Opinion
4:04-cr-00199
2021-02-01
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Sergio SANTAMARIA, Defendant.
Andrew H. Kahl, Maureen McGuire, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew H. Kahl, Maureen McGuire, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
ORDER GRANTING COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Sergio Santamaria's Motion for Compassionate Release filed on November 23, 2020. ECF No. 522. The Government filed its Resistance on January 29, 2021. ECF No. 531. The matter is fully submitted.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 1, 2005, a jury found Defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy knowingly and intentionally to distribute methamphetamine. ECF No. 208. Less than a week before trial commenced, the Government had introduced a notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 asserting Defendant had two prior drug felony convictions: a California conviction for possession of marijuana for sale for which Defendant was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment, and a conviction for possession of cocaine base resulting in a sentence of ninety days’ imprisonment. ECF No. 522-1 at 4. As a result, the Court had "no alternative in the case ... except the statutory minimum, which in this case is life." ECF No. 460 at 13.
Since Defendant's sentencing in 2006, Congress passed the First Step Act, which, in addition to authorizing compassionate release in extraordinary and compelling circumstances, limited the applicability of the § 851 enhancement to "serious drug felonies," defined as drug felonies with a sentence of at least twelve months’ imprisonment. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (2018). Further, in 2016, the state of California legalized possession of marijuana for sale. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11359. Pursuant to the revised law, in 2017 Defendant applied for and received a redesignation of his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale. ECF No. 522-2. Without this felony drug conviction, if Defendant were sentenced under current law he would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of only 120 months. ECF No. 522-1 at 13. Defendant has now been imprisoned for over fifteen years and currently resides in United States Penitentiary (USP) Victorville. Id. at 7.
Since Defendant was sentenced, the disease known as COVID-19 has killed more than 441 thousand U.S. citizens and infected over 26.2 million. Latest Map and Case Count , N.Y. Times (Feb. 1, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www-nytimes-com.sw.library.ntpu.edu.tw:8443/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has also suffered from the pandemic. At least 3,117 inmates and 1,782 BOP employees have "open" and "confirmed" cases of COVID-19. COVID-19 Cases , Fed. Bureau Prisons (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus. Three employees and 210 inmates have died. Id. Meanwhile, 42,671 inmates and 4,321 staff have had the virus but recovered. Id. The pandemic is no distant threat at Defendant's prison, USP Victorville in Victorville, California. Twenty-three inmates and thirteen staff members currently have open cases of the virus. Id. Overall, the COVID-19 outbreak at Victorville has taken a heavy toll on the facility, with 492 inmates and sixty-four staff recovered from the virus. See id.
Defendant is now forty-five years old and suffers from obesity, prediabetes, and hypertension. ECF No. 522-1 at 16. On December 21, 2020, Defendant requested compassionate release from his warden on the basis that his health conditions, risk of severe illness should he contract the COVID-19 virus, and unjust life sentence constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. ECF No. 530-1. It does not appear that the warden ever responded to the request. See ECF No. 530.
II. ANALYSIS
The First Step Act of 2018 amended numerous provisions of the U.S. Code to promote rehabilitation of prisoners and unwind decades of mass incarceration. Cong. Research Serv., R45558, The First Step Act of 2018: An Overview 1 (2019). Congress designed the statute at issue here "to boost grants of compassionate release by reforming [ 18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s procedures." United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1104, (6th Cir. 2020). Under the old regime, defendants could only petition the BOP Director who could then make a motion at their discretion to the district court. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 cmt. n.4 (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2018) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
"The BOP used that power so ‘sparingly’ that the Department of Justice's Inspector General found in a 2013 report that an average of only 24 imprisoned persons were released each year by BOP motion." United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing U.S. Dep't of Just., Office of the Inspector Gen., The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Compassionate Release Program 1 (2013), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/e1306.pdf). The amended provision for the first time allows defendants to petition district courts directly for compassionate release. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
A. Exhaustion
The First Step Act's gatekeeping provision creates two ways for a defendant to bring a compassionate release motion to a district court. The defendant may file a motion after he "has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Here, Defendant satisfied the gatekeeping provision because thirty days have passed since the BOP received his request. ECF No. 530. The Court may address the merits.
The Government also does not dispute Defendant has satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s gatekeeping requirement. See ECF No. 531; see also United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s gatekeeping requirement is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule that the Government can waive or forfeit).
B. Merits
Compassionate release provides a path for defendants with "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to leave prison early. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Such a sentence reduction must comply with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and "applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Judge Guido Calabresi recently summarized the history of statutory compassionate release in United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 231–34 (2d Cir. 2020). Prior to Brooker , no circuit had ruled as to whether the Sentencing Commission's outdated policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and particularly Application Note 1(D), applied under § 3582(c)(1)(A). If applicable, § 1B1.13 would limit discretion to find "extraordinary and compelling" reasons justifying compassionate release exclusively to the BOP Director. Brooker , 976 F.3d at 235.
Many district courts, including this one, have concluded the Commission lacks an applicable policy statement regarding when a court can grant compassionate release. United States v. Brown , 457 F. Supp. 3d 691, 699 (S.D. Iowa 2020), appeal dismissed following government request , No. 20-2053 (8th Cir. June 16, 2020); United States v. Haynes , 456 F. Supp. 3d 496, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing thirteen such cases). In Brooker , the Second Circuit affirmed this conclusion, holding,
[T]he First Step Act freed district courts to consider the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before them in motions for compassionate release. Neither Application Note 1(D), nor anything else in the now-outdated version of Guideline § 1B1.13, limits the district court's discretion.
In the absence of an applicable policy statement, "the Court can determine whether any extraordinary and compelling reasons other than those delineated in" the Commission's outdated commentary support release. United States v. Cantu , 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 352 (S.D. Tex. 2019). The result is that the district court can consider all relevant factors when assessing a defendant's motion. See Brooker , 976 F.3d at 236 ("Application Note 1(D) cannot constrain district courts’ discretion to consider whether any reasons are extraordinary and compelling."). In sum, if the First Step Act is to increase the use of compassionate release as intended, "When the BOP does not timely act or administrative options are exhausted, ‘whichever is earlier,’ discretion to decide compassionate release motions is to be moved from the BOP Director to the courts." Brooker , 976 F.3d at 237 (quoting § 3583(c)(1)(A)). "District judges must operate under the statutory criteria—‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’—subject to deferential appellate review." United States v. Gunn , 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020).
1. Defendant's Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
a. Excessive Sentence
Several courts, including this one, have concluded that drastic sentencing disparities created by sentencing law reforms can be an extraordinary and compelling reason supporting release. Brown , 457 F. Supp. 3d at 702 (holding changes to mandatory minimum sentence calculations for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) constitute one of several extraordinary and compelling reasons); e.g., United States v. McPherson , 454 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1053 (W.D. Wash. 2020) ("It is extraordinary that a civilized society can allow this to happen to someone who, by all accounts, has long since learned his lesson.").
Here, as the Court has long maintained, Defendant's life sentence for a non-violent drug trafficking offense "would be laughable if only there w[as not a] real p[erson] on the receiving end." United States v. Holloway , 68 F. Supp. 3d 310, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ; see also ECF No. 460. Defendant only faced a mandatory life sentence because the Government chose to flag two prior drug convictions under § 851. These prior convictions were incredibly minor—Defendant served a combined eight months for the two offenses—yet they were sufficient to trigger a mandatory life sentence under a more draconian version of 18 U.S.C. § 841. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000).
Congress has since made drastic changes to the law. Now, only a "serious drug felony" for which the defendant served more than a year of imprisonment can trigger an enhanced penalty under § 841(b)(1)(A). See § 841(b)(1)(A) (2018) ; 21 U.S.C. § 802(57). Because Defendant served less than a year for each offense, neither would qualify. See ECF No. 522 at 13. Thus, Defendant would only face a mandatory minimum of ten years for this conviction rather than the life sentence he received.
And even if Defendant had two prior convictions for a "serious drug felony," as required under modern law, the mandatory minimum would be just twenty-five years. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2018).
More importantly, a life sentence is objectively inhumane here. Defendant moved to the United States at the age of sixteen "to work and have a better life." ECF No. 389 ¶ 67. Instead, Defendant worked at minimum wage jobs in California and found cash-paying work when he moved to Des Moines. Id. ¶¶ 83–85. Despite this difficult background, Defendant had only three prior convictions (accounting for the redesignation of his possession conviction) before his arrest for the underlying offense. Id. ¶¶ 57–59. The Court understands the importance of finality in criminal proceedings. Even so, justice has a role, too. The fact Defendant received a mandatory life sentence for a low-level drug crime is "extraordinary" in itself. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The Court is sensitive to the fact that retroactivity for sentencing calculations generally is the Legislature's province. But Congress already demonstrated how factors that cannot be an "extraordinary and compelling reason" alone can still be considered with other factors. See § 994(t). And if this is so, it is hard to argue that the unfairness of keeping a man in prison for decades more than if he had committed the same crime today is anything other than compelling. This is especially so when Defendant almost certainly would have completed his term of imprisonment by now if sentenced under modern law. Defendant thus presents an "extraordinary and compelling reason[ ]" for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
b. COVID-19
The district courts holding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release are legion. E.g., United States v. Tillman , No. 12-cr-2024, 2020 WL 3578374, at *5 (N.D. Iowa June 30, 2020) ; United States v. Schneider , No. 14-CR-30036, 2020 WL 2556354, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 20, 2020). It necessarily follows that COVID-19 presents a still-greater extraordinary and compelling reason for release when a defendant's prison is battling a bona fide outbreak. United States v. McLin , No. 1:17-CR-110-LG-RHW, 2020 WL 3803919, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 7, 2020) (finding that "the threat posed by COVID-19 at FCI Forrest City Low, in conjunction with McLin's medical vulnerability, weigh[ed] in favor of his release" but ultimately concluding the § 3553(a) factors barred release); United States v. McCall , 465 F. Supp. 3d. 1201, 1209 (M.D. Ala. 2020) (finding "the overwhelming number of COVID-19 cases," in combination with other factors, constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for release). This is particularly so when an inmate has preexisting health conditions that increase the likelihood of COVID-19 complications. As stated above, Defendant has numerous such conditions that increase his risk of severe illness should he contract the virus. People with Certain Medical Conditions , Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/groups-at-higher-risk.html. The Government concedes Defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for release given his health conditions and the outbreak at USP Victorville. ECF No. 533 ¶ 8. Thus, the Court concludes Defendant's health conditions and the risk posed to him by the COVID-19 pandemic create a second extraordinary and compelling reason for his release.
c. Rehabilitation
Defendant also argues his substantial rehabilitation during sixteen years in prison constitutes another extraordinary and compelling reason for release. "Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered" sufficiently extraordinary and compelling to justify compassionate release. § 994(t) (emphasis added). Yet a "statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions." Corley v. United States , 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn , 542 U.S. 88, 101, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004) ). This means that for the word "alone" to do any work—as it must—the statute allows courts to consider rehabilitation as part of a compassionate release motion. Thus, several courts, including this one, have found a defendant's rehabilitation to be part of the extraordinary and compelling reasons favoring release. E.g., Brown , 457 F. Supp. 3d at 701 ; United States v. Chan , No. 96-CR-00094-JSW-13, 2020 WL 1527895, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020).
Here, Defendant provided ample evidence that he is no longer the same person whom this Court incarcerated in 2006. In sixteen years, Defendant never incurred a disciplinary violation until January 2020. ECF No. 522-1 at 8. Defendant was such a model inmate, in fact, that the Supervisor of Education wrote a letter of recommendation supporting him when he was transferred between BOP facilities in 2014. ECF No. 522-4. Meanwhile, Defendant completed drug treatment and the BOP's "Challenge Program," earned his GED in 2009, served as a suicide companion and an ESL tutor, worked throughout his incarceration, and completed numerous education programs. ECF No. 522-1 at 7–8. Defendant's concerted efforts to grow as a person despite the hardships of incarceration weigh strongly in favor of compassionate release.
2. Section 3553(a) Factors
Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), this Court must "consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors before rendering a compassionate release decision." Jones , 980 F.3d at 1114 (citing Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 49–50, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) ). The Court's lodestar is to ensure the sentence is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary." § 3553(a). The Court also conducts this analysis given the conditions Defendant currently faces at USP Victorville, not the conditions a defendant usually experiences in a BOP facility.
"District judges maintain an ‘obligation to provide reasons’ in ... sentencing-modification decisions." Jones , 980 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Chavez-Meza v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1963, 201 L.Ed.2d 359 (2018) ). In Defendant's case, he possessed methamphetamine for the purpose of distribution. As explained above, Defendant has served more than the term of incarceration this Court would have imposed under current law. The nature and circumstances of the offense do not justify further incarceration. See § 3553(a)(1).
In considering the remaining § 3553(a) factors, the Court must assess Defendant as a whole person. Koon v. U.S. , 518 U.S. 81, 113, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). Defendant has demonstrated significant rehabilitation and can no longer benefit from "educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment," provided by the BOP. See § 3553(a)(2)(D). Further, Defendant's criminal history demonstrates he is not a recidivism risk or a significant danger to the public. Id. at (a)(2)(B), (C). The Court does not excuse Defendant's behavior but is "simply suggesting that [he is a] human being[ ]," with flaws, virtues, and a need for empathy. Richard S. Arnold, Remarks Before the Judicial Conference of the Eighth Circuit: The Art of Judging (Aug. 8, 2002).
The "need for the sentence imposed" also appears weaker given the extremely high risk to Defendant should he contract COVID-19. § 3553(a)(2). Although in normal times extended incarceration might be appropriate, normal times these are not. Given the risks to Defendant should he contract COVID-19, the Court finds Defendant's term of incarceration sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate deterrence, and provide Defendant with educational and vocational training. See § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), (D).
The Court acknowledges the need "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant." § 3553(a)(2)(C). However, incarceration is not the only "kind[ ] of sentence available," and there are other ways to achieve the same public protection. § 3553(a)(3). Further, Defendant will most likely be deported upon release, which is itself a punishment. Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 364, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) ("[D]eportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants ...." (footnote omitted)). Any lingering public safety concerns are mooted by the fact of Defendant's impending deportation.
As the Court has repeatedly noted as of late, a decision does not cease to be an "exercise of reason simply because it is also an exercise of compassion." United States v. Likens , 464 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2006) (Bright, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Gall , 552 U.S. at 52 n.7, 128 S.Ct. 586. The Court grants Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release because it is supported by extraordinary and compelling reasons as well as the § 3553(a) factors.
C. Release Plan
Defendant's remaining term of imprisonment shall be reduced to time served following a fourteen-day quarantine period with the BOP that begins February 1, 2021. If Defendant is not deported upon release, he shall serve a five-year term of supervised release subject to the conditions imposed in the 2006 Judgment. See ECF No. 379.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 522) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.