Summary
upholding pretrial release prohibition on gun possession
Summary of this case from United States v. RowsonOpinion
Case No.: 3:22-CR-01581-GPC
2022-09-18
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jesus PEREZ-GARCIA, Defendant.
Elizabet F. Brown, Patrick C. Swan, Assistant United States Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Criminal Division, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff. Federal Defenders, Camille Boyd Fenton, Public Defenders, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant.
Elizabet F. Brown, Patrick C. Swan, Assistant United States Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Criminal Division, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff. Federal Defenders, Camille Boyd Fenton, Public Defenders, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
[ECF No. 29]
Allison H. Goddard, United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Jesus Perez-Garcia's Motion to Amend Conditions of Pretrial Release. ECF No. 29. Mr. Perez-Garcia contends that "Standard Condition (4)," which prohibits him from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution under the standard recently articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022) ("Bruen"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Standard Condition (4) does not violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Mr. Perez-Garcia, and therefore DENIES the motion.
Standard Condition (4) is authorized by 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(1)(B)(viii).
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Perez-Garcia was charged initially in a Complaint accompanied by a probable cause statement with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. As alleged in the Complaint, on June 24, 2022, Mr. Perez-Garcia was a passenger in a vehicle crossing at the San Ysidro Port of Entry. The vehicle was inspected after a law enforcement canine alerted to the rear bumper. During the inspection, Customs and Border Protection officials discovered 58 packages in the rear bumper containing 11.24 kg of methamphetamine and .45 kg of fentanyl. During a post-Miranda interview, Mr. Perez-Garcia admitted knowledge of the narcotics, but denied that he would be paid to transport them. ECF No. 1.
At Mr. Perez-Garcia's initial appearance on June 27, 2022, the undersigned issued a Pretrial Release Order setting conditions of release. ECF No. 10. The conditions include Standard Condition (4), which states: "The defendant must not possess or attempt to possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon. The defendant must legally transfer all firearms, as directed by Pretrial Services." Id. The Court approved the bond package submitted by Mr. Perez-Garcia and ordered him to be released on June 30, 2022. ECF No. 13.
The Court set several additional conditions governing Defendant's release. Pretrial Services has filed a petition alleging that Defendant is not in compliance with other conditions of release. This petition is pending and Defendant has not entered an admission or denial of these allegations. ECF No. 39.
Standard Condition (4) is not a mandatory condition of release. It is referred to as a "Standard Condition" because it is on a list of conditions that are usually and customarily ordered on the preprinted Pretrial Release Order form used in this judicial district. Judicial officers are authorized to impose this condition under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142. Section 3142(c)(1)(A) sets forth mandatory conditions that must be imposed whenever pretrial release is ordered: "that the person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release," and "that the person cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample." Section 3142(c)(1)(B) sets forth discretionary conditions that a judicial officer may impose if necessary to "reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." One of the discretionary conditions is that a defendant "refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(viii).
On July 21, 2022, the Government filed an Information charging Mr. Perez-Garcia with importing methamphetamine and fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. That same day, after being advised of his right to submit the charges to the Grand Jury for a determination of probable cause, Mr. Perez-Garcia waived his right to indictment and agreed to proceed on the Information. ECF No. 22. Mr. Perez-Garcia is scheduled to appear before the undersigned on September 19, 2022, for an initial appearance on alleged pretrial release violations; and before Judge Gonzalo Curiel on September 26, 2022, for a motion hearing/trial setting.
II. PARTIES' POSITIONS
Mr. Perez-Garcia challenges the Court's ability to restrict the rights of persons on pretrial release from possessing a firearm, both as a general matter and as applied to him specifically. Mr. Perez-Garcia is a licensed firearm owner and security guard. He does not have a criminal record. Mr. Perez-Garcia maintains that he is a responsible firearm owner who keeps his firearm secured in a lockbox. In the past, Mr. Perez-Garcia has worked as a security guard for a marijuana dispensary, which requires him to carry a firearm at work. He would like to continue to work as a security guard with the ability to possess a firearm because he will earn a higher wage if he is able to carry a firearm on the job.
At a hearing on this motion on August 25, 2022, the Court advised Mr. Perez-Garcia that he would not be able to work in a marijuana dispensary without violating the mandatory condition of release that he not violate any federal, state, or local law. Because marijuana is a controlled substance under federal law, aiding and abetting the distribution of marijuana would violate 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Mr. Perez-Garcia argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Bruen "fundamentally altered the framework for determining whether a firearm regulation violates the Second Amendment," thereby rendering Standard Condition (4) unconstitutional. ECF No. 29 at 1. In Bruen, as discussed further below, the Supreme Court held that to pass constitutional muster, any restriction on the Second Amendment right to bear arms must be "consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. Mr. Perez-Garcia argues that the only historical conditions attaching to bail relate to money and property to be used to secure bail. In contrast, the restriction on possession of firearms set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(viii) was not enacted until 1984, and similar laws restricting possession of firearms by persons under indictment were not enacted until the Federal Firearms Act of 1938. According to Mr. Perez-Garcia, because firearm restrictions were not historically conditions of bail before or around the time that the Second Amendment was adopted, any attempt to restrict a pretrial defendant's access to firearms is unconstitutional under Bruen.
The Government opposes the motion, arguing that Standard Condition (4) is a reasonable restriction imposed for the safety of others, including the Pretrial Services Officers who supervise Mr. Perez-Garcia. According to the Government, if the Court has the power to deny pretrial release altogether, it has the power to impose temporary restrictions, even ones that interfere with constitutional rights, as a condition of pretrial release. The Government contends that Standard Condition (4) is consistent with the historical concept that only "virtuous" citizens fall within the Second Amendment's ambit, and is consistent with analogous laws, such as surety statutes, that restricted firearm possession by persons who were likely to breach the peace.
At a hearing on this motion, Pretrial Services expressed its opposition to the motion for safety reasons. Pretrial Services Officers are required to visit with defendants at their home and workplace, and unfettered firearm access by defendants under supervision places them at risk of harm when doing so.
III. BRUEN DOES NOT RENDER STANDARD CONDITION (4) OR 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(viii) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Mr. Perez-Garcia brings a facial challenge to Standard Condition (4), arguing that it is an unconstitutional restriction as to any defendant. Mr. Perez-Garcia also challenges Standard Condition (4) as it applies to him specifically. Each of these challenges is addressed below following the standards set in Bruen.
A. Summary of Bruen
Bruen resolved a challenge to a New York law that required a person to demonstrate that "proper cause" exists in order to obtain a concealed carry license for a firearm. 142 S. Ct. at 2122. The Court found the law to be unconstitutional because it required applicants to demonstrate a "special need" to obtain a concealed carry license. Id. This was an impermissible restriction on the Second Amendment's protection of an "individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home." Id. The Court held that "when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, . . . the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." Id. at 2126.
In Bruen, the Supreme Court confirmed its holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) that the Second Amendment protects "an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense." Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2125. The Bruen court rejected, however, the two-step test that many courts of appeal adopted following Heller. Id. at 2126, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The second step of that test involved applying scrutiny to the regulation, weighing the government interest against the burden on the constitutional right. Id. The Bruen court held that step two of the tests adopted by the courts of appeal was "one step too many." Id.
The Court acknowledged that determining whether a regulation comports with the Nation's historical tradition can be difficult in some cases and requires flexibility, stating that "the Constitution can, and must apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated." Id. at 2132. As a result, the requisite historical inquiry "will often involve reasoning by analogy - a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge." Id. Analogous regulations must be "relevantly similar." Id. Two metrics for this analysis are "how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self-defense." Id. at 2133. The Court cautioned that this inquiry does not require a "historical twin," but rather a historical analogue. Id. ("[E]ven if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous to pass constitutional muster."). With respect to the New York law challenged in Bruen, the Court found that the historical record did not support "a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for self-defense," or a tradition that would require "law-abiding citizens" to "demonstrate a special need for self-defense" in order to carry a firearm in public. Id. at 2138.
B. Mr. Perez-Garcia's Facial Challenge Fails
To prevail on a facial challenge to a statute or regulation, Mr. Perez-Garcia must demonstrate that "no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute or regulation] would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). This is a "heavy burden" to meet. Id.
As a threshold matter, Standard Condition (4) is not mandatory. Even though it is treated as a "standard" condition, it can only be imposed after an individualized consideration of that defendant's circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (a judicial officer "may" include a restriction on possession of firearms); see also United States v. Snead, No. 12-132M, 2014 WL 4473773 (D.R.I. Feb. 4, 2014) (pretrial firearms restriction is discretionary, not mandatory). To be sure, this standard is regularly imposed in this and other judicial districts because it ensures the safety of Pretrial Services Officers who conduct home and work visits as part of their supervisory duties. E.g., Snead, 2014 WL 4473773, at *8 ("[T]he imposition of a pretrial restriction on the possession of firearms has been found to be critical in most cases because it safeguards the Pretrial Services officers who visit the home in the course of supervision."); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (E.D. Miss. 2009) (imposing the restriction "is a precaution to safeguard pretrial services officers who will have contact with the defendant in their supervisory activities."). But the Standard Conditions are subject to modification at the judicial officer's discretion. The form commonly used in this judicial district expressly states that any Standard Condition may be stricken.
Moreover, there are several laws that restrict categories of persons from possessing a firearm based on pending criminal charges, their criminal history, or characteristics such as mental health or substance abuse, that would warrant imposing Standard Condition (4). By way of example, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) prohibits sales of firearms to a defendant under indictment, and 18 U.S.C.§ 922(n) prohibits a defendant under felony indictment from shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms transported in interstate commerce. Standard Condition (4) would be an appropriate pretrial release condition in the case of any person charged under indictment, or other persons whose access to firearms is restricted under other provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922, because it would reinforce the mandatory condition to comply with all federal, state, and local laws.
Mr. Perez-Garcia cannot show that there are no circumstances that exist where imposition of a pretrial restriction on possession of firearms would be valid. The Court therefore DENIES Mr. Perez-Garcia's facial challenge to Standard Condition (4) and 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(viii).
C. Mr. Perez-Garcia's As-Applied Challenge Fails
Mr. Perez-Garcia's as-applied challenge also fails. As discussed below, Mr. Perez-Garcia does not fall within the category of "law-abiding" persons protected by the Second Amendment while his charges are pending. And even if Mr. Perez-Garcia did qualify for the protection of the Second Amendment, the pretrial restriction on possession of firearms is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of regulating firearms and can therefore regulate Mr. Perez-Garcia while he is under pretrial release.
The Court noted throughout Bruen that the New York law at issue was unconstitutional because it restricted "law-abiding" citizens' rights to possess firearms for self-defense. E.g., Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122 (Heller recognized that "the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense"); id. at 2133 (courts should look at "how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self-defense" when finding historical analogues); id. at 2134 (noting that plaintiffs are "ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens"); id. at 2138 (noting that there is no historical tradition "limiting public carry only to those law-abiding citizens who demonstrate a special need for self-defense"); id. at 2150 (historical analogues advanced by New York to defend the challenged law fail because "none operated to prevent law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from carrying arms in public for that purpose."); id. at 2156 (no historical record of requiring "law-abiding, responsible citizens" to demonstrate a need in order to obtain a license to carry firearms); id. at 2156 (New York violates the Second Amendment because it "prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms."). The focus of Bruen was therefore on "regulations impacting law-abiding citizens, as opposed to the class of regulations prohibiting certain people from carrying firearms based on their conduct or characteristics." United States v. Nutter, No. 2:21-cr-00142, 2022 WL 3718518, at *4 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 29, 2022) (noting that such regulations "have a longstanding history.").
Heller and the concurring opinions in Bruen support the principle that regulations restricting certain categories of persons from possessing firearms who may pose a threat to public safety do not violate the Second Amendment. In Heller, for example, the Court made clear that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. In his concurring opinion in Bruen, Justice Alito confirmed that the Court's opinion does not disturb "anything that we said in Heller or McDonald v. Chicago . . . about restrictions that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns." Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh, quoting the language from Heller above, reiterated that the Second Amendment "allows a 'variety' of gun regulations." Id. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
In United States v. Ingram, No. 0:18-557-MGL-3, 2022 WL 3691350 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2022), the district court considered a post-Bruen challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(c). Id. at *1. Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm, and section 924(c) makes it unlawful to knowingly use or carry a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Id. The defendant challenged his indictment under each statute, arguing that the conduct prohibited by those statutes is "protected by plain text of the Second Amendment and historically unregulated." Id. Rejecting this argument, the district court determined that the distinction between law-abiding and non-law-abiding citizens in Heller, McDonald, and Bruen "clarifies the bounds of the plain text of the Second Amendment." Id. at *3. Because the statutes at issue "prohibit the use of firearms by non-law-abiding citizens for unlawful purposes," the conduct they prohibit is not protected by the Second Amendment. Id.; but see United States v. Kays, No. CR-22-40-D, 2022 WL 3718519, *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2022) (concluding that a defendant charged with illegal receipt of a firearm by a person under indictment is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, but nonetheless finding the statute at issue does not violate the Second Amendment).
Similarly, in Nutter, a district court rejected a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2) post-Bruen. 2022 WL 3718518, at *7. Sections 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2) make it unlawful for a person previously convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence to possess firearms. Id. at *1. The defendant argued that the charges against him should be dismissed because there were no similar laws affecting the rights of persons convicted of domestic violence crimes in the Nation's historical tradition. Id. at *5. The district court noted the importance of "the Supreme Court's repeated invocation of 'law-abiding citizens' in its recent Second Amendment jurisprudence," and found support in the historical tradition for laws prohibiting certain categories of persons from possessing firearms in the interest of public safety. Id. at *7-8. These historical categories were not limited to felons, but extended more broadly to "groups identified as dangerous," "classes of individuals reasonably regarded as posing an elevated risk for firearms violence," and "any person viewed as potentially dangerous." Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
As a person who has been charged with a crime based on a finding of probable cause, Mr. Perez-Garcia would not be considered a "law-abiding" or responsible citizen, so he is outside the plain text of the Second Amendment. Persons with criminal charges pending are routinely subject to significant restrictions on their constitutional rights once probable cause has been shown. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (privacy expectations of a person in custody are diminished); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ("Even competent adults may face substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of our criminal justice system."); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (holding that a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate judge is required "as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."); United States v. Thomas, 540 F. Supp. 3d 363, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) ("[T]he reality is that once an individual has been charged with a crime, certain rights must give way to reasonable restrictions in order to protect the safety of others and the community, prevent any risk of flight, and ensure compliance with pretrial release conditions."). The restriction on Mr. Perez-Garcia's ability to possess a firearm while charges are pending against him is a temporary restriction that will be lifted if the charges are resolved in his favor. Restrictions on pretrial release liberty, even those as severe as detention, are necessary regulatory measures that do not violate either the Constitution or the presumption of innocence. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ("We have repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, out-weigh an individual's liberty interest.").
Mr. Perez-Garcia waived his right to a probable cause determination by a Grand Jury, effectively conceding that probable cause exists. Mr. Perez-Garcia's arrest was also supported by an initial probable cause determination by a magistrate judge.
Even if Mr. Perez-Garcia, as a person charged with a crime, would be considered a "law-abiding" citizen protected by the text of the Second Amendment, his as-applied challenge fails. As discussed above, restricting access to firearms for persons who are charged with a crime is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition. This is true even though the "historical twins" to the restriction in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(viii), i.e., laws restricting access to firearms for persons under indictment, were not enacted until the twentieth century. As the Court noted in Bruen, a current regulation need not have a "historical twin" that was in effect at the time of adoption of the Second Amendment. Instead, a court can look to historical analogues to support the current regulations.
Here, surety statutes provide a historical analogue to support a pretrial release restriction on possession of firearms. In Bruen, the Court recognized that surety statutes were part of the Nation's historical tradition of regulating firearms. Surety statutes generally required certain people, on a finding that they were "reasonably likely to breach the peace," to post a bond in order to carry a weapon in public. Id. at 2148. The Court rejected the Government's argument that surety statutes were analogous to the New York law at issue in Bruen because surety statutes "were not bans on public carry, and they typically targeted only those threatening to do harm." 142 S. Ct. at 2148 (emphasis in original). Unlike the New York law, "the surety statutes presumed that individuals had a right to public carry that could be burdened only if another could make out a specific showing of reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace." Id. (emphasis in original) (punctuation omitted).
A restriction on possession of firearms by persons on pretrial release lines up with the two metrics advanced in Bruen for identifying a historical analogue here: "how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self-defense." Id. at 2133. Both surety statutes and the pretrial release restriction operate to restrict the rights of a discrete group of people, and not the public generally. They also both allow such restrictions for the purpose of public safety. The pretrial release restriction at issue here did not emerge from a void, as Defendant suggests. Regulations limiting or prohibiting access to firearms by specific groups in the interest of public safety have been part of the Nation's historical tradition since the earliest days of our Nation's founding. See National Rifle Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2127 n.4 ("In the view of at least some members of the founding generation, disarming select groups for the sake of public safety was compatible with the right to arms specifically and with the idea of liberty generally."); Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1360 (2009) ("[F]rom time immemorial, various jurisdictions recognizing a right to arms have nevertheless taken the step of forbidding suspect groups from having arms. American legislators at the time of the Bill of Rights seem to have been aware of this tradition of excluding criminals and other suspect persons from the right to arms.").
Courts analyzing similar laws following Bruen agree that the Nation's historical tradition supports such targeted regulations. In United States v. Daniels, No. 1:22-cr-58-LG-RHWR-1, 610 F.Supp.3d 892 (S.D. Miss. Jul. 8, 2022), for example, a district court found that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, did not violate the Second Amendment. Id. at *4 ("Congress's disarmament of drug abusers did not occur in a vacuum; rather, many states had theretofore restricted the right of habitual drug abusers or alcoholics to possess firearms.") (citations and punctuation omitted). In Kays, a district court found that the surety statutes are an appropriate historical analogue to 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), which limits firearm access for persons under indictment. 2022 WL 3718519, at *4 ("[A] historical analogue to § 922(n) does exist in the form of the surety statutes discussed in Bruen. These statutes can be traced to the mid-19th century. . . . Although these laws were not 'bans on public carry,' they did restrict it."). The district court recognized an important distinction between the New York law at issue in Bruen and § 922(n) and similar statutes, such as surety statutes. Id. "Like the surety statutes, § 922(n) is faithful to the notion that individuals have a right to bear arms. . . . Similarly, § 922(n) only burdens an individual's Second Amendment rights 'during the pendency of the indictment, a volatile period during which the stakes and stresses of pending criminal charges often motivate defendants to do violence to themselves or others." Id. (citations omitted). Applying a restriction on ownership or possession of firearms as a condition of Mr. Perez-Garcia's pretrial release does not violate his rights under the Second Amendment.
The Court further finds that Mr. Perez-Garcia's request to remove Standard Condition (4) so that he can possess a firearm in order to earn a better wage as a security guard is premature and speculative. The only position that has been offered to Mr. Perez-Garcia is at a marijuana dispensary, and the Court would not approve that work because marijuana is a federally controlled substance. There is no information before the Court to suggest that Mr. Perez-Garcia has declined to apply for, or turned down offers for, other lawful jobs that require him to possess a firearm. It is also not clear that in any position offered, Mr. Perez-Garcia would be required to carry his own firearm. Depending on the employment opportunity that Mr. Perez-Garcia is pursuing, the Court may reconsider whether he should be allowed to possess a firearm solely for the purpose of employment, particularly if the firearm is left in the control of the employer while Mr. Perez-Garcia is not at work.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that imposition of Standard Condition (4) as a condition of Mr. Perez-Garcia's pretrial release does not violate the Second Amendment. Mr. Perez-Garcia's motion to modify the conditions of his pretrial release is therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.