Opinion
23-2411
06-20-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KARL C. QUILTER, Defendant-Appellant.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted June 14, 2024
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 20-CR-00826(1) Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
Before MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
ORDER
Karl Quilter paid thousands of dollars for nine children in the Philippines to produce and send him hundreds of videos and images of them engaging in sexually explicit conduct. He pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting one of those children, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and in his plea agreement, he stipulated to having sexually exploited the eight others. The district court imposed a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment and 10 years' supervised release. It also assessed mandatory restitution of about $75,000 under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2).
Quilter filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel's brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Quilter did not respond to the motion. See Cir. R. 51(b). Because counsel's analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel tells us that she consulted with Quilter and confirmed that he wants to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). Because Quilter did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we would review the validity of the plea for plain error. See United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 607-08 (2013). An error is reversible under this standard only if it is "obvious, affected the defendant's substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness or integrity of the proceedings." United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013).
Counsel concludes, and we agree, that Quilter could not plausibly challenge his guilty plea because the district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 before accepting the plea. See id. The court advised Quilter of the nature of the charges, the range of penalties he faced, and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining his sentence. It advised him of the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty and confirmed that Quilter was pleading guilty of his own accord. See Fed R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)-(2).
Counsel spots deficiencies in the plea colloquy but correctly concludes that any omissions were harmless. The district court neither warned Quilter that lying under oath risked a perjury prosecution nor advised him that he could persist in a plea of not guilty. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A)-(B). And while the court asked Quilter if anyone was "forcing" him to plead guilty (he said "no"), it did not ask him if the guilty plea was the result of "threats" or "promises" beyond those in the plea agreement. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). But as to the perjury warning, nothing in the record suggests that he faces a risk of being prosecuted for perjury. See United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 597- 98 (7th Cir. 2016). Quilter also knew that he could persist in his plea of not guilty because his plea agreement told him as much, and he confirmed to the district judge that he had reviewed the plea agreement and understood its contents. Quilter had also previously entered a plea of not guilty and the context of the plea hearing makes clear that he knew he could continue with that plea and go to trial. The district court's failure to advise him of this right during the colloquy was harmless. See United States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2014). Finally, the court's omission of "threats" or "promises" from its inquiry into whether Quilter was pleading guilty voluntarily did not affect his substantial rights. These are minor deviations from the language of Rule 11(b) that were covered in his plea agreement, and the rest of the colloquy leaves no doubt that the judge adequately verified that Quilter's plea was voluntary. See United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2001).
Even so, counsel tells us, Quilter "would like to argue that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he believed he would receive a 15-year sentence upon pleading guilty." But Quilter acknowledged in his plea agreement, then stated under oath at the plea hearing, that he understood he faced up to 30 years in prison. (Indeed, the plea agreement specified that the anticipated guideline range was 30 years, and the court walked through this calculation with him, so Quilter knew that 30 years was likely to be the starting point for the court.) Counsel correctly concludes that Quilter's assertion about the expected sentence contradicts his sworn statements and so a challenge to the plea has essentially "no chance of success on appeal." United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2015).
Counsel next discusses potential challenges to Quilter's sentence and rightly concludes that any argument attacking the sentence on procedural grounds would be frivolous. Counsel explains that the district court correctly calculated Quilter's offense level to be, functionally, the maximum of 43 (though several levels higher in reality) and his criminal history category to be I. And while this ordinarily would yield a guideline sentence of life in prison, the court correctly reduced the guideline "range" to 30 years, the statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). Counsel notes that, at the sentencing hearing, Quilter agreed with this calculation, which deviated only in inconsequential ways from what Quilter acknowledged in his plea agreement. Counsel further explains that the district court discussed the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and otherwise complied with the procedural requirements of sentencing. See United States v. Jerry, 55 F.4th 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 2022) (outlining possible procedural errors).
Finally, counsel explains that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of Quilter's sentence would be futile. The within-guideline prison sentence is presumptively reasonable, and counsel identifies no plausible grounds for rebutting that presumption. See United States v. McGhee, 98 F.4th 816, 823-24 (7th Cir. 2024). The district court discussed the seriousness of Quilter's offense, his background and upbringing, the need to deter him from inflicting further irreparable harm to children, possible sentencing disparities, and the need for restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Counsel correctly concludes that the district court adequately stated its reasons for imposing its sentence with reference to the factors in § 3553(a) and that it would be frivolous to argue that the district court should have weighed the factors differently. See McGhee, 98 F.4th at 823-24.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.