Opinion
Criminal Case No. 10-cr-00164-REB
06-21-2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. 1. RICHARD SANTIAGO, and 2. SILVESTRE MAYORQUI RIVERA, Defendants.
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
ORDER EXCLUDING ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
(18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A))
Blackburn, J.
The matter is before me again sua sponte to exclude additional time under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (the Act). Based on the analysis below, I exclude approximately 180 days from May 2, 2012, through November 2, 2012, from the computation of time for a speedy trial under the Act.
I engaged in a similar analysis and entered a similar order on December 21, 2011. See [#468] entered December 21, 2011.
On December 21, 2011, I entered an Order Excluding Time Under Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)) [#468]. The order, inter alia, excluded from the time for a speedy trial "an additional 180 days from November 2, 2011," see Order at 2, ¶ 1, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Although given a reasonable time to object to my findings, conclusions, or orders, no party objected.
"[#468]" is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific paper by the court's electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I continue to use this convention throughout this order and the orders entered in this case.
I have been monitoring this case carefully. Even though the defendants have been severed, I continue to find it appropriate to address speedy trial in a single order. Both defendants continue to review discovery and conduct pretrial investigation. I have entered scheduling orders governing the filing of pretrial motions and corresponding responses. Both defendants have indicated when each may be ready to proceed to trial. Without the exclusion of additional time, both defendants could be forced to trial - ironically in the name of speedy trial - well before they can be trial ready. The totality of relevant circumstances ineluctably cause me to conclude that the failure to exclude an additional 180 days would actually shorten the time for a speedy trial; thus, depriving counsel for the defendants of the time reasonably necessary for pretrial and trial preparation with the concomitant risk of a miscarriage of justice. Section 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). Additionally, the failure to exclude an additional 180 days in this complex case would make it unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial and trial proceedings in the time otherwise allocated for a speedy trial under the Act. Section 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii). Thus, I conclude ultimately that the ends of justice by excluding an additional 180 days outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial in a technical sense. Section 3161(h)(7)(A).
Although my findings "'may be entered on the record after the fact, they may not be made after the fact.'" United States v. Hill, 197 F.3d 436, 441 (quoting United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir.1989)). "Instead, '[t]he balancing must occur contemporaneously with the granting of the continuance because Congress intended that the decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance be prospective, not retroactive[.]'" Id. (quoting Doran, 882 F.2d at 1516). I conducted my analysis and reached my conclusions on or about May 2, 2012. The press of business has delayed the entry of this written order. Thus, I have discharged these duties.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. That an additional 180 days from May 2, 2012, through November 2, 2012, SHALL BE EXCLUDED under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) from the time for a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974; and
The exclusion of this period in no way affects the exclusion of some or all of this same time or additional time under other provisions of the Act, e.g., § 3161(h)(1)D) (delay resulting from other pending pretrial motions.)
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2. That any party that objects to the foregoing findings, conclusions, or orders shall file its objections by July 9, 2012.
Dated June 21, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
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Robert E. Blackburn
United States District Judge