Opinion
CR-21-190-D
11-03-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. EDDIE WAYNE MORRISION, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUZANNE MITCHELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
On November 2, 2022, the undersigned conducted a competency hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) regarding Defendant Eddie Wayne Morrison (“Defendant”). As set forth fully below, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that a preponderance of the evidence establishes Defendant is competent to the “extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e).
I. Pertinent factual background.
The grand jury indicted Defendant with one count of making a false statement to a firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). Doc. 1. The Court arraigned Defendant on August 12, 2021 and appointed counsel. Docs. 4, 5. At his August 16, 2021 detention hearing, the Court sua sponte moved under § 4241(a) to require Defendant to undergo a competency evaluation. Defendant moved to stay the order so that Defendant could undergo evaluation by a locally licensed practitioner. The government did not object and the Court ordered Defendant to remain in custody pending that psychological evaluation. Doc. 12.
At the September 14, 2021 competency hearing, the Court ordered Defendant be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment. Doc. 20. The Court found Defendant was not capable of understanding the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his own defense and that Defendant was not competent to stand trial. Id. The Court then continued the detention hearing and all other proceedings, struck the case from the October 2021 trial docket, and found that any periods of delay resulting from these proceedings are excluded from time computations under the Speedy Trial Act. Doc. 21.
Defendant waited nearly eight months to be hospitalized in a Bureau of Prisons Medical Center. The Court denied Defendant's motions to vacate, given evidence of the protracted wait time for admission for an appropriate facility. Docs. 27, 32.
Sarah Hampton, Ph.D. prepared a Forensic Psychological Report that was filed on October 28, 2022. Doc. 34. Her report opined that Defendant is competent to proceed. She stated that although “he is diagnosed with Intellectual Disability, any deficits in cognitive functioning he experiences are unlikely to notably improve or worsen.” Id. at 12. A Certificate of Competency signed by J.E. Krueger, Warden of the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, accompanied the report. See Doc. 34; 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e).
II. Jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 636.
The Tenth Circuit has not expressly addressed the authority of a magistrate judge to issue competency decisions with or without a referral order. See, e.g., United States v. Archuleta, 218 Fed.Appx. 754, 755 (10th Cir. 2007) (Explaining, without commenting on the magistrate judge's authority to do so, that “[a] magistrate judge held a competency hearing in March 2006 and determined that Archuleta was not competent to stand trial and ordered that he be remanded to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for restoration of competency”); United States v. Morrison, 415 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir .2005) (“On appeal Defendant raises two issues. His first ground for reversal, which was not raised below, is that the district court was required to exercise de novo review of the magistrate judge's order [requiring forced medication of the defendant] on the facts as well as the law. Defendant may well be correct. There is authority for the proposition.”). The practice in this Court and many others is for magistrate judges to conduct competency hearings and make their determinations by Order rather than Report and Recommendation. E.g., United States v. Bertschy, No. 20-296-J, Doc. 40; United States v. Waner, No. 20-116-P, Doc. 28; United States v. Redbird, No. 19-347-F, Doc. 32. But this Court has also found that magistrate judges lack such authority. United States v. Benford, No. M-98-21-H, Order (W.D. Okla. May 20, 1998) (“There is no authority under [28 U.S.C. § 636], the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Local Court Rules for a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a competency hearing under [18 U.S.C. § 4241 et. Seq.] without having been designated to do so by an Article III Judge or otherwise assigned.”).
The undersigned has elected to proceed with a Report and Recommendation, “to fully preserve the prerogative” of the reviewing district judge, “and to provide adversely affected parties with equal opportunity for review.” United States v. Murray, 2008 WL 3287036, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2008); see also United States v. Madison, 2018 WL 6818925, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2018); United States v. Moreno, 2013 WL 6019269, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 13, 2013) (“The court will issue a Report of Findings and Recommendation rather than an order because the scope of a magistrate judge's authority on the issues before the court is unclear.”).
Other courts that have squarely addressed the issue have reached discrepant results. Compare United States v. Vietor, 2017 WL 9401118, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017) (handling via Report and Recommendation because “my own research indicated that the authority of a magistrate judge to issue competency decisions with or without a referral order has not been addressed by the Second Circuit”), adopted, 2018 WL 2247214 (W.D.N.Y. May 16, 2018), with United States v. Ellis, No. 2:14-CR-33, 2020 WL 5363315, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 8, 2020) (“And to the extent that a magistrate judge's authority is limited by Article III, I concur with the analysis of the court in United States v. Prado, No. 18-CR-192, 2019 WL 1320316, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2019), which found that although the competency decision affects fundamental rights, it is akin to allowing a magistrate judge to decide whether a defendant may waive conflict-free representation, or waive counsel and represent himself at trial, which are duties magistrate judges routinely handle.”). This discrepancy persists across circuits. See also United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Weissberger contends, and we agree, that the Magistrate Judge exceeded her authority in ordering the competency evaluation without first receiving a request to do so from a District Judge as required by Local Rule 501.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Hemmings, 1991 WL 79586, at *4 (D.D.C. May 2, 1991) (“Since a Magistrate Judge is generally the only judicial officer who exercises jurisdiction over a criminal defendant between the time of arrest and the time of indictment, the contention that such a [competency] ruling is beyond the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge appears contrary to the intent of [Rules 5 and 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]”); United States v. Rayyan, 2016 WL 1746013, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 3, 2016) (“Although the Sixth Circuit has recognized the authority of a magistrate judge to order a competency examination, . . . the general practice in the Sixth Circuit is for district courts to refer the issue of whether to grant a competency examination to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation only.”) (collecting cases); United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that an order authorizing involuntary medication for purposes of rendering defendant competent to stand trial “is dispositive of a claim or defense of a party, and therefore . . . it is not among the pretrial matters that can be fully delegated to the magistrate judge under [28 U.S.C.] § 636(b)(1)(A).”); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C) (providing for referral and de novo review of matters outside the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge, including evidentiary hearings in felony criminal proceedings).
III. The undersigned recommends Defendant be found competent to stand trial.
At the November 2, 2022 competency hearing Defendant appeared with counsel, Kyle Wackenheim, and Assistant United States Attorney David Nichols appeared on behalf of the United States. Defendant, through Counsel, did not contest that the conclusion of Dr. Hampton's report is correct and that Defendant is competent. Counsel did reiterate his frustration about the protracted delays in getting his client into a Federal Medical Facility, and the Court acknowledged those delays and its previous orders about those delays. The Government deferred to Dr. Hampton's report. Neither party offered any additional evidence.
After careful consideration of the record, statements of counsel, and relevant legal authority, the undersigned recommends that the Court finds a preponderance of evidence establishes Defendant is competent to the “extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e).
IV. Recommendation.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court find Defendant Morrison competent to stand trial. At the hearing, Defendant, through counsel, waived his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2).