But cf. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832-33 n. 3, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) (declining to address question of equivocal requests for counsel; finding defendant's agreement to answer oral questions, but not to give any written statement without counsel present, to be unequivocal waiver of his right to remain silent in counsel's absence); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492-93, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam) (declining to address question of equivocal responses; finding defendant's request for counsel unequivocal when, after being told that he had a right to have counsel present, he replied, "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that."); United States v. Rondon, 614 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding assertion of right to counsel implicit in fact that defendant said he would "talk to Legal Aid" about treatment by police); United States v. Olsen, 609 F. Supp. 1154, 1158-60 (D.Me. 1985) (same where defendant asserted right to an attorney when evidence showed that "at some point" defendant "discussed with [the questioning postal inspector] his need for an attorney"). In the present case, however, the defendant's statement is not an assertion of his right to an attorney, nor is it an "equivocal" assertion.
We stated that the "ritualistic reading" of the rights will not always be sufficient to fulfill the prosecution's obligation. McDevitt, 484 So.2d at 550 (citing United States v. Rondon, 614 F.Supp. 667, 670 (S.D.N.Y.1985)). Our holding in McDevitt controls here.
The defendant was picked up from the M.C.C. at approximately 10:00 a.m. and was taken to 26 Federal Plaza for "routine processing" which generally takes one hour and in this case took 65 minutes. At this point, approximately 11:15 a.m., the defendant could have been taken to the United States Courthouse for arraignment before a magistrate. Given the local geography, Rivera was transported right past the courthouse door on his way from the M.C.C. to 26 Federal Plaza. Instead, the defendant was read his Miranda rights and questioned by Agent Galligan and Detective Bostic. This interview resembles the troublesome Southern District United States Attorney's policy of prearraignment interviews, discussed in Perez, United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. den., 469 U.S. 1161, 105 S.Ct. 915, 83 L.Ed.2d 928 (1985) and United States v. Rondon, 614 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). During his prearraignment interview the defendant signed a written confession admitting his complicity in several robberies.
The Miranda warnings are not to be treated as ‘a mere textual formality to be recited on the way to eliciting a confession.’ United States v. Rondon, 614 F.Supp. 667, 670 (S.D.N.Y.1985).”State v. McDevitt, 484 So.2d 543, 549–50 (Ala.Crim.App.1985)
The Miranda warnings are not to be treated as 'a mere textual formality to be recited on the way to eliciting a confession. 'United States v. Rondon, 614 F. Supp. 667, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)." State v. McDevitt, 484 So. 2d 543, 549-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)
The Miranda warnings are not to be treated as "a mere textual formality to be recited on the way to eliciting a confession." United States v. Rondon, 614 F. Supp. 667, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) It is beyond any question that McDevitt could not have effectively waived his Miranda warnings without fully understanding that he had a right to appointed counsel.