Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, KAREN A. ESCOBAR, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
MARC KAPETAN, Counsel for Defendant Quenga.
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on Monday, September 28, 2015, at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the hearing date until October 26, 2015, at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between September 28, 2015, and October 26, 2015.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties have been working out the details of a plea agreement, which has now been finalized in writing and submitted to the defense for review with the defendant.
b. The parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendants the reasonable time necessary for effective resolution and/or case preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would deny continuity of counsel for the government.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 28, 2015, to October 26, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's and government's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.