Thus, as long as the Officer had probable cause to stop the car based on its window tint, it does not matter whether he actually intended to or ultimately did test the vehicle's window tint."United States v. Reyes, No. 1:11-CR-00009-ODE, 2012 WL 176488, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012). Thus, while Ms. Santana may be correct that "[Trooper Moremen] wanted to stop the car, and he was looking for any reason to do so," (doc. 45 at 18) Trooper Moremen was able to establish that he had reasonable suspicion to stop Ms. Santana to investigate whether a window-tint violation had occurred.
Defendant cites no authority in support of this objection. Judge Garza discussed in detail United States v. Reyes, No. 1:11-CR-00009-ODE-RGV, 2012 WL 176488 (N.D. Ga. 2012), a case factually similar to Defendant's. Defendant does not address this case or the application of Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) by the Reyes court or Judge Garza's reasoning.
Another district court, encountering almost identical facts, found that multiple inventory searches were permissible when they were conducted pursuant to a reasonable administrative policy. See United States v. Reyes, No. 1:11-CR-00009-ODE-RGV, et seq., 2012 WL 176488, at *4-6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012) (unpublished). In Reyes, the defendant was arrested and the vehicle he was driving was searched pursuant to a police department's inventory procedure immediately prior to the vehicle being impounded by police.