But see United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir.1998) (“A factual condition which is consistent with the smuggling of illegal aliens in a particular area, will not predicate reasonable suspicion, if that factual condition occurs even more frequently among the law abiding public in the area.”).See United States v. Garza, 727 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir.2013) (“The area's reputation as a smuggling route supports [the agent's] reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Rico–Soto, 690 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir.2012) (determining that although the stop occurred approximately 450 miles from the border in Lake Charles, Louisiana, reasonable suspicion existed in part because the stop occurred on I–10, “a major alien-smuggling corridor”); United States v. Rivera–Gonzalez, 413 Fed.Appx. 736, 739 (5th Cir.2011) (giving weight to “the prevalence of drug and illegal alien smuggling on I–20 near Midland”); Morales, 191 F.3d at 604 (determining reasonable suspicion existed in part based on the agent's testimony that “I–20 is ‘notorious for alien smuggling and narcotics.’ ”); Orozco, 191 F.3d at 582 (“Although the stop was not within fifty miles of the border, other facts existed indicating that the particular stretch of I–20 [fifteen miles from Odessa, Texas,] was a favored route for illegal alien smugglers.”). But see Olivares–Pacheco, 633 F.3d at 401, 404 (according minimal to no weight to I–20's reputation as a smuggling route).
Although this factor alone is not controlling, it is vital, id., and, in its absence, “we examine the remaining factors charily.” United States v. Rico–Soto, 690 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir.2012) (citing United States v. Olivares–Pacheco, 633 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.2011)). Hernandez was stopped on Interstate 10, which is a major corridor for illegal alien-smuggling between cities in Texas, such as Houston, and the East Coast. Rico–Soto, 690 F.3d at 379.
"United States v. Francisco , 497 F. App'x 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Barnett , 197 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir. 1999) ).Porter twice moved for a continuance.
The issue is a close one, and our decision rests on the unique blend of facts presented. Under the totality of the circumstances, considered in connection with the Brignoni–Ponce factors, we conclude that Guerrero has reasonable suspicion to stop Garza's truck. See United States v. Rico–Soto, 690 F.3d 376 (5th Cir.2012); Jacquinot, 258 F.3d at 423;Chavez–Chavez, 205 F.3d at 145;Zapata–Ibarra, 212 F.3d at 877;Morales, 191 F.3d at 602;Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 668;see also United States v. Medina, 295 Fed.Appx. 702 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Vega, 254 F.3d 70 (5th Cir.2001) (unpublished). Conclusion
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "None of the factors alone is dispositive, and courts must analyze them as a whole, rather than each in isolation." United States v. Rico-Soto, 690 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2012); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) ("A factor viewed in isolation is often more 'readily susceptible to an innocent explanation' than one viewed as part of a totality."). Second, once reasonable suspicion is established, the scope of the detention "must be reasonable in the light of the facts articulated as having created the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."
Defendant argues that I–10 is a major route for east and west-bound traffic not involved in alien or drug smuggling, and that Agent Lively's observation about traffic moving with illegal purposes is “meaningless but often relied on by agents in justifying stops on I–10” (doc. 17, at 4). As the United States notes, the Fifth Circuit, in a similar case, referred to I–10 as a “major alien-smuggling corridor” (doc. 18, at 4, quoting United States v. Rico–Soto, 690 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir.2012)). Therefore, this factor supports the argument that Agent Lively had a sufficiently reasonable suspicion (doc. 18, at 4).
Furthermore, the present case is distinguishable from others in which officers had stronger indicators that occupants of a vehicle might be undocumented immigrants to supplement facts that, without more, would be insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. For example, in United States v. Rico–Soto, the Fifth Circuit determined that a Border Patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to stop a van based on numerous observations of the officer, including the fact that the van had the name “Paisanos” on its side, at a time when “intel reports showed ‘Paisanos' vans had recently become active in transporting illegal aliens.” 690 F.3d 376, 379–80 (5th Cir.2012). Similarly, in Lopez–Moreno, 420 F.3d at 432–34, the Fifth Circuit determined that an officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention of the driver of a van when, because of the officer's prior experience, he was armed with knowledge that the same type of van had been involved in an earlier undocumented immigrant traffic stop.