Several districts courts in the Eleventh Circuit have also come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Potts, 2019 WL 1059837 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019) (Rosenberg, J.); United States v. Glover, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (Lenard, J.); United States v. Razz, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (Lenard, J.), order amended on denial of reconsideration, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1397 (S.D. Fla. 2019). For the same reasons, this court agrees.
The Court nevertheless notes that several courts have found ยง 3582(c) analogous and instructive in the First Step Act context. See, e.g., United States v. Razz, 379 F.Supp.3d 1309, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (Lenard, J.)(construing the First Step Act under ยง 3582(c)(1)(B) and relying on ยง 3582(c)(2) caselaw, because the court determined that the two provisions are "analogous"); United States v. Lawson, Case No. 1:03CR398, 2019 WL 1959490 (N.D. Ohio May 2, 2019) (Lioi, J.)(relying on ยง 3582(c)(2) caselaw in the First Step Act context and stating that "a reduction of sentence pursuant to the First Step Act is analogous to a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. ยง 3582(c)(2), based on a retroactive guideline amendment, which does not require plenary resentencing"); United States v. Russo, 8:03CR413, 2019 WL 1277507, *2 (D. Neb. March 20, 2019) (Camp, J.)(stating that the court "finds persuasive the Government's argument that a reduction of sentence pursuant to the First Step Act is analogous to a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. ยง 3582(c)(2), based on a retroactive Guideline amendment, which does not require plenary resentencing"). In United States v. Sampson, 360 F. Supp. 3d 168 (W.D.N
Id. See also United States v. Buckery, No. 1:08-cr-30032, 2019 WL 2724340 at *2 (W.D. Va. July 1, 2019) (same); United States v. Mitchell, No. 05-00110 (EGS), 2019 WL 2647571 at *6 (D.D.C. June 27, 2019) (finding mootness doctrine did not apply because a case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant relief to the prevailing party, and relief is possible under the First Step Act); and United States v. Razz, 379 F.Supp.3d 1309, 1316-1317 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (noting that every court to have addressed the Surratt argument in a First Step Act case has rejected it). The court finds persuasive the reasoning in Stallworth and the other cases cited above.
The Court observes that courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., United States v. Razz, No. 05-80011-CR, 2019 WL 2204068, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2019) (rejecting "the Government's "presidentially-imposed" sentence argument[.]"); United States v. Pugh, No. 5:95 CR 145, 2019 WL 1331684, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2019) (same); United States v. Biggs, No. 05 CR 316, 2019 WL 2120226, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2019) (same); United States v. Dodd, 372 F. Supp. 3d 795, 798 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (same).
" Dkt. 53 at 6. The government acknowledges, however, that a clear majority of district courts who have considered this issue have determined that a presidential commutation does not render a defendant ineligible for ยง 404 relief, chiefly because "the commutation shorten[s] an existing sentence, it [does] not impose a new sentence that would place it outside the reach of the First Step Act." United States v. Dodd, 372 F. Supp. 3d 795, 798-99 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord United States v. Razz, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2019 WL 2204068, at *7 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2019); United States v. Biggs, No. 05 CR 316, 2019 WL 2120226, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2019); United States v. Pugh, No. 5:95 CR 145, 2019 WL 1331684, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2019); United States v. Walker, No. 1:94-CR-5, 2019 WL 1226856, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2019). Holding otherwise, to wit, "that a presidentially-commuted sentence constitutes a new, 'presidentially-imposed' sentence," would violate the separation of powers doctrine.
The Order is pending publication. United States v. Razz, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 2019 WL 2204068, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85770 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2019). The Court finds that because Defendant remains accountable for 100.2 grams of crack cocaine as to Count Two, remains a Career Offender, and remains subject to a Section 851 enhancement, he is not entitled to a sentence reduction under Section 3582(c)(1)(B).