Sanders claims that there is an incongruity in our case law between a more formalistic approach that would require the district court to respond directly to the nonfrivolous argument and a more functional approach that focuses on the overall sentencing record to determine whether the district court considered the nonfrivolous argument. Sanders points to an unpublished case, United States v. Moore, 654 Fed.Appx. 705 (6th Cir. 2016), for this proposition. There are a few responses to this argument.
A court’s "consideration of the argument and its reasons for rejecting the same need not, however, always be explicit or specific; the record might be sufficient for us to extract this information implicitly and contextually." United States v. Moore , 654 F. App'x 705, 711 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Taylor , 696 F.3d 628, 635 (6th Cir. 2012) ); United States v. Chiolo , 643 F.3d 177, 184 (6th Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Petrus , 588 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2009) ). The record here reflects that the district court considered Richardson’s arguments before reinstating his sentence.
Gall , 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 ; United States v. Nichols , 897 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2018). The sentence should reflect the § 3553(a) factors, United States v. Gahan , 678 F. App'x 275, 279 (6th Cir. 2017), but the district court’s reasoning does not need to address every single concern; instead, the record may sufficiently imply the considerations, United States v. Moore , 654 F. App'x 705, 711 (6th Cir. 2016). We may presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable.
And in the context of a resentencing, the record must reflect both "(1) that the district court considered a defendant’s nonfrivolous argument for a particular sentence, and (2) why that argument was rejected." United States v. Moore , 654 F. App'x 705, 710–11 (6th Cir. 2016). That is not to say that the district court must state with particularity the grounds for rejecting each argument.
We have held that a defendant waived his right to challenge a calculation or enhancement under the Guidelines because he had "explicitly agreed" to its applicability on four different occassions. See Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d at 1086 (finding that a defendant's admission in his sentencing memorandum that his prior convictions qualified as aggravated felonies precluded him from challenging such a designation on appeal); Priddy, 808 F.3d at 682 (relying on Aparco-Centeno to hold that a defendant waived his ability to challenge his designation as an Armed Career Criminal when his sentencing memorandum and his lawyer's statements in court reiterated that the designation applied); United States v. McBride, 826 F.3d 293, 295 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that statements in a defendant's plea agreement, sentencing memorandum, and during his sentencing hearing, which reflected his agreement with his career-offender designation, constituted waiver of a challenge to that designation on appeal); United States v. Moore, 654 F. App'x 705, 709 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding explicit agreement to a statutory enhancement because a defendant had acknowledged he was subject to the enhancement in his plea agreement and during his change-of-plea hearing). In this case, Tran explicitly agreed to the applicability of § 2S1.3(b)(1) in his plea agreement.
This timely appeal followed.United States v. Moore, 654 F. App'x 705, 706-08 (6th Cir. 2016). On June 29, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Judgment of this Court.