Opinion
CR-12-0459 EMC
03-01-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ANDREA C. MOHR, Defendant.
MELINDA HAAG (CABN 132612) United States Attorney MIRANDA KANE (CABN 150630) Chief, Criminal Division THOMAS E. STEVENS (CABN 168362) Assistant United States Attorney Attorney for the United States
MELINDA HAAG (CABN 132612)
United States Attorney
MIRANDA KANE (CABN 150630)
Chief, Criminal Division
THOMAS E. STEVENS (CABN 168362)
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorney for the United States
STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED]
ORDER EXCLUDING TIME
UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
WHEREAS, the above-captioned matter came before the Court on February 27, 2013, for status conference. The United States was represented by AUSA Tom Stevens, and defendant Mohr, who was not present (due to a death in her family), was represented by Marc Axelbaum. The Court set the case for a further status conference on March 20, 2013.
WHEREAS, during the previous status conference on January 16, 2013, the Court, on the record and as reflected in the minute order, excluded time from that date through and including February 27, 2013, for continuity of counsel and counsel's effective preparation (because Mr. Axelbaum had recently substituted into the case).
WHEREAS, counsel for Mohr requested the continuance to the March 20 date, after noting that he had been diligently reviewing discovery, working through technical issues respecting the electronic discovery, and needed more time to complete his discovery review and discuss the case with his client.
NOW THEREFOR, based upon the need for Mohr's counsel effectively to prepare, the parties seek a further exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act, through and including March 20, 2013.
SO STIPULATED.
MELINDA HAAG
United States Attorney
________________________
Thomas E. Stevens
Assistant United States Attorney
________________________
Marc Axelbaum
Counsel to Andrea Mohr
[PROPOSED] ORDER
Based upon the above stipulation, the Court finds that the time from and including February 27, 2013, to and including March 20, 2013, should be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), because the ends ofjustice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial. The findings are based upon the need for the defendant to have reasonable time necessary for effective preparation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv), taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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EDWARD M. CHEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE