Opinion
Case Number: 1:13-cr-25
2013-10-18
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff v. SHANTEZ REMBERT, et al., Defendants
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
ENDS OF JUSTICE ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the requests of counsel for the Government and for several of the Defendants for a continuance of the currently scheduled November 4, 2013 trial date. A number of the Defendants in this multi-defendant case have executed plea agreements. The remainder of the Defendants either are engaged in continuing negotiations with the Government or are preparing for trial.
On October 17, 2013, the Court held two hearings involving those Defendants. During the first hearing, pertaining to Defendant Frederick Benton's Motion to Substitute Attorney (Doc. 245) and Motion for Continuance (Doc. 252), Benton's newly retained attorney requested a continuance of approximately one month so that he may have sufficient time to review the discovery materials, which include hours of recorded conversations, and to determine the best course of action for his client. Finding that a continuance was justified, the Court vacated the November 4, 2013 trial date and set a telephonic status conference for December 3, 2013 at 12:00 p.m.
The second hearing, scheduled as a final pretrial conference, pertained to Defendants Demico Higgins, Eric Brock, Casey Brock, Antonio Montgomery, Eric Gunn, Dwayne Finnerson, Shawniece Grant Cavins, Martha Clark, Mario Harris, and Tonya Jackson. The Court did not proceed with the final pretrial conference as scheduled because defense counsel all indicated that they were the process of exploring plea agreements with counsel for the Government, and needed additional time for negotiations. The Court found that the need to explore plea agreements justified a continuance of the trial date as to all Defendants, and advised that any Defendant who has not entered a plea of guilty by December 3, 2013 must participate in the telephonic status conference scheduled for 12:00 p.m. that day. At that time, the Court will set a change of plea date or trial date for any Defendant participating in the conference.
The Court now finds that for the following reasons the continuances discussed above are in the best interests of the Defendants and are excludable from the speedy trial calculation. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), pursuant to a defendant's motion for a continuance or on its own motion, a court may grant a continuance that is excludable from the speedy trial clock if the court finds that "the ends of justice served by the granting of the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." The Court is to consider a number of factors in determining whether to grant such a continuance, including "[w]hether the failure to grant such a continuance . . . would . . . result in a miscarriage of justice;" "[w]hether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by [§ 3161];" and [w]hether the failure to grant such a continuance . . . would deny counsel for the defendant . . . the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(I), (ii), (iv). Additionally, the Court is not limited to considering the factors listed in that statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B). Directly relevant to this case, the Sixth Circuit has held that time spent plea-bargaining is excludable from the time periods prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. See United States v. Dunbar, 357 F.3d 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2004) ("We have held that plea negotiations may be excluded as 'other proceedings' pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1099 (2005).
Based on the representations made by counsel during the October 17, 2013 hearings, the Court finds that a continuance of the trial date as to all Defendants listed above is warranted due to both the ongoing plea negotiations and the recent substitution of defense counsel for Defendant Benton. To the extent that those negotiations fail to result in an agreement for any Defendant, counsel for that Defendant will require additional time to review the voluminous amount of discovery produced by the Government in order to prepare for trial. This Court thus finds that under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the ends of justice are served by continuing the trial. Defendants' right to effective representation and an adequate presentation of their defense outweighs the best interest of Defendants and the public in a speedy trial. The Court hereby finds that the time period between the October 17, 2013 hearings and the December 3, 2013 telephonic status conference is excludable from the speedy trial calculation as to all Defendants discussed herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
United States District Court