United States v. Pastor

67 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Barron

    594 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1979)   Cited 14 times
    In Barron, we relied upon the reasoning of other circuit opinions holding to the same effect, especially United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977).

    See United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 172, 58 L.Ed.2d 165 (1978); United States v. Boney, 572 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 733, 54 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978). In United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit determined that the delegation in § 811 was in accordance with the clear statement of the congressional policy governed by precise standards consistent with the statement of policy in requiring specific findings as to the qualities and dangers of the substance as a condition precedent to regulation. 557 F.2d at 941.

  2. U.S. v. Fontanez

    878 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1989)   Cited 65 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding it impermissible to proceed in a single-defendant case where court was informed that defendant's absence because of police detention would likely be brief

    It has long been settled that an accused enjoys a right both at common law and pursuant to the sixth amendment's confrontation clause to be present at all stages of trial. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 373, 13 S.Ct. 136, 137, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 448, 12 S.Ct. 525, 527, 36 L.Ed. 218 (1892); United States v. Hernandez, 873 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1977). It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence."

  3. United States v. Yannai

    791 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2015)   Cited 26 times
    Defining preponderance standard as "more likely than not"

    “A defendant who deliberately fails to appear in court does so voluntarily,” and “his absence can be considered a ‘knowing’ waiver.” United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir.) (“Tortora”), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 554, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972) ; see, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 248–50 (2d Cir.) (“Sanchez”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986) ; United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 933–34 (2d Cir.1977) (“Pastor” ). Waiver of a constitutional right, however, is not to be presumed; indeed, “[t]here is a presumption against” such a waiver. Brookhart

  4. United States v. Sanchez

    790 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1986)   Cited 126 times
    Holding that the acknowledgment by defendant's trial counsel that there is no evidence of the defendant's whereabouts adequately supported the district court's conclusion that the defendant "willfully absented himself without a reason"

    We cannot say that the district judge's finding that Sanchez was aware of the setting of his trial date was clearly erroneous. Cf. United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying clearly erroneous standard to factual findings concerning defendant's absence from trial).

  5. U.S. v. Hovey

    674 F. Supp. 161 (D. Del. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    In United States v. Hovey, 674 F. Supp. 161 (D.Del. 1987), the court canvassed circuit court cases addressing the constitutionality of the § 811(a) delegation.

    Thus, judicial analysis of the validity of delegations from Congress to the executive branch turns on the ability of courts to monitor compliance with congressionally determined policy. See, e.g., U.S. v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 876, 103 S.Ct. 168, 74 L.Ed.2d 139 (1982); U.S. v. Barron, 594 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951, 99 S.Ct. 2180, 60 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1979); U.S. v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051, 99 S.Ct. 731, 58 L.Ed.2d 711 (1978); U.S. v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857, 99 S.Ct. 172, 58 L.Ed.2d 165 (1978); U.S. v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 733, 54 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978); U.S. v. Piatti, 416 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).U.S. v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 941 (2d Cir. 1977).

  6. U.S. v. Latham

    874 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1989)   Cited 63 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "an inference of intent to distribute [was] not warranted from the possession of one ounce of cocaine"

    We have followed this teaching. See United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 967 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is well-settled that a defendant is entitled to be present at his trial but that this right may be waived by voluntary and deliberate absence from the trial without good cause."); United States v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600, 603 (1st Cir.) (because "the [district] court's finding that [the defendant's] absence was voluntary was well supported, [t]he trial could properly continue despite his absence"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 956, 93 S.Ct. 300, 34 L.Ed.2d 225 (1972); accord Dasher v. Stripling, 685 F.2d 385, 387 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1977); Cureton v. United States, 396 F.2d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In addition, Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b) permits a district court to proceed with the trial if a defendant who is initially present voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced.

  7. U.S. v. Hernandez

    873 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1989)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that where absentee defendant offers a seemingly valid excuse, the trial court must inquire into the circumstances of his absence to determine whether he has knowingly and voluntarily absented himself

    A defendant's right to be present at his own trial has been codified in Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that a defendant be present at critical steps in the criminal proceedings against him "including the impaneling of the jury." See United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C.Cir. 1987); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2958, 53 L.Ed.2d 1083, 434 U.S. 853, 98 S.Ct. 170, 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1977); Crutcher, 405 F.2d at 242. The right to be present at one's trial is, however, subject to waiver.

  8. U.S. v. Londono

    659 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)   Cited 1 times

    The government now moves to try Sanchez and the sisters Carvajal in absentia. A defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his sixth amendment right to be present at his trial, United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986), by voluntarily and deliberately absenting himself from the trial without good cause, United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1977). "It must clearly appear in the record . . . that the defendant was advised when proceedings were to commence and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and without justification failed to be present at the designated time and place before the trial may proceed in his absence."

  9. U.S. v. Widdowson

    916 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1990)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    United States v. Barron, 594 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951, 99 S.Ct. 2180, 60 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1979). In Barron, we relied upon the reasoning of other circuit opinions holding to the same effect, especially United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977). Pastor is the first and leading circuit court case to consider the constitutionality of Congress' delegation to the Attorney General of the power to make permanent scheduling decisions; it analyzed the issue extensively.

  10. U.S. v. Mackey

    915 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding reversible error where the trial court continued the trial when the defendant's absence was not clearly voluntary

    As Jackson correctly points out, "an accused enjoys a right both at common law and pursuant to the sixth amendment's confrontation clause to be present at all stages of trial." United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 373, 13 S.Ct. 136, 137, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 448, 12 S.Ct. 525, 527, 36 L.Ed. 218 (1892); United States v. Hernandez, 873 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1989); and United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1977)). Moreover, the defendant's right to be present at trial also is implicated by the fair trial concerns of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, "`to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.'"