Opinion
CR 117-039
05-04-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JASON WAYNE MORRIS
ORDER
Before the Court in the captioned case is Defendant Jason Wayne Morris's motion to apply First Step Act time credits to his five-year term of supervised release. Morris explains that he is to be released to a halfway house program in June 2023, and his release date is set for January 31, 2024. Morris does not take issue with either of these dates. Instead, Morris is concerned that he has earned 500 days' worth of First Step Act credits, which he wishes to apply to shorten his term of supervised release.
Morris does not appear to dispute the computation of his time credits.
The First Step Act of 2018 ["FSA"] implemented a "risk and needs assessment system," which allows prisoners within the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to participate in certain "evidence-based recidivism reduction programming and productive activities." See 18 U.S.C. § 3632. Participation in this programming provides certain incentives to include earning time credits that "shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release. The Director of the [BOP] shall transfer eligible prisoners, as determined under [18 U.S.C. §] 3624(g), into prerelease custody or supervised release." 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C). Section 3624(g)(3) provides: "If the sentencing court included as a part of the prisoner's sentence a requirement that the prisoner be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment . . ., [the BOP] may transfer the prisoner to begin any such term of supervised release at an earlier date, not to exceed 12 months, based on the application of time credits under section 3632." 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (g)(3); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.44 (d)(3) ("The application of FSA Time Credits would result in transfer to supervised release no earlier than 12 months before the date that the transfer to supervised release would otherwise have occurred.")
This provision does not provide a mechanism for the district court to shorten the length of supervised release, however. That is, "[b]ased on the plain text of the statute [§ 3624], FSA credits cannot be used to shorten a term of supervised release. Rather, the credits can only be used to allow early transfer to supervised release." Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2022 WL 17093441, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022); see also United States v. Calabrese, 2023 WL 1969753, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2023) ("Plainly, the FSA allows a prisoner to either complete the service of their sentence in prerelease custody or complete their term of supervised release at an earlier date by transferring the prisoner to supervised release at an earlier date - the FSA does not allow a prisoner to reduce the imposed length of supervised release."); Pillow v. Bureau of Prisons, 2022 WL 13892877, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2022) ("Once [petitioner] begins serving his supervised release, he is no longer in BOP custody, and the Court can no longer grant relief" on a claim for application of FSA earned time credits.); Puccio v. Ortiz, 2022 WL 44668599, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2022) ("[T]he Court can no longer grant Petitioner's request for FSA time credits, as such 'credits affect the timing of an inmate's conditional release from prison, but they do not alter the sentence itself.'" (quoted source omitted)).
Thus, to the extent that Morris seeks an order from this Court shortening the length of his five-year supervised release term based on FSA time credits, the Court has no authority to do so. Instead, Morris's complaint and relief lie with the Bureau of Prisons, which has the discretion to apply his FSA time credits to release Morris to start his three-year term of supervised term earlier than expected.
In short, this Court cannot change a sentence, to include the term of supervised release, once it has been imposed except under very limited circumstances not present here. Implementation and application of the First Step Act time credits rest within the discretion of the BOP. Morris must bring any challenge thereto in a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of his confinement, the District of South Carolina, after exhausting his administrative remedies.
Upon the foregoing, the Court is without authority to grant the requested relief. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Morris's motion to apply time credits (doc. no. 75) and . the Government's motion to dismiss (doc. no. 76).