Opinion
No.CR11-0709-DLJ
11-14-2011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOSHUA MOORE AND CALA REMICK, Defendants.
MELINDA HAAG (CABN 132612) United States Attorney MIRANDA KANE (CABN 150630) Chief, Criminal Division THOMAS M. O'CONNELL (NYSBN 1801950) Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff
MELINDA HAAG (CABN 132612)
United States Attorney
MIRANDA KANE (CABN 150630)
Chief, Criminal Division
THOMAS M. O'CONNELL (NYSBN 1801950)
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME
SAN JOSE VENUE
On October 25, 2011, parties appeared before the court for the first Status Hearing in this matter. At that time the court continued the case until November 15, 2011 so that the discovery process could be commenced and counsel would have sufficient time to review the materials and confer with their clients. However, the court will be unavailable, in trial, on November 15. Moreover, discovery is still not complete and other non-severed co-defendants have yet to be joined, inasmuch as they have been in the process being writted, with due diligence, from state facilities and have yet to appear before the District Court. The parties therefore hereby stipulate and agree to continue the matter until November 29, 2011, and to exclusions of time under the Speedy Trial Act, and that said exclusions of time are appropriate based on the defendant's need for effective preparation of counsel.
SO STIPULATED:
MELINDA HAAG
United States Attorney
THOMAS M. O'CONNELL
Assistant United States Attorney
VICKI YOUNG
Counsel for Remick
THOMAS FERRITO
Counsel for Moore
Accordingly, for good cause shown, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the matter is continued until November 29, 2011. The Court further finds that based on the defendant's need for effective preparation of counsel, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The failure to grant the requested continuance would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(3)(A), (6) and (7)(B)(iv).
SO ORDERED.
D. LOWELL JENSEN
United States District Judge