Opinion
13-CR-00069-01
11-04-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MYLES ROBINSON
BRANDON B. BROWN United States Attorney SETH D. REEG Assistant United States Attorney
BRANDON B. BROWN United States Attorney SETH D. REEG Assistant United States Attorney
FOOTE JUDGE
UNITED STATES' NOTICE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY RELEVANT TO THE PENDING MOTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
HORNSBY MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The United States files this notice calling to the Court's attention a precedential ruling of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals published after the United States filed its response to the defendant's motion for compassionate release. The defendant previously argued that because the First Step Act had eliminated the “stacking” provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), his current sentence should be reduced because “[t]he changes affected by the [First Step Act] constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.” Rec. Doc. 263, p. 2.
In United States v. McMaryion, No. 21-50450, 2023 WL 2658434 (5th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023), the defendant identified, as one of four “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction under U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), non-retroactive changes to statutory minimum penalties in the First Step Act. Agreeing with two other circuits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that “a prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a compassionate release motion, because such changes are neither extraordinary nor compelling.” Id. at p. 3. According to the Court, the “ordinary practice” of applying new penalties to those who have not been sentenced and old penalties to those who have “reflects a presumption against retroactive legislation that is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and that embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, courts “may not usurp the legislative prerogative and use 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) to create retroactivity that Congress did not.” Id.
In the new light of McMaryion, it is clear that Congress changing the penalty provisions of a statute do not constitute “extraordinary” or “compelling” circumstances which warrant relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). As noted repeatedly in previous filings, Congress expressly stated that the changes to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) applied only prospectively, and thus did not affect any already-imposed sentences. See First Step Act, § 403(b) (“This section, and the amendments made by this section, shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.”).
Accordingly, the United States respectfully maintains its argument that this Court should deny the defendant's motion for compassionate release.