Opinion
17-CR-548 (JMF)
11-10-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSHUA SHULTE, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JESSE M. FURMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On November 10, 2022, the Court received a letter from Defendant seeking “reconsideration” of the decision to deny his request for a laptop computer to prepare his posttrial motions, with respect to which he is still proceeding pro se. See Doc. No. 969 (“Def.'s Letter”). Defendant contends that the Court's decision violates his “5th Amendment right to Due Process.” Id. at 1.
Every court to consider the question - including the Second Circuit - has held that “the right to represent oneself in criminal proceedings[, although] protected by the Sixth Amendment, . . . does not carry with it a right to state-financed library resources where state-financed legal assistance is available.” Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1981); see Tellier v. Reish, 164 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished); Smith v. Hutchins, 426 F. App'x. 785, 789-90 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); United States v. Byrd, 208 F.3d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2000); Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F.Supp.2d 157, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Instead, any right of access to legal resources owed to pretrial detainees “is satisfied when the presiding courts merely offer such detainees appointed counsel or standby counsel.” Stanko v. Patton, No. 06-CV-290, 2007 WL 1309701, at *2-3 (D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2007) (citing cases).
In light of these principles, Defendant's request for reconsideration is DENIED as utterly frivolous. The fact that Defendant was granted permission to use a laptop (and provided other extraordinary resources) to prepare for trial is immaterial - and gave him no “property right” that would trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. First, the task now is simpler: Defendant is preparing a memorandum of law using a closed universe of materials (the trial transcript, exhibits, etc.). It is no hardship to require that he do so using a typewriter - or, if that technology is too “ancient” for his tastes, Def.'s Letter 1, by hand. Second, there have been two material developments since Defendant was granted a laptop: Defendant was convicted after two trials of various serious offenses - including contempt of court and offenses relating to the abuse of electronic devices - and multiple judges have found probable cause to believe that Defendant used his laptop in violation of Court orders and/or the law. See ECF No. 954, at 1-3.
In short, there is no merit to Defendant's argument that he is entitled to a laptop under the Constitution or otherwise (let alone to his suggestion that, if he is denied a laptop, the Government should be “force[d] . . . to use a typewriter as well,” Def.'s Letter 2). And to the extent the Court has discretion over the matter, the Court exercises its discretion to deny Defendant's request for a laptop to prepare his post-trial motions. If Defendant does not want to use a typewriter or pen to prepare his motions, he has two choices: He can forego filing any motions or he can decide to give up his self-representation with respect to the post-trial motions and allow appointed counsel to file any motions on his behalf.
SO ORDERED.