Opinion
Mag. 23-6027 (DEA)
02-27-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MARQUISE PATTERSON
Adam K. Axel, Esq. Counsel for Defendant Ashley Super Pitts Assistant U.S. Attorney
Adam K. Axel, Esq.
Counsel for Defendant
Ashley Super Pitts
Assistant U.S. Attorney
ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE
HON. DOUGLAS E. ARPERT UNITED STATES JUDGE
1. This matter came before the Court on the joint application of Philip R. Sellinger, United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey (Ashley Super Pitts, Assistant U.S. Attorney, appearing), and Marquise Patterson (Adam K. Axel, Esq., appearing), for an order granting a 60-day continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
2. This Court granted one § 3161(h)(7)(A) continuance previously in this case.
3. Counsel for the parties represented that this continuance is necessary for effective preparation and to permit the parties to attempt to resolve this case prior to indictment and thereby avoid a trial.
4. Counsel for the United States also represented that this continuance is necessary to prevent any more non-excludable days under § 3161(h) from expiring.
5. The defendant knows that he has the right under § 3161(b) to have this matter submitted to a grand jury within thirty days after his arrest.
6. The defendant, through counsel, has consented to this continuance.
7. FOR GOOD CAUSE, THIS COURT FINDS that this case should be continued for the following reasons:
a. The charge in this case results from a lengthy investigation. Despite the exercise of diligence, therefore, the circumstances of this case require giving defense counsel a reasonable amount of additional time for effective preparation.
b. In addition, plea negotiations may soon commence, which would render grand jury proceedings and a trial in this matter unnecessary.
c. Consequently, the ends of justice served by granting the continuance and preventing any further non-excludable days from passing under § 3161(h) outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
IT IS, therefore:
ORDERED that this action is continued for a period of 60 days from February 21, 2024, through April 21, 2024; and it is further
ORDERED that the period from February 21, 2024, through April 21, 2024, shall be excluded in computing time under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974; and it is further ORDERED that nothing in this Order or the application prompting it is a finding or representation that less than 31 non-excludable days under § 3161(h) have expired.