Opinion
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE MOTION HEARING TO FEBRUARY 27, 2014, AT 9:00 A.M.; MODIFIED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
The parties stipulate, through respective counsel, that the Court should reschedule the motion hearing set for January 23, 2013, at 9:00 a.m., on February 27, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.
Counsel for Mr. Pratt requires further time to research, prepare, and file motions. The additional time will also facilitate consultation with Mr. Pratt, who resides in Nevada County Jail, Nevada City, CA.
Counsel agree to the following modification of the briefing schedule: motion to suppress due on or before January 9, 2014; opposition due on or before February 6, 2014; optional reply due on or before February 20, 2014.
Counsel and the defendant agree that the Court should exclude the time from the date of this order through February 27, 2014, when it computes the time within which trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), Local Code T4, and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), Local Code E.
Counsel and the defendant also agree that the ends of justice served by the Court granting this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
ORDER
The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, adopts the stipulation in its entirety as its order. The Court specifically finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and defendant in a speedy trial.
The Court orders the motion hearing rescheduled for February 27, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., and approves the briefing schedule outlined above. The Court orders the time from the date of the parties stipulation, up to and including February 27, 2014, excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must commence under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), Local Code T4, and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), Local Code E.
IT IS SO ORDERED.