See United States v. Whirlwind Soldier , 499 F.3d 862, 871 (8th Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Mshihiri , 816 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2016). Relevant factors include the nature of their activities, the location and time frame, and the participants.

Given Schropp's conviction by a jury, we recount the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See United States v. Mshihiri , 816 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2016). Schropp and his uncle co-owned PK Manufacturing Corporation (PKM).

However, once a party makes a proper objection to a magistrate's finding, including a credibility finding, the district court must make a de novo determination of that finding."). Neither United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 319 (2016), nor United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476 (8th Cir. 2011), which the government cited to support the proposition that "[i]t is well settled that a reviewing court affords great deference to the credibility determinations of the court that actually conducted the evidentiary hearing and observed the witnesses testify—rendering those credibility assessments virtually unassailable on review," compels deference to a magistrate judge's credibility assessment in the context of a district court's review of a recommended disposition of a defendant's motion to suppress. In each case, a magistrate judge recommended that a defendant's motion to suppress be denied, the defendant objected, a district court conducted a de novo review, and the court of appeals deferred to the credibility determination reached by the district court.

"A statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant's will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination." United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 319 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The government bears the burden of persuasion and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of the challenged statements."

In fact, whether Just was arrested or detained is not a factual dispute capable of defeating summary judgment; instead, it is a legal question within the province of the judge, not the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir. 2016) (reviewing de novo the district court's determination of whether the defendant was in police custody while reviewing all fact findings for clear error). Therefore, because the Officers could defeat Just's Fourth Amendment claim by showing that they had probable cause (or arguable probable cause), see Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith, 925 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim is defeated where the arresting officer had probable cause), the question before us—a legal question, which we have the ability to resolve, see Odom v. Kaizer, 864 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2017) ("Whether probable cause existed is a legal question ...." (citation omitted))—is whether such probable cause existed.

Because he provides no basis in law or fact for his cursory assertions of error, we cannot consider the merits of these claims. See United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997, 1009 n.5 (8th Cir. 2016) ; see also United States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275, 278 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) ("At no point does [Welch] cite authority, cite to the record, or provide reasoning in support of this argument."); United States v. Warren, 788 F.3d 805, 814–15 (8th Cir. 2015) ("Since Warren has failed to go beyond a cursory assertion of this argument in his opening brief and made no mention of it in his reply brief or at oral argument, we refuse to consider the merits of the issue."). We affirm the district court's judgment.

Miranda requires that officers provide warnings "before conducting an interrogation of a suspect who is in custody." United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997, 1003–04 (8th Cir. 2016). An officer's "failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained."

Without more, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in determining the testimony was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See United States v. Guzman, 926 F.3d 991, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019) (standard of review); see also United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997, 1009 n.5 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a party waived an argument by failing to "meaningfully" argue it); United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1026 n.3 (8th Cir. 2015) (declining to consider an argument where the defendants "mention[ed] other pieces of evidence that they say should have been excluded, but . . . fail[ed] to take the necessary step of explaining why this evidence was inadmissible"). --------

A district court’s determination that a person was not in custody for purposes of Miranda is reviewed de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). "To determine whether a suspect was in custody, we ask ‘whether, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave or cause the agents to leave.’ "

This is an interesting, thought-provoking argument, but it does not carry the day, for ultimately a district court's evaluation of a witness's emotional state, whether expressed by words, physical conduct, or demeanor, should be given the same deference that we give to its determinations of a witness's credibility. See United States v. Mshihiri, 816 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating in the context of a suppression motion that "[t]he district court . . . has a distinct advantage in evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and its credibility determinations are virtually unreviewable on appeal") (quoting United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is not to say, of course, that all judges, trial and appellate alike, should not strive to set aside preconceptions, unwarranted assumptions, and the like in performing their respective roles.