Opinion
Crim. 20-244 (PAM/ECW)
09-20-2024
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Tayrel Lamar Rulford, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Court Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Tayrel Lamar Rulford's pro se Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 148) and pro se Motions to Reduce Sentence under Amendment 821 (Docket Nos. 150, 155). For the following reasons, the Motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
On April 12, 2022, Rulford pled guilty to possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2). (Docket No. 91.) The Court sentenced Rulford to 120 months' imprisonment on October 4, 2022. (Docket Nos. 114, 116.) Rulford filed a Motion asking the Court to reconsider his sentence, which the Court denied. (Docket Nos. 115, 118.) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. (Docket No. 145.)
DISCUSSION
A. Section 2255 Motion
Rulford's § 2255 Motion contains four grounds for relief: (1) disagreement with the appliable guidelines in this case; (2) alleged ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) an alleged error at sentencing and the conditions at USP Hazelton; and (4) changes to the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court will address each in turn.
1. Collateral Attack on Sentencing Guidelines
Rulford contends that the Court should have imposed a lower sentence because during his youth he lacked guidance, suffered abuse, and depended on drugs and alcohol. (Docket No. 148 at 5.) Section 2255 “provides a remedy for jurisdictional and constitutional errors.” Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “Beyond that, the permissible scope of a § 2255 collateral attack on a final conviction or sentence is severely limited; ‘an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Relief under . . . § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, Rulford could have raised this challenge to the sentencing guidelines calculations on direct appeal but did not do so. The collateral attack on the sentencing guidelines is not properly raised in this § 2255 motion, as the guideline sentence imposed did not exceed the Court's statutory authority. See Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705.
In any event, in the plea agreement, Rulford waived his right to bring a § 2255 motion except for claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel or retroactive changes in the law. (Docket No. 91 at 8.) Rulford's request that the Court consider various aspects of his history and background fall outside the exceptions to that waiver. This claim fails.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Rulford claims that he is innocent and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations and at sentencing. (Docket No. 148 at 7.) The Court presumes that the attorney provided effective representation, and “will not second-guess strategic decisions or exploit the benefits of hindsight.” Henderson v. Norris, 118 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Court's “scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). To prevail on a claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, Rulford must establish both that his attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by it. Id.
To establish that counsel performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland, Rulford must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Anderson v. United States, 393 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate prejudice, Rulford must establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If he cannot establish prejudice, the Court need not address the reasonableness of the representation, because the failure to establish prejudice is dispositive of a § 2255 claim of ineffective assistance. Apfel, 97 F.3d at 1076.
The Government initially indicted Rulford as an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm; thus, he faced a mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). (Docket No. 1.) But Rulford's counsel negotiated a plea agreement that allowed him to plead guilty to a less serious charge, which carried a statutory maximum sentence of 120 months' imprisonment. (Docket No. 91 at 6-7.) Therefore, Rulford faced a significantly shorter guidelines range under the plea agreement than he would have if sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act-his counsel was extremely effective during plea negotiations.
Rulford's claim regarding his attorney's conduct at sentencing similarly fails. Before sentencing, Rulford's counsel secured his enrollment in Minnesota Adult and Teen Challenge, diverting him from further time spent in pretrial detention. (Docket No. 44.) Moreover, Rulford's counsel filed a motion to reconsider Rulford's sentence immediately after sentencing. (Docket No. 115.) Rulford's conclusory assertions regarding his attorney's performance do not demonstrate any deficiency in his counsel's representation, and the ineffective-assistance claim is without merit.
3. Alleged Error at Sentencing and Miscellaneous Relief
Rulford next contends that the Court erred at the sentencing hearing, erroneously applying a mandatory sentence. As an initial matter, this claim is not cognizable in a § 2255 motion, as it should be raised on direct appeal. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 702.
Even if Rulford's claim regarding the Court's alleged error at sentencing was properly before the Court, it is without merit. The Court sentenced Rulford to 120 months' imprisonment, the length of imprisonment to which Rulford agreed in his plea agreement and that the parties jointly recommended at sentencing. Immediately following the sentencing hearing, Rulford's counsel filed a motion to reconsider, based on the Court's comments at sentencing. (Docket No. 115.) The Court denied that motion, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision. (Docket Nos. 118, 145.) Rulford's claim regarding an error at sentencing is without merit.
Additionally, Rulford takes issue with various aspects and conditions of his incarceration at USP Hazelton. This claim is likewise not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 702.
4. First Step Act
Rulford raises a claim for relief under “New Law and Changes in the Sentencing Guidelines” for victims of abuse and individuals serving long sentences. (Docket No. 148 at 4.) These categories mirror those included in the revised Sentencing Guidelines' policy statement, which became effective November 1, 2023. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Thus, the Court construes Rulford's request as a claim for compassionate release under the First Step Act.
Before a defendant may seek compassionate release from a district court, the First Step Act requires the defendant to have “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Rulford provides no evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies in the facility in which he is detained. See United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the claim. Further, motions for compassionate release and motions to correct a sentence are distinct from each other; thus, the Court cannot, when considering a § 2255 motion, concurrently consider claims falling under § 3582. See United States v. Fine, 982 F.3d 1117, 1119 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court's decision not to consider § 2255 claims raised in a § 3582 motion). Rulford's unexhausted claim for compassionate release is denied without prejudice.
5. Certificate of Appealability
Rulford may not appeal this Court's ruling on his Motion without a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). But such a certificate requires Rulford to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2); see also Kramer v. Kemna, 21 F.3d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Good faith and lack of frivolousness, without more, do not serve as sufficient bases for issuance of a certificate under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.”). Rulford must establish that the issues he raises are “debatable among reasonable jurists,” that different courts “could resolve the issues differently,” or that the issues otherwise “deserve further proceedings.” Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997). Rulford has not met this high standard, and no certificate of appealability will issue.
B. Amendment 821
A court may modify a previously imposed term of imprisonment if the defendant's sentencing range has subsequently been lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In Amendment 821, the Commission amended two sections of the Guidelines and specified that these amendments should be applied retroactively. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2), (d). “The first change limits the impact of § 4A1.1 ‘status points,' which are criminal-history points added when the defendant committed his offense while under another criminal sentence.” United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 15-185, 2023 WL 8868799, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 2023) (Schiltz, C.J.); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 7. The change to § 4A1.1 does not apply to Rulford because he was not determined to have status points at sentencing, and therefore he is ineligible for relief under this section.
Amendment 821 also changed § 4C1.1 by “providing] a decrease of two levels from the [otherwise applicable total] offense level” for defendants who meet certain criteria, including having no criminal history points. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.10 cmt. 7, 4C1.1(a)(1). Because the Court determined that Rulford had criminal history points at sentencing, he is not a zero-point offender and is thus ineligible for a sentencing reduction under § 4C1.1. Therefore, he does not qualify for a reduction in his total offense level under Amendment 821.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Rulford's pro se Motion to Vacate (Docket No. 148) is DENIED; and
2. Rulford's pro se Motions to Reduce Sentence (Docket Nos. 150 and 155) are DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.