"This is one of the cases growing out of the grant made by the United States Government to the New Orleans Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company being the assignee of the grant. The history of the grant and its terms, the contests thereof before the Land Department, and its confirmation by the act of 1887 are all fully set forth and examined by Justice Van Devanter in United States v. New Orleans Pacific Railway Company, 248 U.S. 507, 39 S. Ct. 175, at pages 176 and 177, 63 L. Ed. 388. "Suffice it to say at the present time that under the terms of the confirmation of the grant by Act of Congress of February 8, 1887, c. 120, 24 Stat. 391:

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge. This is a suit like that of United States v. New Orleans Pacific Railway Company, 248 U.S. 507, 39 S. Ct. 175, 63 L. Ed. 388. It was brought by the United States in the interest of one Annie Jason, an actual settler on public lands in Louisiana, to secure to her the benefit of the Federal Act of February 8, 1887, and to enforce in her behalf the provisions of the agreement of August 3, 1892, between the United States and the trustees of the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company. Section 2 of the act provided: "That all said lands occupied by actual settlers at the date of the definite location of said road and still remaining in their possession or in the possession of their heirs or assigns shall be held and deemed excepted from said grant and shall be subject to entry under the public land laws of the United States."

The foregoing authorities definitely establish that the running of the period prescribed in the act of March 3, 1891, supra, has no other effect than to make the title in the patentee good as against the grantor — the United States. That the expiration of said statutory period within which the federal government might proceed to annul a patent does not preclude a person other than the patentee from asserting and enforcing an interest adverse to that of the patentee was decided in the case of United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507 [63 L.Ed. 388, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175]. That action was instituted by the United States for and on behalf of certain homestead claimants, who were permitted to intervene.

The supreme court of the United States has construed with strictness the five-year limitation upon the power of the government to bring suit to annul a patent. ( United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. et al., 248 U.S. 507, [63 L.Ed. 388, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175].) The rule is thus stated in UnitedStates v. St. Paul M. M. Ry. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 313, [62 L. Ed. 1130, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525, 526]: "Laying aside other questions raised by the government, we have reached the conclusion that, having regard to the general principle which requires a strict construction to be given to legislation in derogation of the public right, and in view of the legislative history of this particular enactment, the proviso must be given the effect of a curative measure confined to lands theretofore patented, and not granting dispensation for frauds or mistakes thereafter occurring.

At common law, the word "unenforceability" had a meaning that encompassed laches. See, e.g.,United States v. New Orleans Pacific R. Co., 248 U.S. 507, 511, 39 S.Ct. 175, 63 L.Ed. 388 (1919) (considering whether an agreement "had become unenforceable by reason of inexcusable laches"). We often read statutes as incorporating common-law meanings.

The United States may not avoid the bar of limitations by suing to impress the lands with a constructive trust. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 209 U.S. 447, 450; United States v. Winona St. P.R. Co., 165 U.S. 463; Elemendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152; Lockhart v. Leeds, 195 U.S. 427; United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507. In so far as the State is concerned the lands were not obtained as a result of a material misrepresentation of the known facts as to the character of the lands.

And we think it plain that the present suit, founded on equitable grounds, to compel a conveyance of title derived from a certification by the government is not a suit to cancel the certification. See United States v. New Orleans Pacific Ry., 248 U.S. 507, 510, 518. We hold that the acquisition of the title of the lands by the Land Company as set out in the bill was in violation of equitable principles and of the decree enjoining the defendants in the first suit "from setting up or making any claim to the premises," and that a proper case was stated for the imposition on both petitioners of a constructive trust with respect to the lands acquired by them.

Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88; United States v. Osage County, 251 U.S. 128. It is enough if there be an interest or concern arising out of an obligation to those for whose benefit the suits are brought. United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507; Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78; Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219. Since the United States was not a party to the previous suits brought by the Pueblo of Laguna, it can not be bound thereby, especially since the right which it seeks to vindicate is entirely distinct from the property rights of the Pueblo, the subject matter of the previous suits.

Whether in point of merits the bill is well grounded or otherwise, we think it shows that the United States has a real and direct interest in the matter presented for examination and adjudication. Its interest arises out of its guardianship over the Indians and out of its right to invoke the aid of a court of equity in removing unlawful obstacles to the fulfillment of its obligations; and in both aspects the interest is one which is vested in it as a sovereign. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437-444; United States v. Osage County, 251 U.S. 128, 132-133; La Motte v. United States, 254 U.S. 570, 575; Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 232; United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342-343; United States v. New Orleans Pacific Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507, 518. And see United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga St. Louis Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 126; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584.

The bill presents a controversy within the original jurisdiction of this Court. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 591; Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413; United States v. New Orleans R.R., 248 U.S. 507; Missouri v. Illinois, etc., 180 U.S. 208; Kansas v. Colorado 185 U.S. 125; 206 U.S. 46; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230; United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432; Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264. The suit is not against the United States. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; United States v. Lee, 160 U.S. 196; Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U.S. 100; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605. The bill sets forth a cause of action against all of the defendants.