Opinion
No. 19-2915-cr
09-10-2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. SAMUEL T. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
For Appellee: Emily C. Powers, Assistant United States Attorney, for Grant C. Jaquith, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY. For Defendant-Appellant: James P. Egan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Syracuse, NY.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of September, two thousand twenty. Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. For Appellee: Emily C. Powers, Assistant United States Attorney, for Grant C. Jaquith, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY. For Defendant-Appellant: James P. Egan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Syracuse, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-appellant Samuel T. Moore appeals from a judgment entered on August 27, 2019 by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.). Moore pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and the district court sentenced him to 43 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal, Moore argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
Beginning with his procedural challenge, Moore argues that the district court failed to consider "the nature and circumstances of [his] offense," as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Specifically, Moore contends that his "particular offense was at or very near the low end of the culpability spectrum within 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)." Appellant's Br. 9. Moore asserts that he did not "claim any possessory right or interest in the firearm or plan to use it in a separate crime," id. at 10, and that he "took temporary possession of the firearm for the sole purpose of removing it from the reach of small children," id. at 11. Because the district court overlooked "the benign nature of [his] possession," Moore argues, his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. Id.
Moore failed to raise his procedural challenge before the district court, and we therefore review it for plain error. See United States v. Degroate, 940 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2019). We conclude that the district court did not err, let alone plainly so. Although we have explained that "[a] district court commits procedural error where it . . . fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors," United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 38 (2d Cir. 2012), we have also explained that a district court is not required to "engage in the utterance of robotic incantations when imposing sentences," United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2020), or to "discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually," United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, "this Court presumes that the sentencing judge has considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise." Id. at 118.
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. --------
In the instant case, nothing in the record suggests that the district court failed to consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors. Although the district court did not discuss Moore's contention regarding the culpability of his offense conduct, it was not required to address each of Moore's arguments explicitly. See id. at 119. Moreover, the district court stated that it had reviewed the § 3553(a) factors, and it discussed multiple issues that bore on those factors, including Moore's criminal history, his psychiatric and substance abuse issues, and his noncompliance with the terms of his pretrial release. This was adequate to comply with the district court's duties, particularly given the "straightforward, conceptually simple arguments" presented by the parties. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Moving to his substantive challenge, Moore argues that his sentence was unreasonable because of the benign nature of his offense conduct and because his Guidelines range already accounted for the criminal history and noncompliance issues highlighted by the district court. In reviewing Moore's challenge, "we consider the totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district courts." Smith, 949 F.3d at 66. "We reverse for substantive unreasonableness only when the trial court's sentence cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions." Id.
Here, the district court's sentence does not warrant reversal. Although Moore's 43-month sentence was toward the high end of his 37- to 46-month Guidelines range, and although the government did not oppose a sentence at the low end of that range, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. As the district court noted, Moore had an extensive criminal history at the time of his offense, which itself was committed while Moore was on parole. In addition, while Moore was awaiting sentencing in the instant case, he was arrested and charged in connection with a separate incident during which he allegedly beat his girlfriend's cousin with a metal pipe and left the victim lying semi-conscious in the middle of a highway. Even if Moore's offense conduct was relatively benign, and even if some aspects of Moore's infractions were accounted for in his Guidelines range, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Moore's history of violence and noncompliance merited a sentence toward the high end of that range.
We have considered Moore's remaining arguments on appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk