the second, Defendant moves primarily for access to a laptop and for leave to file an addendum to his Rule 29 and 33 motion. The Court construes both motions to be limited to litigation of the Rule 29 and 33 motion, as to which Defendant is proceeding pro se. Defendant is now represented for all other purposes, which includes sentencing on the counts of conviction and his upcoming trial on child pornography and copyright charges. Pursuant to the Court's inherent docket-managing authority, the Court will not consider Defendants' pro se motions with respect to those matters. See, e.g., United States v. DiPietro, No. 02-CR-1237 (SWK), 2007 WL 3130553, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007) (“Pursuant to its docket-managing authority, a district court may reject purported pro se motions filed by a represented defendant.”); United States v. de la Cruz, No. 06-CR-1091 (SAS), 2007 WL 2325860, at *3 n.46 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2007) (noting that a court has discretion to accept - and, by implication, reject - pro se submissions from a represented criminal defendant).
Defendant's motion to recuse is DENIED as frivolous. In general, a showing of bias to warrant a judge's recusal must be based on “extrajudicial conduct, not conduct which arises in a judicial context.” Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d 1138, 1141 (2d Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citation omitted). Moreover, because recusal “necessarily results in a waste of the judicial resources which have already been invested in the proceeding,” In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 933 (2d Cir. 1980), a judge is “as much obliged not to recuse himself when it is not called for as he is obliged to when it is,” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988). In light of these standards, Defendant's motion - which is based entirely on a select handful of the Court's rulings (some of which are mischaracterized no less) - is frivolous. Put simply, his “disagreements with the Court's rulings and his unsupported accusations of bias are insufficient to warrant recusal.” Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Balchem Corp., No. 17-CV-2810 (PMH), 2023 WL 2266536, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023).
Defendant's motion for other relief, including for access to a laptop and for leave to file an “addendum” to his Rule 29 and 33 motion, is also DENIED. Defendant's motion proceeds from the premise that he had a right to the laptop that he was given to prepare for his second trial, at which he chose to represent himself. As the Court has noted before, however, that premise is mistaken. See, e.g., ECF No. 970. It is well established that “the right to represent oneself in criminal proceedings, [although] protected by the Sixth Amendment, . . . does not carry with it a right to state-financed library resources where state-financed legal assistance is available,” as it certainly is here. Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1981); see Tellier v. Reish, 164 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished); Smith v. Hutchins, 426 Fed.Appx. 785, 789-90 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); United States v. Byrd, 208 F.3d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2000); Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F.Supp.2d 157, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Instead, any right of access to legal resources owed to pretrial detainees “is satisfied when the presiding courts merely offer such detainees appointed counsel or standby counsel.” Stanko v. Patton, No. 8:06-CV-290, 2007 WL 1309701, at *2-3 (D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2007) (citing cases). It follows that Defendant, who has had counsel or standby counsel at all times throughout this litigation, has no legal basis to demand the resources he is seeking - resources, the Court notes, that were taken away in the first instance (if not permanently) for good reason. See ECF Nos. 954, 1022.
Separate and apart from the issue of legal entitlement, Defendant does not need the resources he seeks to prepare his reply memorandum of law - which is the only work he has left to do in his pro se capacity. Over the course of this case, Defendant has filed literally dozens of motions and other papers, some prepared on a computer, some prepared on a typewriter, and some (like the two motions addressed here) prepared by hand. In other words, Defendant has demonstrated that he is entirely capable of responding to the Government's opposition without a laptop. Nor is there any basis to file an “addendum” to the Rule 29 and 33 motion. Through multiple extensions, see ECF Nos. 888, 962, 986, the Court granted Defendant six months to prepare his post-trial motion - a motion that, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is ordinarily due within fourteen days of a verdict. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1), 33(b)(2). Moreover, when finally filed, Defendant's motion was a shocking seventy-two pages longer than the forty pages the Court had allotted - yet the Court denied the Government's (well-justified) motion to strike his brief. See ECF No. 996. In short, Defendant has had ample time and ample pages to make any arguments he wanted to make. He is welcome to file his reply - not exceed thirty pages (or it will be stricken), see id. - and that is it. As a courtesy, the Court grants Defendant an additional two weeks, to April 13, 2023, to file that reply.
SO ORDERED.,