United States v. Alessi, supra 638 F.2d at 475-76. See United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). Moreover, the inference of defendant's intent to use invoices manufactured from lost or stolen credit cards to obtain "money . . . or anything else of value" ( 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a)) is supported by her simultaneous course of conduct in promptly withdrawing the funds generated by the scheme either in the form of cash or certified checks.

Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or . . . willfully overvalues any . . . property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . any bank the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . upon any . . . advance . . . or loan . . . or extension of any of the same . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Check-kiting violates 18 U.S.C. § 1014. United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). Careless checkbook recordkeeping is not enough; the prosecutor must show that the defendant misrepresented the value of the check presented to the bank.

639 F.2d 1311, 1319 (CA5 1981). In line with its earlier decision in United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), the court found such action proscribed by the statute. We granted certiorari, limited to Questions 3 and 4 presented by the petition, in order to resolve a conflict concerning the reach of § 1014. 454 U.S. 1030 and 1096 (1981).

The district court, 505 F. Supp. 858 granted Sher's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the indictment did not state facts sufficient to constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 because Section 1014 does not specifically proscribe check kiting. A panel of this Court affirmed, 657 F.2d 28. Although the panel acknowledged that its decision was in conflict with the decision of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), it declined to accept the reasoning of that court and instead affirmed on the basis of the district court's opinion. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

" United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215, 1219 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), quoting Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Bank of Altenburg, 216 F.2d 294, 302-303 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952, 75 S.Ct. 440, 99 L.Ed. 744 (1955). Recently, this court held that check kiting violates § 1014. United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).

The courts have repeatedly rejected restrictive constructions of § 1014, deeming it designed to protect against a broad variety of schemes that may influence a bank "in any way." In United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215, 1219 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), the court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1014 reached a "check kiting" scheme that was unrelated to the lending activities of the defrauded bank ("the intent of Congress was to incorporate in one codal section all of the business transactions of any of the specified agencies"). See United States v. Norberg, 612 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Kovens v. United States, 338 F.2d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1964).

Indeed, it is this Court's belief that such dealings can best be described as "check-kiting," or the deliberate practice of drawing checks against deposits which have not yet cleared through the collection process. Marine Midland Bank v. John E. Russo Produce Co., Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 38, 405 N.E.2d 205, 208, 427 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (1980). Since "check-kiting" is a "form of fraud and misrepresentation," United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), courts have refused to characterize the funds obtained from such a practice as the product of an extension of credit. Liberty National Bank Trust Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 58 Misc.2d 443, 295 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup.Ct. Erie Cty. 1968); United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d at 1218; National Bank of Com. in New Orleans v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 312 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.La. 1970).

Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); United States v. Pavlick, 507 F. Supp. 359 (M.D.Pa. 1980). According to the revisor's notes, the enumeration of "application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan" did not appear in the predecessor sections, but represents a composite of terms and transactions mentioned therein.

18 U.S.C. § 1014. Our court held long ago in United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), that "[t]he essence of check kiting is the obtaining of credit in the nature of an advance or loan, however it may be characterized"; that it "was a device for fraudulently obtaining credit sufficiently in the nature of an advance or loan to come within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1014." The Supreme Court's holding in Williams does not displace this aspect of proof necessary for the latter part of the statute.

At the time that he was tried and convicted in May 1980, a conflict of sorts existed in two federal circuits over the proper interpretation of section 1014. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had departed from the reading of section 1014 taken by a district court in another federal circuit. See United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (rejecting United States v. Edwards, 455 F. Supp. 1354 (M.D.Pa. 1978)). In Edwards, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that presentation of a worthless check to a federally insured bank was not proscribed by section 1014, the same result later reached by the Supreme Court in Williams.