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finding no error where the district court explained that the 18-month revocation sentence, six months above the policy-statement range, "addressed the issues of adequate deterrence and protection of the public"
Summary of this case from Burnside v. United StatesOpinion
No. 15-10173
10-06-2015
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TERRENCE EUGENE PRIESTLEY, Defendant-Appellant
Summary Calendar Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:06-CR-10-1
Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. --------
Defendant-Appellant Terrence Eugene Priestley appeals the 18-month sentence imposed following the revocation of his supervised release. The district court varied upward from the six-to-twelve-month guidelines range, reasoning that the sentence imposed "addresse[d] the issues of adequate deterrence and protection of the public."
Priestley did not timely object to the sentence when it was imposed, so we review his claims under the deferential plain error standard. See United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). In so doing, we evaluate the adequacy of the district court's explanation of its revocation sentence pursuant to Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Whitelaw, 580 F.3d at 261. The district court noted deterrence and protection of the public, thereby explicitly considering those 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) factors that the court deemed relevant to its determination. See § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). The sentencing court committed no error, plain or otherwise.
In any event, no error affected Priestley's substantial rights. His assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, the record of the sentencing proceedings in this case does permit a meaningful appellate review. See Whitelaw, 580 F.3d at 264. Nothing in the record suggests that a more thorough explanation would have resulted in a shorter sentence, or that the district court considered any improper factor, or that it would impose a different sentence on remand. Id. at 264-65.
Finally, Priestley's argument that Whitelaw was wrongly decided—concededly raised to preserve that contention for further review—is unavailing. We may not overrule Whitelaw absent a superseding decision by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 313 n.34 (5th Cir. 2002).
AFFIRMED.