Opinion
Mag. 20-14031 (DEA)
11-21-2021
Andres Jalon, Esq. Counsel for Defendant Alexander E. Ramey Assistant United States Attorney
Andres Jalon, Esq. Counsel for Defendant
Alexander E. Ramey Assistant United States Attorney
CONTINUANCE ORDER
HONORABLE DOUGLAS E. ARPERT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter having come before the Court on the joint application of Rachael A. Honig, Acting United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey (by Alexander E. Ramey, Assistant United States Attorney), and defendant Elizabeth Sanchez (by Andres Jalon, Esq.), for an order granting a continuance of the proceedings in the above-captioned matter from the date of this order through January 3, 2022, and the defendant being aware that she has the right to have the matter submitted to a grand jury within 30 days of the date of her arrest pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 3161(b), and the defendant through her attorney having consented to the continuance, and one prior continuance having been granted by the Court; and for good and sufficient cause shown, IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that this action should be continued for the following reasons:
1. Plea negotiations may soon commence, and both the United States and the defendant seek time to achieve a successful resolution of1
these negotiations, which would render trial of this matter unnecessary;
2. Defendant has consented to the aforementioned continuance;
3. The grant of a continuance will likely conserve judicial resources; and
4. Pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 316l(h)(7), the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, it is on this 12th day of November, 2021, ORDERED that the proceedings scheduled in the above-captioned matter are continued from the date of this Order through and including January 3 2022;
ORDERED that the period from the date of this Order through and including January 3, 2022, shall be excludable in computing time under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974; and 2